



RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3030 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

28 March 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Refocused Terms of Reference – Defense Science Board Task Force on 21st Century Industrial Base for National Defense

As potential threats have evolved, the Department of Defense (DoD) needs a strategy to improve the defense industrial base resilience and to protect its supply chains for the development of current and future defense systems and technology. For some defense supply chains, critically important materials and components come from foreign sources, and the DoD needs options for reducing supply chain risk due to threat disruption. The DoD also needs to develop options for increasing the scale and resilience of its industrial base to address the needs for rapid mobilization and potential extended conflict.

On October 30, 2019, the Task Force on 21st Century Industrial Base for National Defense (“the Task Force”) was established as a subcommittee of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The Task Force met May 2020 through January 2021 prior to the Secretary of Defense’s Zero-Based Review (ZBR) and was paused during the ZBR. This Terms of Reference (ToR) refocuses the Task Force from the original ToR to reflect the evolution in the industrial base environment since January 2021. The refocused ToR mirrors both the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) industrial base current areas of interest.

The DSB, working through the Task Force, should review the state of the defense industrial base and provide recommendations to improve our capabilities, capacity, and resilience and diminish our vulnerabilities and susceptibility to adversary actions. The refocused Task Force should consider, at minimum:

- Finding approaches for effective adaption of commercial technology and non-traditional suppliers to defense industrial needs;
- Developing ways to increase the resilience and capacity in the defense industrial base and associated supply chains to sustain both legacy capabilities for surge and mobilization purposes, as well as to anticipate the needs of the industrial base to support future capabilities;
- Assessing means to increase the resilience of the supply chain and the industrial base and reduce the risk of kinetic and non-kinetic attacks by potential adversaries,;
- Identifying opportunities to broaden the defense industrial base and supply chains through collaboration with close allies, including the use of existing regulatory and statutory authorities;

- Identifying opportunities to strengthen the supply chain industrial base associated with the U.S. strategic deterrent, including the nuclear enterprise through the Office of the Secretary of Defense role in the Nuclear Policy Council, and;
- Developing opportunities to drive more innovation into the defense industrial base through technology investments and demonstrations;
- Identifying critical materials unavailable in the US required for defense articles and recommending appropriate additions to the Defense Logistics Agency critical material stocks, and;
- Cataloguing critical machinery imported from overseas and exploring alternatives to these dependencies, to include stockpiling spares in the United States as necessary.

The Task Force findings, observations, and recommendations will be presented to the full DSB for its thorough, open discussion and deliberation at a properly noticed and public meeting, unless it must be closed pursuant to one or more of the exemptions found in subsection 552b(c) of title 5, United States Code (U.S.C.). The DSB will provide its findings and recommendations to USD(R&E) as the Sponsor of the DSB. The nominal start date of the study period for this refocused ToR will be within 30 days of the appointment of Task Force members. In no event will the duration of the Task Force exceed 24 months from the start date.

In support of this ToR and the work conducted in response to it, the DSB and the Task Force have my full support to meet with Department leaders. The DSB staff, on behalf of the DSB and the Task Force, may request the Office of the Secretary of Defense and DoD Component Heads to timely furnish any requested information, assistance, or access to personnel to the DSB or the Task Force. All requests shall be consistent with applicable laws, applicable security classifications, DoD Instruction 5105.04, "Department of Defense Federal Advisory Committee Management Program," and this ToR. As special government employee members of a DoD federal advisory committee, the DSB and the Task Force members will not be given any access to DoD networks, to include DoD email systems.

Once material is provided to the DSB and the Task Force, it becomes a permanent part of the DSB's records. All data/information provided is subject to public inspection unless the originating Component office properly marks the data/information with the appropriate classification and Freedom of Information Act exemption categories before the data/information is released to the DSB and the Task Force. The DSB has physical storage capability and electronic storage and communications capability on both unclassified and classified networks to support receipt of material up to the TS/SCI level.

The DSB and the Task Force will operate in conformity with and pursuant to the DSB charter; chapter 10 of title 5, U.S.C.; subsection 552b(c) of title 5, U.S.C.; and other applicable federal statutes, regulations, and policy. Individual DSB and Task Force members and the Task Force as a whole do not have the authority to make decisions or provide recommendations on behalf of the DSB nor report directly to any Federal representative. The members of the Task Force and the DSB are subject to

certain Federal ethics laws, including section 208 of title 18, U.S.C., governing conflicts of interest, and the Standards of Ethical Conduct regulations in 5 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2635.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Heidi Shyu". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Heidi Shyu