Report

of the

Defense Science Board

CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT TASK FORCE

(Implications of Third World Urban Involvement)

May 1986

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD

6 JUN 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

SUBJECT: Report on the Defense Science Board Task Force on "Conflict Environment" -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

I am pleased to forward the final report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on "Conflict Environment - Implications of Third World Urban Involvement" organized at the request of General John W. Vessey, Jr.

This report,which was chaired by Dr. Davis B. Bobrow, in addition to being briefed to you, has been briefed to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and five Commanders in Chief of our Unified Commands. It tends to be a subject of high interest to the field commanders who face the unappealing possibility of being involved in such tough urban situations, but a subject of far less interest to the Services which are geared more toward larger wars.

I agree with the Task Force that:

1) Avoidance of urban quagmires is the preferred course.

2) Military and political factors and Third World urbanization clash with that preference.

3) Refusal to face up to possible involvements degrades pre-commitment asssessments of risks, requirements and subsequent mission performance. Our current lack of preparedness could catch our National policy makers unaware and leave the Department in the lurch should some of these situations occur.

4) The steps proposed in this report are modest, inexpensive, and should provide the most practical help.

I recommend you read Dr. Bobrow's transmittal letter, review the Executive Summary and the recommendations in Chapter 6 and sign the attached implementing memorandum.

Charles A. Fowler

Charles A. Fowler

Attachments
a/s

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD

16 MAY 1986

Mr. Charles A. Fowler
Chairman, Defense Science Board
The Pentagon, 3D1020
Washington, D. C. 20301-3140

Dear Mr. Fowler:

In response to a request from General Vessey, then CJCS, we examined problems and U. S. capabilities relevant to support for the management and control of large Third World Cities. We were directed to take a generic approach and not to examine any particular city, country, or region. While we recognize that each situation has unique elements, we have found a number of important characteristics that warrant a general set of U.S. policy guidelines and capabilities.

We emphasize that avoiding urban involvements is by far the wisest course. Yet we also recognize that in the contemporary world, and the substantially urbanized Third World, U.S. policy may dictate military operations that cannot avoid cities. Missions may be ordered to support foreign governments, to protect our own lines of logistics and communications, or for other political and military reasons. In all those cases failure to maintain a functioning urban environment will pose grave costs. Absent substantial preparatory steps, U.S. and foreign experience tells us that the risks of such operations will not be properly assessed and operations will encounter serious problems. Even with those steps, it is clear to us that "avoiding disaster" is about the most that can be expected in terms of success.

We find that currently the Department of Defense is itself poorly prepared to cope with such entanglements, or to benefit from the substantial capabilities of other parts of the U.S. Government and the private sector. We also conclude that as currently organized and tasked, relying on crisis-specific, temporary infusions of money and priority will not make much of a difference.

Accordingly, we recommend a set of steps that are modest in financial terms but significant in the allocation of responsibility and infusion of expertise. Particular attention should go to our choice of the Corps of Engineers to serve as a focal point for basic preparedness. It has far more of the needed characteristics than other existing organizations (and we reject as infeasible creating a new organization). It would of course be better to provide each Theatre with its own suite of people and equipment. Resource constraints make that unrealistic. Accordingly, we opt for a central pool identified by the Corps (but not solely within it) that can be "chopped" to the appropriate Military Commander for execution.

Thank you for the opportunity to chair this Task Force. The distinguished membership made a most vigorous and constructive contribution, and I am in their debt. I am also most grateful for your support and that of numerous U.S. and foreign officials who candidly shared their experiences and insights with us.

Sincerely,

Davis B. Bobrow
Chairman, Task Force on
Conflict Environment

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Defense Science Board Conflict Environment Task Force was formed at the request of General John W. Vessey, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1985. It was charged (Appendix A) to examine problems of support for control and management of large urban areas, especially in the Third World, but not issues of military seizure and defense. Relevant situations were defined to have small numbers of U.S. personnel relative to the local population. The problem was to be generic, precluding specific attention to any particular city, region or country. The Task Force did not address any particular city, region or country.

We were posed four questions. What are the control and management implications of existing, albeit possibly damaged, elements of the urban infrastructure--physical, economic and social? What are current DoD capabilities in the areas of intelligence, engineering, civil affairs and psychological operations? How good is the fit between U.S. operational concepts, capabilities and Third World urban realities? What changes are needed in those concepts and capabilities?

The Task Force participants (Appendix B) were chosen to provide substantial operational military command experience, in-depth knowledge of the intelligence community, expertise on civil functions and relevant military specialties, professional understanding of country team operations, and insight into the U.S. Government elements that would have to implement possible recommendations.

The Task Force held extensive discussions with: (a) experts on the functioning of Third World cities; (b) current and former U.S. officials with pertinent responsibilities in the Services, OSD, and other parts of the Government; (c) foreign military officers with recent relevant experience (British, French, and Israeli). Other experience was surveyed through a review of the historical literature (Appendix E) and briefings on the Soviet experience in Kabul, and that of the U.S. Marines in Beirut. Special steps were taken to learn the views, capabilities and plans of the Unified Commands.

History tells us that the most likely situations U.S. forces will face abroad are those we now label (perhaps euphemistically) as low intensity conflicts and used to call "small wars" or "military expeditions short of war." These interventions usually

take place in the Third World, which is substantially urbanized and increasingly so. Avoiding passage through, use of, or presence in Third World cities may amount to avoiding intervention. Interventions often become dependent on the relatively orderly functioning of the relevant urban area and facile use of important parts of it (if only for logistical flow). Much of what will happen in the urban area lies well outside the control of U.S. forces or the U.S. Government. That makes it all the more important to foster realistic anticipation of what is likely to happen in the urban area and contribute to influence at the margin open to the U.S. Those steps must be taken now to be of value; years or even months for situation specific assessment planning are probably not going to be available once a crisis arises.

Our problem submits to no cookbook solution. The cities are too diverse, the circumstances surrounding an intervention too varied, the U.S. objectives too heterogeneous. The mission might be to defeat enemy forces, deny an enemy an urban area, bolster a friendly government, insure the flow of supplies through urban ports to U.S. and friendly forces elsewhere, or safeguard U.S. citizens. Nevertheless, some general assumptions seem well-founded:

- Situations will not be ones of World War II type triumphal occupation/liberation.

- The U.S. will prefer to minimize its role in support for urban control and management and in particular that of the DoD (and within that, of DoD combat assets).

- Any DoD role will be intended to be temporary and transitional.

- Our primary purpose will be minimum distraction from the U.S. military mission and minimum disruption of "normal" civilian life.

- U.S. forces will operate under intense Congressional, media, and public scrutiny.

- There will be little chance of sustained U.S. Government or DoD priority for this type problem.

While each instance will be *sui generis*, we have identified a set of critical factors and the relative positions on them that bode for disaster or promise some manageability (Chapter I, Table 3). Unfortunately, those that have the greatest potential for disaster are the more likely cases for U.S. military involvement. Perhaps that is why the voices of experience--foreign and U.S.--argue for the greatest possible caution and prudence before and during involvement (Chapter 2).

Third World urban realities (Chapter 3) are inherently complex. Local governments have limited functions. Services are chronically overburdened leading to allocation by connections and corruption. All services are provided by mixes of formal, high technology and informal labor intensive systems. There is pervasive interdependence between the city and its hinterland. Large fractions of the population are poor, young, and un- or under-employed. Nevertheless, there is a high degree of social organization, and individual and group adaptiveness. Informal communications and influence networks are as important as mass communications and the formal organizations of the public and private sector. Locals often have had centuries of experience at manipulating foreign intervenors.

Urban complexity demands a sophisticated understanding on the part of U.S. commanders of how the specific city really works and who really determines what gets done. Steps to isolate the city from its surroundings will impose very great support burdens on the U.S. Our commanders will face immediate requirements to provide what are by local standards minimum essential civil services (electricity, water, food, public health). Population tolerance for the U.S. presence surely will be lacking if the U.S. cannot generate mass communications and plug into local information networks of communication and influence. Locals will, however, find a way to cope if allowed to do so and if provided basic resources. U.S. commanders will have to accept that their ways of coping are not necessarily those we would use or prefer. U.S. personnel should assume that locals will know more about what the U.S. is doing than *vice versa*.

While U.S. capabilities (Chapter 4) are potentially very substantial, those in being, ready-to-go are but a hollow facade. As for policy leadership and responsibility, there is none in OSD or OJCS--planning and preparedness for the Task Force problem lack an advocate, leader or gadfly. Civil affairs and psychological operations capabilities in the active forces are of the most token and

low-level nature and those in the reserves are unavailable or unfocused. We see no way in which the present arrangements for these functions can provide an effectiveness multiplier or play a major role in mission assessment, planning or execution. The intelligence community chronically gives low priority to the Third World and to urban area non-physical information in particular. No focal point for support to our problem exists. No systematic use is made of the knowledge available in other parts of DoD, the U.S. Government or the private sector. The possible contribution of technical means requires varying combinations of leadtime and extraordinary priority. One or both of these are often missing in current practice. Without major changes there will be grave and basic intelligence gaps.

Enormous potentially useful capabilities exist in the engineering elements of the Services (the Corps and the Seabees in particular), elsewhere in the U.S. Government (especially the U.S. A.I.D. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and country teams), and in the U.S. private sector (business firms and voluntary organizations). No systematic arrangements exist to benefit quickly from these capabilities to assess in a timely manner the needs, difficulties and feasible measures for support to urban control and management, or to use these capabilities to implement chosen measures.

Historical experience (Chapter 5) repeatedly yields similar basic lessons. It is crucial to have a substantial human intelligence network operating before and during involvement. It is crucial to have or secure cooperation from local elites and police forces on matters pertaining to the calm functioning of the city. The wise intervenor maintains the lowest possible profile both with respect to control and management of the urban area and contact with the local population. The intervenor will be deaf and dumb without language skills at every point of contact, e.g., each patrol. Attention to civil function can be postponed only at a heavy price in terms of errors that haunt subsequent relations and unpreparedness for the end of what will inevitably be at most a short-lived honeymoon. Yet military commanders again and again try to postpone attention to civil considerations. The volume of civil needs is chronically underestimated leading to unexpected burdens on military logistics, engineering and medical elements. An intervening military establishment will find the inevitable tension between its logistics requirements and those for civil support made much worse if it is committed to non-austere logistics. Whatever may be preferred, sustained neutrality on the part of the intervenor is impossible. It will

inevitably be drawn into indigenous conflicts. Some frequently offered solutions are probably illusions. Restricting the intervenor presence to one small part of a city suggests weakness to locals. Announced sanctions, restrictions, and curfews must be enforced to avoid locals perceiving weakness. Yet their enforcement leads to resentment. Even intervenors with advantages the U.S. is unlikely to have cannot eliminate small numbers of hostile cadres. Thus they sooner or later have to face the choices of withdrawal or accepting continuing casualties and sporadic violence.

The severity and timing of these difficulties can be modified partially by a combination of: (a) special training (restraint, initiative, skills); (b) special doctrine (unpredictability, patrol and protection); (c) special equipment (mobile vehicles, communications, low rate of fire weapons); (d) special force composition (heavy on intelligence and engineers); (e) early entry of an urban management team; and (f) timely, usable intelligence disseminated down to patrol leaders. Even if such steps are taken, the burden of evidence suggests that avoiding a political or military disaster should be viewed as the limit of feasible success.

This bleak picture leads us to recommend four sets of actions (Chapter 6). The first package consists of ten "policy commandments" to fill the current guidance vacuum and provide the basis for more detailed doctrine. These principles begin with the desirability of avoiding Third World cities, recognize that reality may well not conform to that desire, and emphasize the historical lessons summarized above.

The second package provides for quick help and improved awareness within six months and for several hundred thousand dollars. This band-aid calls for the Chairman of the JCS to task part of OJCS to: (a) set up two small teams of senior operational experts in urban management that will be available on call; (b) request the major private sector engineering trade groups to form military emergency committees knowledgeable about private sector capabilities to support urban control and management in particular cities; and (d) inform the CINCs about these teams and committees and urge their inclusion in appropriate theater exercises.

The third package suggests institutionally significant but financially modest steps to lay the foundation for long-term mission preparedness. They will take up to two years to put in place and involve an annual cost on the order of $50 million. First they call for the Secretary of Defense designating a responsible element in OUSD

(Policy) to work with the JCS to turn the policy ten commandments in the first package into authoritative guidance, and to arrange for functional cooperation with other elements of the U.S. Government for support to urban control and management. Second, they make the Corps of Engineers the institutional focus for planning and preparedness by direction of the Secretary and the Chairman. The problems we address need to be provided with a clear home. No other DoD element has an equally useful combination of current missions, substantial relevant resources , private sector ties, pertinent non-DoD linkages in the Government, foreign experience, emergency responsiveness, civil functions experience, working relationships with relevant elements across DoD, and senior representation in the unified commands. The charter the Corps needs is spelled out in detail. Particular emphasis goes to: (a) granting a strong hunting license to get other elements of DoD to pre-designate human and material resources; (b) reporting directly to responsible elements in OSD and OJCS, and (c) working closely with the principal engineering officer of the Army component of unified commands. That officer would be the CINC's key agent for unified command requirements and contingencies and implementation of support for urban control and management. Third, the Secretary and the Chairman should jointly request the intelligence community to establish a focal point for support to the Task Force problem.

We conclude with a fourth package of recommendations useful for support to urban control and management but badly needed for other problems involving the Third World (e.g., terrorism, security assistance, combat operations). They should be acted on regardless of views about the feasibility of avoiding Third World cities. The most important steps to be taken by the Secretary and the Chairman involve:

For intelligence, urge higher priority for "how to find out quickly" capabilities on the Third World, pilot information assembly and dissemination efforts (Appendix C) and quick response exercises. Emphasize community participation in DoD planning and training activities from their inception.

For the National Security Council, request action to develop and exercise inter-agency arrangements, raise country team priorities for Mission Disaster Relief Plans (Appendix D), and authorize a CINC participating on every country team.

For personnel resources, task the ASD(RA) to develop an improved system to retrieve reserve personnel by language competence/foreign area experience/civil skill. Direct the Army and Navy to develop more personnel like the Army Foreign Area Specialists. Task the Services to beef up attention to Third World conflicts with urban control and management aspects in the Service academies and command and staff colleges.

For psychological operations, establish a central, high quality psychological operations staff, expert in mass persuasion and shaping elite perceptions. Task the Army to provide the Fourth Psychological Operations Group with modern, mobile, mass communications assets for TV, radio, and use of direct broadcast satellites.

For effective and secure operations in and around Third World cities, encourage the unified commanders, the Army and the Marines to develop and fund requirements for essential types and numbers of equipments (warning sensors, patrol vehicles, hand radios). Task the Navy to be prepared to provide Lion or Cub advanced base packages similar to those used in World War II.

Implementing the many recommendations of this report will require specific actions by a number of Department of Defense Agencies. See Chapter 6 for a complete description of those recommendations and actions.

Chapter 1.

INTRODUCTION AND PREMISES

Introduction

The Conflict Environment Task Force was formed at the request of General John W. Vessey, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was charged to examine problems associated with U.S. support for the control and management of urban areas, especially in the Third World. This set of problems was recognized by the 1984 Defense Science Board Summer Study on Urban Warfare. The broad range of problems addressed by that Study precluded concentrated attention on urban control and management.

The Terms of Reference (Appendix A) emphasized attention to urban control and management in contrast to seizure and military defense. They posited a small number of involved U.S. forces compared to the size of the local population. The presence of the local population was recognized as a key factor. The Task Force was asked to pay particular attention to the control and management import of existing, albeit possibly damaged, elements of the urban system including water sources and distribution, medical facilities and sanitation, transportation facilities and patterns of use, power sources and networks, communications media, food sources and distribution, and cultural and educational institutions. Particular attention was requested to the role of intelligence, and of engineer, civil affairs and psychological operations units and specialists. The relationship between current DoD concepts of operations, U.S. capabilities, and situational requirements was to be addressed. Finally, changes needed were to be identified to the extent it was feasible to do so.

The Task Force was charged to examine and make recommendations pertinent to the generic problem, in all its variety, not to address any particular situation. We addressed no particular urban area, country or region and make no recommendations with respect to any particular urban area, country, or region.

Participants in the Task Force (Appendix B) were selected to provide expertise on the topics central to the Terms of Reference: (1) U.S. military operations in the field; (2) how urban areas function; (3) critical U.S. functions; and (4) the practicalities of implementation in the Department of Defense and elsewhere of possible recommendations.

The Task Force held five two day meetings. On urban realities, we received a tutorial from nine experts on Third World cities. On U.S. concepts and capabilities, we held discussions with individuals with current or previous responsibilities for: intelligence (the DIAC, CIA, NSA,USMC, and OSD Net Assessment); civil affairs (Army staff, TRADOC, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion); psychological operations (OJCS, Army staff, 4th PSYOP Group); engineers (Corps of Engineers, Air Force Engineering and Services, Navy SEABEES); a recently retired CINC; OSD functions (Reserve Affairs, Humanitarian Assistance, International Logistics); country team direction (a career Foreign Service Officer who had served as Ambassador in the Third World); and U.S. capabilities to assist distressed civilian populations (U.S. AID Office of Disaster Relief). To benefit from historical experience, we surveyed available written materials (Appendix E), and received briefings on the Soviet experience in Kabul and from foreign experts on their experience (British, French,

Israeli). Information was solicited from current CINCs and the last wave of DoD sponsored studies (from the Vietnam era) were reviewed.

Is There a Problem?

The U.S. focus on large, high technology wars against a first-rate superpower military adversary does not imply that those are the most likely situations U.S. forces will face abroad. What we now label as low intensity conflicts and used to call "small wars" or "military expeditions short of war" are historically shown to be far more probable. This report does not argue that the DoD should allocate resources in proportion to that likelihood. It does call for substantial attention to and capability for, first, assessing the risks and costs associated with prosecuting such interventions and, second, substantial attention to and preparation for them so long as decisions have not been made to avoid such interventions. They may arise from circumstances as diverse as a call for help from a friendly government faced with external threat or internal turmoil to imminent triumph by revolutionary forces held to pose unacceptable threats to U.S. interests.

The most likely forms of conflict associated with such interventions include terrorism, sabotage, guerrilla war, and civil war. The key military functions associated with such campaigns are less those of fire power than they are security assistance, intelligence, communications, civic action and psychological operations.

The most probable sites for such U.S. involvements are in the Third World, where the reality is one of increasing urbanization--already widespread and accelerated by urban growth rates outpacing those of rural areas. Some illustrative data appear in Table 1. In addition, the Third World is increasingly host to mega-cities--enormous agglomerations of people fueled by in-migration from the countryside in search of economic opportunity (see Table 2).

This combination of circumstances implies that U.S. forces may find themselves dispatched to pursue missions that involve them in passage through or use of or presence in Third World cities. Avoiding such passage or use or presence may amount to avoiding intervention. Undertaking such interventions makes attainment of military objectives often depend on relatively orderly functioning of the relevant urban area and use of important parts of it. The costs of an intervention and possibly its ultimate fate then depend on what happens in the urban area. We emphasize that much of what happens will be determined by factors well outside the control of U.S. forces or indeed the U.S. Government as a whole. That makes it all the more important to try to realistically anticipate what is likely to happen and to make the sorts of preparations that can help at the margin open to U.S. influence. The relevant possible interventions are unlikely to have the luxury of years of focused planning and preparation. Steps now are crucial for informed pre-intervention assessments and lessening ad hoc scrambles in case of intervention.

Table 1. Urbanization Patterns in a Sample of Less Developed Countries

Country	Per Capita GNP Level in 1972 US$	Size of Population (in 000's) 1975 Urban	1975 Rural	2000 Urban	2000 Rural	Percentage of Urban Population 1975	2000	Compound Urban Growth Rate 1970-75	1995-2000	Compound Rural Growth Rate 1970-75	1995-2000
Argentina	1,290	20,293	5,091	29,288	3,573	79.9	89.1	2.19	1.11	-2.46	-1.66
Mexico	750	37,349	21,855	103,287	28,957	63.1	78.1	4.86	3.60	1.19	0.82
Columbia	400	15,938	9,952	40,115	11,349	61.6	78.0	5.24	2.96	2.58	0.13
Brazil	530	65,128	44,602	161,604	50,903	59.4	76.1	4.72	3.13	1.67	0.31
Algeria	430	8,432	8,455	27,205	11,199	49.9	70.8	6.78	3.85	1.52	0.94
Egypt	240	17,822	19,546	42,716	23,726	47.7	64.3	4.20	3.24	1.15	0.49
Korea	310	16,074	17,875	36,019	15,979	47.4	69.3	6.66	2.26	-1.36	-0.68
Phillipines	220	15,837	29,468	46,068	47,956	35.0	49.0	4.25	3.66	3.02	0.99
Malaysia	430	3,641	8,666	9,888	12,589	29.6	44.0	3.34	3.28	2.09	0.58
Senegal	260	1,262	3,190	3,740	5,013	28.4	42.7	3.89	4.18	1.83	1.47
Ivory Coast	340	994	3,891	3,718	5,899	20.4	38.7	7.02	4.46	1.51	1.54
Nigeria	130	11,419	51,511	40,953	94,008	18.2	30.3	4.67	5.10	2.07	2.36
Sudan	120	2,400	15,782	9,438	31,704	13.2	22.9	6.10	5.43	2.57	2.69
Kenya	170	1,483	11,625	6,458	24,743	11.3	20.7	6.48	5.61	3.38	2.83
Upper Volta	70	502	5,556	1,827	9,828	8.3	15.7	5.01	4.87	1.84	2.10
Pakistan	130	18,939	53,418	65,357	93,170	26.2	41.2	4.45	4.28	2.42	1.53
India	110	132,367	488,742	354,872	748,834	21.3	32.2	3.62	3.92	2.09	1.27
Indonesia	90	26,232	110,284	78,433	171,519	19.2	31.4	4.54	4.01	2.32	1.29
China (Mainlaind)	170	207,510	630,406	478,404	673,555	24.8	41.5	4.31	2.75	0.84	-0.07

Sources: UN Urban-Rural Projections from 1950-2000 (October 1974), medium tempo with medium variant. World Bank Atlas (1974).

Table 2. LDC MEGACITIES: 1950-2000
(Population of selected urban areas 1950-2000)
(in millions)

Country	1950	Average annual rate of growth	1975	Average annual rate of growth	2000
Mexico City	2.9	5.4%	10.9	4.4%	31.5
Buenos Aires	4.5	2.9%	9.3	1.5%	13.7
Sao Paulo	2.5	5.7%	9.3	3.9%	26.0
Rio de Janeiro	2.9	4.4%	8.3	3.45	19.3
Bogota	0.7	6.5%	3.4	4.2%	9.5
Cairo	2.4	4.3%	6.9	3.6%	16.9
Seoul	1.0	8.3%	7.3	3.8%	18.7
Manila	1.5	4.4%	4.4	4.3%	12.8
Kinshasa	0.2	9.7%	2.0	5.6%	7.8
Lagos	0.3	8.1%	2.1	6.2%	9.4
Shanghai	5.8	2.8%	11.5	2.6%	22.1
Peking	2.2	5.8%	8.9	3.7%	22.0
Jakarta	1.6	5.1%	5.6	4.7%	17.8
Calcutta	4.5	2.4%	8.1	3.7%	20.4
Bombay	2.9	3.7%	7.1	4.2%	19.8
Karachi	1.0	6.2%	4.5	5.4%	16.6
Developed Countries (for comparison)					
New York-	12.3	1.3%	17.0	1.3%	22.2
London	10.2	0.2%	10.7	0.7%	12.7
Paris	5.4	2.1%	9.2	1.2%	12.4
Tokyo	6.7	3.9%	17.5	2.0%	28.7

Source: UN, City Projections, medium tempo, medium variant (December 1975).

Enormous Variety

The Task Force quickly recognized that we were faced not with a uniform, homogeneous problem but rather with a melange of possibilities. In part, that is because of the differences between Third World urban areas (political, economic, social and demographic). In part that is because control and management of urban areas might be (and has been) intended to support different primary U.S. missions--defeating enemy forces, denying urban areas to an enemy, bolstering a friendly government, insuring the reliable flow of supplies through urban ports to U.S. and friendly forces operating elsewhere, or perhaps just safeguarding U.S. citizens. A primitive list of factors that can take many different forms that make a big difference forms the center column of Table 3. As more items tend toward the left side of the spectrum the tougher the job will tend to be; toward the right, the easier it will be. Additionally, one should continually reevaluate the items since many of these factors are open to change from the time of U.S. entry until withdrawal.

Table 3. A SPECTRUM OF CONTINGENCIES

LIKELY DISASTER	INGREDIENT	RELATIVELY MANAGEABLE
	A. URBAN AREA:	
LARGE	GEOGRAPHIC SIZE	SMALL
LARGE	POPULATION SIZE	SMALL
HIGH	DENSITY	LOW
HIGH	COMPLEXITY OF INFRASTRUCTURE	LOW
DIVERSE	SOCIO-CULTURAL COMPOSITION	HOMOGENEOUS
HOSTILE	GROUP RELATIONS	FRIENDLY
PERVASIVE	LINKAGES TO REST OF COUNTRY	THIN
VITAL	FOREIGN LINKAGES	MARGINAL
HEAVY	RECENT IN MIGRATION	LIGHT
	B. MILITARY CONTEXT:	
HEAVY	PHYSICAL DAMAGE	LIGHT
SEVERE	HOSTILE ACTIVITY	TRIVIAL
TOTAL	HOSTILE OBJECTIVES	SPECIFIC & MARGINAL
COMPREHENSIVE	U.S. MILITARY OBJECTIVES	SELECTIVE
	C. POLITICAL/HISTORICAL:	
DEPENDENT	CITY RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL GOVT.	INDEPENDENT
HOSTILE --	RELATIONS U.S. AND CENTRAL GOVT.	FRIENDLY
NEGATIVE	ATTITUDES TOWARD US	POSITIVE
LITTLE	PREVIOUS U.S. PRESENCE	GREAT
VAGUE	U.S. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES	CLEAR
OPEN-ENDED	DURATION U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE	SHORT
LOW	COMPETENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT	HIGH

The chance of any single, specific set of capabilities and concepts being appropriate and sufficient for all cases is nil for practical purposes. Any of the permutations can arise. Worse still, the specifics will matter enormously. Our problem is then best approached by a search for some general principles about a usefully flexible set of concepts and capabilities, and some suggestions about how to achieve them. Any set of "how much is enough" specifications would be unwarranted.

Some Limiting Assumptions

We have bounded our problem in several ways. First, we assume that the likely universe of situations basically excludes the most familiar types of World War II cases. That is, we set aside consideration of situations in which the U.S. military enters as victor after a prolonged conventional war to arrange for the construction of a new political order in a defeated major enemy country, or as the liberator of a nation long occupied by that major enemy.

Second, we make some assumptions about U.S. Government preferences and about constraints on it and on the DoD. The most fundamental U.S. preference will be to minimize the role of the U.S. in supporting urban control and management and,

within what is necessary, to minimize the roll of DoD in general and of military, combat assets in particular. Preference will go to having locals and friendly third parties do as much as possible of what urban control and management require. The U.S. military role will then be intended to be temporary and transitional and emphasize the least possible disruption of the "normal" functioning of the urban area. Any U.S. military contribution to urban control and management will be discounted in DoD as it interferes with usual military objectives, and discounted elsewhere in the U.S. Government as it interferes with political objectives. U.S. objectives and actions will be under intense U.S. Congressional, media, and public scrutiny. We also find it hard to imagine that urban control and management will rank high on the priority list of U.S. military commanders or civilian DoD officials for any sustained period.

The limiting conditions we assume combined with the enormous variety of potentially relevant situations guide the types of recommendations we have sought. We wanted ones that are modest to invisible in their resource requirements. We wanted ones that are realistically generic and quick reaction because planning time is likely to be very short. Finally, we wanted suggestions that would diffuse needed capabilities well- down in the military chain of command. That is where much of U.S. - local interaction will take place, and there is little chance that very much specialized expertise will be available and deployed before events are well underway.

Chapter 2.

VOICES OF EXPERIENCE

A. Contempory

"BEING BULLISH ON AMERICA IS NOT THE PARAMOUNT INGREDIENT FOR OPERATING A CHINA SHOP IN THE THIRD WORLD."

--a senior city manager--

"IF YOU HAVE GRINGOS WITH BAYONETS ON EVERY STREET CORNER, EVEN THE TEENAGERS OPPOSED TO THE LOCAL COMMUNISTS WILL PUT A KNIFE IN THEIR BACK."

--a senior U.S. military commander--

"EVERY ISRAELI OFFICER'S NIGHTMARE IS TO HAVE TO CONTROL AN INHABITED ARAB CITY."

--an Israeli reserve officer, veteran of 5 wars--

"AVOID THE CITY UNLESS YOU HAVE THE FORCES TO CONTROL THE WHOLE CITY."

--a senior Israeli officer--

"IT DOESN'T GET BETTER, IT ONLY GETS WORSE"

--a senior Israeli commander--

"IF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ISN'T SUPPORTIVE, YOU'RE ON THE WRONG SIDE."

--a senior British Military Commander

B. USMC, 1940 (Small Wars Manual)

"Small wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions."

"Small war situations are usually a phase of, or an operation taking place concurrently with, diplomatic effort. The political authorities do not relinquish active participation in the negotiations and they ordinarily continue to exert considerable influence on the military campaign. The military leader in such operations thus finds himself limited to certain lines of action as to the strategy and even as to the tactics of the campaign."

"United States forces 'dribble in' to the countries in which they intervene.....our Government is observed endeavoring to accomplish its end with the minimum of troops, in fact, with nothing more than a demonstrationof force if that is all that is necessary and reasonably sufficient. This policy is carried on throughout the campaign and reinforcements are added by "driblets."

"The responsibility of officers...and the training necessary are of a very different order from their responsibilities and training in ordinary military duties. Instead of striving to generate the maximum power with forces available, the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force and the consequent minimum loss of life."

"Experience must not lead to an underestimate of the modern irregular, supplied with modern arms and equipment.... All.../his/...natural advantages, combining primitive cunning and modern armament, will weigh heavily in the balance...if a careless audacity is permitted to warp good judgment."

"No defined battle front exists...hostile forces in occupied territory will employ guerrilla warfare...rear installations and lines of communications will be threatened. Movements will be retarded by ambuscades and barred defiles, and every detachment presenting a tempting target will be harassed or attacked. ...The population will be honeycombed with hostile sympathizers..."

Chapter 3.

URBAN REALITIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

The prevalence and growth of urbanization in the Third World only begins to suggest its importance. Urban areas are the driving factors for economic growth and international trade and host transport hubs. Major cities are the homes for almost all modern institutions of national integration (political, economic, and cultural). Foreign, and to a lesser extent indigenous, perceptions of who controls the country are heavily shaped by judgments about who controls the cities, especially the capitol city. These common features operate while urbanization differs widely in degree and content between countries.

Third World Urban Systems

Most urban areas are internally very diverse physically (from high-rise office towers to sprawling shanty towns), economically (from modern, advanced technology enterprises to the most simple forms of individual barter), and culturally (along religious, ethnic, and tribal lines). A large fraction of the population lives in slums and squatter settlements (see Table 4). Most of even the poorest sections have some urban services (if sporadically), especially electricity and communal water (see Table 5). some of the poorest parts of the population often live in the heart of the city. A large share of the population is young and many of them are unemployed or underemployed. There often is little co-location of housing, work, and shopping. Many systems are composites of the modern in terms of technology and organization and the more traditional. For example, communications includes television, telephone, mobile networks, transistor radios, ham radios, satellite ground stations, and very important oral networks. Informal social organization is ubiquitous even among the poor. In general, informal structures and institutions marked by low technology, labor-intensive, small scale operations play a much more important role than in the industrialized countries.

Table 4. INCIDENCE OF SLUMS AND SQUATTER AREAS IN SELECTED LDC CITIES

Country	City	Slums and Squatter Settlements as Percent of City Population	
Sub-Saharan Africa			
Cameroon	Douala	80	(1970)
	Yaounde	90	(1970)
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	90	(1968)
Ghana	Accra	53	(1968)
Ivory Coast	Abidjan	60	(1964)
Kenya	Nairobi	33	(1970)
	Mombasa	66	(1970)
Liberia	Monrovia	59	(1970)
Madagascar	Tananarive	33	(1969)
Malawi	Blantyre	56	(1966)
Nigeria	Ibadan	75	(1971)
Senegal	Dakar	60	(1971)
Somalia	Magadishu	77	(1967)
Sudan	Port Sudan	55	(1971)
Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	50	(1970)
Togo	Lome	75	(1970)
Upper Volta	Ouagadougoou	70	(1966)
Zaire	Kinshasa	60	(1969)
Zambia	Lusaka	48	(1969)
Emena			
Iraq Bahgdad		29	(1965)
Jordan	Amman	14	(1971)
Turkey	Ankara	60	(1970)
	Istanbul	40	(1970)
	Izmir	65	(1970)
Lebanan	Beirut	1.5	(1970)
Morocco	Casablanca	70	(1971)
	Rabat	60	(1971)
Low Income Asia			
Afghanistan	Kabul	21	(1971)
India	Calcutta	33	(1971)
	Bombat	25	(1971)
	Delhi	30	(1971)
	Madras	25	(1971)
	Baroda	19	(1971)
Indonesia	Jakarta	26	(1972)
	Bandung	27	(1972)
	Makassar	33	(1972)
Nepal	Katmandu	22	(1961)
Pakistan	Karachi	23	(1970)
Sri Lanka	Columbo	43	(1968)

Table 4. INCIDENCE OF SLUMS AND SQUATTER AREAS IN SELECTED LDC CITIES
(continued)

Country	City	Slums and Squatter Settlements as Percent of City Population	
Middle Income Asia			
Hong Kong	Hong Kong	16	(1969)
Korea	Seoul	30	(1970)
	Busan	31	(1970)
Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur	37	(1971)
Philippines	Manila	35	(1972)
Singapore	Singapore	15	(1970)
Latin America and Caribbean			
Brazil	Rio de Janeiro	30	(1970)
	Belo Horizonte	14	(1970)
	Recife	50	(1970
	Porto Alegre	13	(1970)
	Brazilia	41	(1970)
Chile	Santiago	25	(1964)
Columbia	Bogota	60	(1969)
	Cali	30	(1969)
	Buenaventura	80	(1969)
Ecuador	Guayaquil	49	(1969)
Guatemala	Guatemala City	30	(1971)
Honduras	Tegucigalpa	25	(1970)
Mexico	Mexico City	46	(1970)
Pahama	Panama City	17	(1970)
Peru	Lima	40	(1970)
	Arequipa	40	(1970)
	Chimbote	67	(1970)
Venezuela	Craacas	40	(1969)
	Maracaibo	50	(1969)
	Barquisimeto	41	(1969)
	Cuidad Guayana	40	(1969)

*Definitions vary from country to country and from city to city, therefore, these data only present the roughest of impressions regarding the housing problem in these cities.

Source: Orville F. Grimes, *Housing for Low Income Urban Families: Economics and Politics in the Developing World.* Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.

Table 5.

PERCENT OF POPULATION WITH ACCESS TO WATER SUPPLY AND EXCRETA DISPOSAL: REGIONAL AVERAGES*

Region	Access to Water		Access to Excreta Disposal	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Sub-Saharan Africa	66.3	10.4	70.3	14.2
Middle East, North Africa, and Southern Europe	74.3	64.4	94.0	93.0
South Asia	66.3	17.2	66.9	2.5
East Asia and Pacific	68.3	9.8	66.6	14.8
Latin America & Caribbean	78.0	34.9	80.3	25.4

*Estimates are based on information for years between 1973 and 1977 as data availability permit.
Source: World Bank estimates as of September 1978.

The demand for urban services and facilities is massive and those support systems are chronically strained and normally inadequate. For example, fire protection services are minimal in terms of equipment, trained personnel and sufficient water availability. Yet the fire vulnerabilities are great--high rise buildings, gasoline tank farms, quick to burn densely packed dwellings. Because of, or in spite of, chronically inadequate services, populations display enormous adaptiveness even in very difficult situations, as in Beirut. Flows in and out of the city to and from its periphery and internationally are crucial to its functioning.

These features suggest in general, first that there is no substitute for detailed knowledge of the particular urban area and, second, that complexity makes foreign micro-management impossible. They also yield some more specific implications. Blockage and interruption of flows between the city and its periphery, or between the city and the rest of the world will be very disruptive unless some substitute arrangements are made quickly. For example, massive food supplies will have to be provided some new way. Large elements of the population are volatile, and hard to fence off without disrupting the city and using very manpower consuming means. Isolation of particular parts of the city, other than distinct embassy quarters or government compounds, will disrupt the lives of much of the population. The population is used to a chronically bad level of services--yet they are used to some services. Physical disruption of what has existed or delay in patchwork fixes will have grave effects very quickly. These effects will be felt across the population, including the poor. Emergency services, inadequate in tranquil times, are incapable of surging to meet more demanding times, at least without large infusions of equipment, supplies, and trained personnel. Control of modern, formal

organizations does not amount to control of the major functional elements of the city including the diffusion of information and rumor, Yet the modern formal organizations are the easiest to contact and, at least on the surface, to control and manage. The major urban resource is the adaptiveness of population who will often find ways to cope if they are allowed to do so.

Third World Urban Governance

The major job of city officials is to avoid and to cope with crises, not to manage in any textbook sense. Local officials have little authority and are marginal to many basic urban functions unless the city is a national (or at least a provincial) capitol. Even if it is, central government officials and institutions and members of the ruling national political party or clique play an enormous role. There is little to no experience at the local level with policy initiative independent of the national ruling elite. There is no integrated urban management at either the local, provincial or national level. A large share of local government funds comes from national ministries or public corporations and some from foreign donors. For example, one-fourth to one-third of urban government operating budgets come from higher levels of government.

This does not mean that city governments are of trivial importance. They often are the single largest employer in an urban area. They play a major role in numerous functional areas: water supply and sanitation (sewage); solid waste collection and disposal; street maintenance (cleaning, traffic management, repair of drains); electricity supply; maintenance of public works; regulation of markets and slaughter houses, cemeteries and crematoria; and fire protection. Their role is minor, however, with respect to criminal justice, transportation, post-elementary education, and the construction of major elements of urban infrastructure. The taxing authority they have tends to center on property taxes and charges on goods entering and leaving the city.

Bureaucratic pathologies flourish--nepotism, favor trading, sabotage and indifference. Corruption is pervasive and institutionalized as a practical way to manage excess demand for city services. The power of officials is primarily based on their family connections, personal power base, age and only then on education, training and competence.

It follows that any U.S. attempt to support urban control and management will face the problem of missing pieces and functions in the absence of a friendly and operating national government. In that eventuality, having the local authorities continue even with their prior functions will probably require an immediate infusion of funds. Funding requirements will be especially great if flows of goods in and out of the city have stopped or changed to deny revenue from customary charges. Even if local government funding is maintained and the national government is functioning and friendly, there will be no local transfer point for comprehensive U.S. schemes about how the city should run.

Breakdown from its previous level of effectiveness by the local government will quickly exacerbate problems of public health and mobility within the urban area. Those breakdowns are ones that will pose difficulties for U.S. personnel. Attempts to get the local level bureaucracy to function along U.S. lines will produce breakdown or passive indifference equivalent to it. Any threat to ranking local officials' privileges, or to those of members of their families, will be resisted stubbornly.

Avoiding such threats and assessing the importance of particular officials and influentials requires a knowledge of family ties.

Some Law and Some Order

Foreign military forces involved in the control and management of cities in other countries will soon find military operations becoming blurred with law enforcement and police activity. Foreign military forces engaged in police activity quickly wear out whatever welcome they had. Accordingly, getting the local police organizations to do the job is of great importance.

Third World countries differ greatly in the incidence and prevalence of various types of crime, and in their police, judicial, and corrections institutions. Differences in legal systems are not very important for street-level police work, but differences in political systems are. In particular, police forces in Communist governed countries have some special features. In practice, there usually will be numerous, independent "police forces"-local, national, judicial, secret, reserve. In general, they are unimpressive (corrupt, inefficient, ill-paid, poorly equipped and trained). Urban areas are marked by rising crime rates. In some cases, Latin America stands out. They are characterized by levels of violence (especially murder) far in excess of the U.S. In others, crimes of violence are much rarer. There will often be a conflict between the obligations placed on a foreign intervenor by international law and the routine violation of these norms by the prevailing local criminal "justice" system. (The pertinent body of international law lies in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, and the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians).

The foreign intervenor has no attractive choice but to seek the cooperation of the local police institutions, and they will usually obey whoever rules. That makes it imperative to be aware of citizen attitudes toward the police (often negative) and to understand where the members of the police fit in the local scheme of things (social composition, political ties). It is wise to choose military security control boundaries that coincide with existing police territorial zones. Even if the police are unpopular and corrupt, firing them will backfire by turning them into a hostile factor. Instead, efforts should be made to coopt and constrain them. Doing so may involve special efforts to locate those with good professional training (e.g., graduates of U.N. programs), provide some improved equipment (transportation and communications), and manipulate checks and balances provided by numerous independent police organizations. Martial law offers no panacea. It has been found to be counterproductive on an extended basis, and sometimes even in the short-run. The judgment about how much law and order, or more practically how much criminality, locals will tolerate can only be made in the light of prior local experience, not against U.S. standards. A small team of criminal justice experts (5-10) can grasp the essence of an urban situation in a week with good access.

Transportation

Transportation systems are a key to how the segments of an urban area interact, and to how U.S. personnel can move themselves and monitor or control the movement of others. Most Third World urban areas have two transportation systems--formal and paratransit. Formal systems are characterized by large organizations, bureaucracy, imported technology, scheduled services, fixed fares/rates, and limited employment opportunities. Their leadership often lodges at

the national level. They tend to display a neglected and decayed infrastructure physically and apathy in personnel performance. Paratransit stands in contrast being characterized by great decentralization, low barriers to entry, family and individual entrepreneur organization, adapted technology, negotiated prices, and flexible routes, destinations and times of service. Paratransit tends to be labor absorbing. It often covers a much greater fraction of the urban area than the formal system, matters more for the poor (including for daily food purchases), and is more likely to function through turbulence and conflict. Paratransit operators are increasingly organized and politically important (e.g., Manila). Paratransit often includes a waterborne element. Together with elements of the formal system, paratransit plays a key role in the movement of goods and people into and out of the city, including its food supply zone that may extend up to 100 kilometers from the urban center.

Physically, the street network in the city core and in older residential neighborhoods is often narrow and irregular, making access by large vehicles impossible. Government and private sector facilities important to urban growth often are in those districts. In those same situations in the larger cities traffic congestion is terrible. Large parts of the urban area that are newer and more suburban are more open. In almost all cases, inter-city bus terminals are important mobility control points.

Control of movement by locals will have to apply to both formal and paratransit systems. If the latter has a waterborne element, control will require appropriate ("brown water") ships. Control that involves severing transport links to the hinterland will produce immediate food supply problems. Obstruction of the paratransit system, for example through fuel allocations practices, will disrupt the functioning of the urban area. Continued functioning of transportation will require special provision of leadership for the formal system and a negotiated understanding with paratransit operators. Planners should assume that motorized access to densely populated areas and the urban core will be problematic, and that traffic delays there will be endemic. Attempts to shut down those areas to indigenous traffic, e.g., through curfews, will be disruptive.

Medicine and Public Health

Health care in Third World cities involves a mosaic of providers: public and private; national and local; indigenous and international; modern and traditional. Most large cities will have poorly supplied and manned clinics or health stations, large and antiquated hospitals, indigenous systems of care (healers, traditional medicine) functioning independently of the government, and at least one high-tech, well-equipped hospital for the wealthy and influential. Health services are always in short supply and standards are very low. Most of the population has no access to the formal, modern medical system. As is usual in situations of chronic scarcity, nepotism, incompetence and graft flourish. Urban health care resources are overwhelmed by "Fourth World" people--young migrants from rural areas. Urban populations are diverse with respect to medical and public health standards and expectations, triggers for seeking care, points of entry into care systems, and the informal communications through which they learn of the availability and quality of care. Little can be done without language capability on the part of the care providers. For much of the population, food, employment and income are more important than health care.

Many diseases are endemic, especially infectious diarrheas and respiratory ills. The chances of epidemic that will spill over onto foreigners are great, in part because water supply systems are almost always qualitatively dangerous. Emergency systems are poor to non-existent as are referral and transfer systems. Pharmaceutical supplies are short and an active black market functions in normal times. Existing stocks may be outdated, of questionable quality, and hard to locate. Critical information on health care assets and on health problems may not be readily at hand in the urban area. That information may be available from the U.S. Public Health Service Center for Disease Control (including through its contacts with the World Health Organization and AID), private foundations, NIH, the U.S. Mission, voluntary organizations including the International Red Cross, and the world-wide medical research laboratories maintained by DoD.

The foreign intervenor should recognize the critical need to assemble basic information on health care assets, how the systems work, and who counts in them. Once again, no single local personality or organization will be clearly in charge. Once again, the informal system is important and must be kept running. It should be understood that there is no local capacity to handle a surge of emergency cases and even current levels of care may require an immediate infusion of supplies to meet civilian medical needs. These include the basics and blood. Triage will be inevitable should operations induce significant numbers of civilian casualties. Local norms for health care should be accepted, not reformed although it may be possible to treat some visible ills, especially of children. Preventing the spread of diseases readily communicable to U.S. personnel suggests urgent attention to waste disposal, disposal of bodies, temporary vector control (lice, mosquitos), and water supply. Mass vaccinations may be necessary to avoid epidemics.

Some Maxims for Dealing with Locals

Recognize that locals behave in terms of perceived self- interest. They will be keenly aware of four sets of interests at work: those of the U.S. intervenor; of hostile elements; of local "cooperators"; and of the general population. They size these up as they operate currently and are likely to evolve (what about after the U.S. leaves?) to arrive at judgments about their stakes, risks and payoffs. The local situation will inevitably be complex and that argues for avoiding grand plans in favor of simple and modest agendas and actions. It will be prudent to keep the U.S. involvement and profile as low as possible. That will help to avoid interfering with local, self- starting efforts to keep the city functioning and to repair or adapt to interrupted functions. Always ask, what would happen if the U.S. wasn't here? If conflict has broken patterns of cooperation between elements in the city try to re-establish them. Otherwise, self-help efforts to restore urban functioning will be severely hampered and U.S. personnel caught up in internecine local conflicts.

Realistic scepticism is essential. Recognize that the most likely collaborators may be those most marginal to the local power structure. Beware of locals experienced in dealing with U.S. organizations who may well be cleverer than novice intervenors. Locals will compete for intervenor resources and will milk the naive and uncoordinated intervenor. The limits on what local authorities can deliver should not be confused with what they promise or assent to superficially. Practices that traditionally get things done locally such as bribes, favors and corruption should be allowed to continue.

The reality is that locals will probably know what the intervenor is doing but that the intervenor will only know in a timely fashion what locals are and are not

doing through access to informal, oral networks. Accordingly, there is no adequate substitute for language competence and prior connections with locals. Direct contacts with persons who are important in the local scheme of things, including members of important families, are crucial. This set of individuals may only slightly overlap the Westernized, official elite. The necessary contacts and basic information to identify key individuals are often available in U.S. civil departments and agencies, U.S. firms, international governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations, and U.S. and foreign voluntary organizations.

Finally, conformity with local mores in public and in private interactions with locals can avoid a great deal of trouble.

Some Maxims for What To Do First

The most important first step will be find informants on the local situation and to grasp their motives and status. That step becomes more feasible by finding non-locals who can provide the appropriate contacts and relevant perspective. Establishing good relations with important local communicators and opinion-makers comes next. Success in these endeavors provides the basis for identifying the local power structure (formal and informal) and developing personal relationships with them. Admissions of ignorance and invitations to provide help are useful.

Substantively, priority should go initially to dealing with problems that have immediate disaster, crisis potential. It helps to have a "worry list" of events and situations that would persuade locals to withdraw from contact and active or passive cooperation. Opposition is always possible and great effort should go to avoiding the conversion of locals into hostile cadres or at least tacit supporters of hostile elements. Effective communications are essential to this objective. That need will not be met on an ad hoc basis. Instead it requires the planned careful blending of identified key audiences, acceptable characterizations of the U.S. presence, credible sources, and appropriate technology. Turmoil or a vacuum conducive to the spread of negative rumors will impose very high costs. That is particularly true with regard to the large share of the urban population composed of young unemployed or underemployed males.

After disaster avoidance, the next step should be to pick a few areas of probable success that provide cheap, symbolic changes visible to and welcome by locals. Basic supplies, acceptable forms of "street medical care" and public health measures are candidates. Consideration should also go to roles and activities for the volatile young. Especially at the outset, it is important to avoid challenging customs dear to locals, especially influential ones. That means refraining from replacing incompetents and sceptics. Also, it is prudent to assume from the very begining that any honeymoon will not last. Deterioration is especially likely if the U.S. presence was initially presented as temporary and the locals expected a cornucopia of benefits.

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Chapter 4.

U.S. CAPABILITIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

U.S. capabilities to support control and management of large urban areas in the Third World are in a sorry state. What capabilities do exist within the DoD and national security agencies are trivial or barred from timely focus on the mission by priority, law and regulation, or tacit norms. The relatively substantial capabilities that exist in other parts of the U.S. Government and in the private sector are effectively unavailable to military planners, in large measure because they are unknown by them. In addition, more specific U.S. capabilities are constrained by two more general features of the U.S. military system: access to reserve personnel and the lack of a doctrine of austere logistics.

Reserve Personnel Resources

There are two crucial questions with regard to military reserve personnel. Can members with relevant skills be quickly identified? Can they be called into service? The answer to the first question is negative. There is no timely capability to identify reserve personnel by such identifying characteristics as civil skill, language competence, and foreign experience. Doing so at this time would involve calls to numerous reserve unit commanders. The answer to the second question is mixed and involves varying types of reserves and of mobilizations.

Selected Reserve members are obligated for 14 days of annual training and one weekend per month. A fraction of them are really full time military. Individual Ready Reserve/Individual National Guard members can volunteer for active duty at any time, can be called up involuntarily by Service Secretaries for up to 14 days per year, and (if DoD initiative succeeds) may be recallable for up to 30 days of active duty training. Standby Reserve members are only available under national mobilization by Congressional action. Of the Retired Reserves, Retired Regulars can be selectively recalled by Service Secretaries, while Retired Reservists become available only with a national declaration of emergency.

There are various mobilization alternatives currently legislated and proposed. The smallest and most relevant for our concerns is the "up to 100,000 call-up." Under its terms, the President can invoke it without declaring a national emergency. Congress must be notified within 48 hours and continuation is limited to 90 days without Congressional approval. However, the call-up is limited to the Selected Reserves and within them to whole units, not individual skill specialties.

In sum, personnel may only be available for our concerns if they volunteer or are used in the "active duty training" mode.

Logistics Problems and Options

Non-austere U.S. force demands for logistics and support compound the difficulty of relations with locals, including support to urban control and management. A most highly leveraged course of action to improve relations with locals and support for urban control and management involves "load-shedding," that is, disciplining U.S. Forces to live at the lowest feasible standards; limiting ourselves to bare essential minima. Failure to depress our level of demand creates conflicting

logistical requirements and carries with it a plethora of small support units that often are hard to manage in relations with locals. The key routine document is the Theater Construction Policy, a document created by unified commanders. The document should impose limits consistent with the minimum without which the command would die.

The feasibility of this course of action depends heavily on prevailing Service and Joint doctrine which spells out operational concepts for logistical and other support in theaters of operations. The considerations that enter into those critical baselines lie well beyond the charter of the Task Force. Suffice it to note that the nature of prevailing doctrine works against austere logistics, thus compounding the difficulties of support to urban control and management.

Host Nation Support Agreements, (with policy leadership from International Logistics in OASD(MI&L)), can be helpful if: 1) they exist for conflict sites; 2) the host government is willing and able to meet its obligations; and 3) those include support to urban control and management. There are almost no agreements with Third World governments. Many pertinent contingencies involve situations where obligations are unlikely to be met even if they exist. Existing agreements deal with support to U.S. forces, not support to urban control and management. The last point is relatively easy to change but the first two pose formidable difficulties.

A different way of dealing with logistics problems is the Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) now entering the implementation stage. The program seeks to lessen the logistic support shortfall for U.S. forces by means of civilian contractors who would operate in theater. The program emphasizes contingency contracting for overseas wartime support, and modifying peacetime contracts to provide for continued support in wartime. The concept involves detailed preplanning for particular contingencies, and exercises of those planned capabilities for operations such as port operation and base construction. Similar arrangements can be imagined for support to urban control and management.

Intelligence

Intelligence is obviously vital before and during such an involvement. It must serve the needs of high level policy officials and military commanders down to those in command of small tactical units such as patrols. Limits on the quality, timeliness, and coverage of available intelligence have grave implications. They degrade estimates of risks associated with deployment to a Third World city, choices of feasible objectives, and the effectiveness of operational steps.

The intelligence needed for mission selection and execution involves a combination of (1) long lead-time human intelligence with political import, (2) a descriptive data base rich in urban detail, (3) quickly usable technical means, and (4) forms of information provision directly useful to tactical units. As matters now stand, there is a profound lack of collection, retrieval, and analysis of information on Third World cities. What does happen is frantic activity in the midst of a hot crisis, a "catch-up" process, and selective efforts devoted to the safety of U.S. personnel. There is no standing set of requirements for information pertinent to the support of urban control and management. This situation in part follows from the perception that the large number of potentially relevant urban areas makes comprehensive, up to date information on other than a tiny fraction of them too much of a resource burden. In sum, Third World priorities are chronically low, and urban ones are perhaps the extreme case.

The intelligence data bases and products that do exist provide physical and geographic information (roads, railroads, airports, ports, office buildings, churches, schools, media sites, utility plants). Social and political information (exactly the sorts emphasized in our discussion of urban realities) is rare. That is the case even though abundant information on those matters is often collected by other parts of the U.S. Government or other organizations to which it has access. The problem is not that "no one knows." The recurrent result is a frantic scramble for information immediately prior to an order to intervene (go to the bookstore and buy some guidebooks, find some hotel brochures).

What does go on is concentrated in the Military Geography Branch of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) and the CIA. The former consists of 47 people responsible for world natural resources, demography, and cities. Its major customer is the JSTPS. Two product series are particularly relevant. Integrated Operational Support Studies (IOSS) are very general emphasizing entry and mobility. They contain nothing about people and networks of people. They are updated every three years for various countries or regions. Counter Terrorist Support Packages (CTISP) focus on U.S. overseas facilities as terrorist targets and emphasize entry and exit details based on overhead means. They are silent on local people or groups. There is a tiny effort to produce town plans, but it is limited to the USSR. General mapping procurement provides helpful products, but of substantially gross scale. CIA conducts a modest effort in its Geography Division, and some information is scattered among country analysts. A couple of cities may be examined every couple of years. Although there is a modest contract effort on urban socio-economic statistics, there is no ongoing work on social geography (group locations, neighborhood character, histories of violence).

Capabilities that do exist are significantly inaccessible. Proper leadtime for requirements and sufficient priority would allow for substantial collection using existing hardware, off- the-shelf lashups, and (more conditionally) language qualified personnel. Military Security Assistance personnel do have access to much relevant information, but are barred from collecting intelligence. Additionally, career movement is blocked between that specialty and defense attache assignments. Defense attaches are often in country, and in the urban area, but their training and tasking are inappropriate. Members of the U.S. private sector often have much relevant knowledge, but there is no system for finding them and gaining their help. Often employees of other parts of the U.S. Government or members of the active duty or reserve forces have relevant knowledge, experience, and skills--but there is no system (even a loose- leaf telephone book) for taking advantage of such assets. Occasional (very occasional) exceptions to this picture are associated with U.S. military presence in the country in question and intense demand by the responsible CINC.

The current situation and its deficiencies were well illustrated by the USMC "peacekeeping" experience in Beirut. The requirements for military operations (support to urban control and management were not significant objectives) called for knowledge of the city equivalent to that possessed by the local government and elites, with at least equivalent timeliness. national assets were made available but encountered several complications. Request channels for some assets bypassed the normal chain of command; product from others was too late in arrival for maximum helpfulness. Turf issues were present between civilian and military intelligence personnel. Field commanders were both dependent on information from particular local groups and third parties (e.g., Israelis) with their own interests and at the same

time given unclear guidance about information sharing with possibly cooperative local elements. Preparatory steps were not taken that recognized the difference between what commanders would "need to know" and "need to locate." Information was often provided in forms not readily usable by operational units (patrols need maps, not coordinates). Arrangements for access to national HUMINT were at best cumbersome and the military had not maintained its own collection arrangements. Improvements are needed to lessen unhelpful command layering, facilitate local coordination between U.S. civilian and military intelligence officials, focus SIGINT assets on tactical needs, and provide local commanders with "lower technology" overhead assets (drones or even model airplanes with 135mm cameras).

The primary difficulty is not one of formulating information needs. A gross outline is provided in Appendix C. A more detailed one focused on civil affairs can be found in the USMC publication CABIR: Civil Affairs Basic Information Requirements.

Barring changes, it is only realistic to assume that U.S. military commanders asked to support control and management of Third World urban areas will have to do so on the basis of poor intelligence. That situation will only change if there are high priorities established well before an intervention. CINCs with Third World responsibilities are the major promising source in DoD of competitive priorities. Since almost any effort would be an improvement, some modest possibilities for marginal change should be noted. There is a need to identify a generic minimum useful data base for Third World cities. For particular urban areas, there is a need to provide military planners with lists of who to call who either know the urban area or know who knows it. Finally there is the matter of arranging for timely use of abundant information collections outside DoD and the intelligence community, beginning with knowledge of where they are.

Civil Affairs

Active duty strength is less than 200 with more than 90% of personnel in the reserves (some 4,700 people). The only dedicated units are in the Army. More than half of the reserve units are assigned to facilitate FRG host nation support supplies to U.S. forces in the event of a war on the Central Front. The remainder are assigned to different CINCs who set their mission. The assignment does not reflect special theater qualifications. Those assignments often resemble the supply facilitation mentioned for the FRG. Individuals may be well-qualified by profession, foreign experience and language to contribute to the support of urban control and management of a particular Third World city. There is, however, no proper system for finding those individuals or getting them on to active duty. Active duty personnel are seldom specialized in either country or urban function terms. Only seven Foreign Area Specialists are authorized, and the rank structure of the unit would be hard put to accommodate more. An active duty team sent to Grenada took checklists, not "how to fix it, make it work" skills. Reserves are fast losing whatever they had of the detailed, practical skills a CINC needs, for example, to operate a port. Reserve recruitment priorities are not policy driven, or supported by special incentives.

Planning at the CINC level often does take place, even though civil affairs staffing often is one person, part-time. Perhaps, that is why the plans are generally unhelpful and focused on occupation, national development, or foreign internal defense. The plans rarely address division of labor with local authorities, other parts of the U.S. Government, or use of U.S. private sector capabilities.

The higher level process for civil affairs sounds good--on paper. The Secretary of Defense will work from policy objectives provided by national authorities to answer a JCS request for guidance. The JCS will then develop policy for a specific situation within that guidance, and keep it abreast of policy and theater developments. When a situation becomes active, the JCS will establish a U.S. Joint Civil Affairs Committee and, if necessary, an Allied Forces Civil Affairs Committee. The Chief of Staff of the Army is the JCS Executive Agent until the Joint Committee is formed. He has responsibility for all U.S. civil affairs training and for the mobilization of Civil Affairs reserve units.

In reality, Army staff attention amounts to about 15% of the time of one civilian. The Joint Committee has never met and is staffed by reservists never mobilized. JCS has no active civil affairs staff element. The only effort to use the process was made by Secretary MacNamara for Cuba in 1962. Agreement was never reached within the Executive Branch on the division of responsibility and authority.

The civil affairs function is a victim of benign neglect and provides only a dubious facade of capability. Those assigned to it are asked to do too much with all too little. The function has no significant advocate or sponsor in the Army, the JCS or anywhere else in DoD.

Psychological Operations

The U.S. Government has recently declared its intention to make a far greater effort in psychological operations and the JCS has drawn up a master plan for the function. However, military psychological operations are excluded from the structure, even though the Secretary of Defense is a member of its Special Planning Group. *The JCS plan is largely a content-free plan to have plans, rather than a statement of a meaningful concept of operations or allocation of resources, or specific practical steps to identify and meet needs for particular real world situations.

Like civil affairs, most personnel (almost 90%) are reservists. Current active duty strength of under 1000 is almost entirely Army, as are the reserves. The Air Force has one Guard squadron with four specially equipped planes and a one-week course; the Marines, one reserve unit that also handles civil affairs. The Navy has no dedicated personnel, but a great deal of relevant media equipment (often on ships). Reserve personnel often duplicate skills found in other military specialties, in particular, public affairs media operations. They seldom provide unique skills, for example, mass persuasion, flow of political influence, or rumor transmission patterns in different societies. This inefficiency in part follows from Army policy not to "taint" public affairs with psychological operations. Language skill requirements may be largely unmet in active duty or reserve units. For example, of 75 slots for Arabic/Pharsi linguists, only 10 are filled. The function apparently has too little support to compete for the skills crucial for effectiveness, that is, with intelligence for linguists and Foreign Area Specialists. It now is allotted only 100 of the 1500 Army Foreign Area Specialists. Like civil affairs, reserve recruitment priorities are not policy driven or supported by special incentives.

*Melvin E. Kriesel (Colonel, USA). "Psychological Operations: a Strategic View." *Essays on Strategy*, National Defense University, 1985.

Personnel limitations are paralleled by equipment limitations. Equipment is not designed to be portable and compatible with Third World communication situations and habits. For example, the active duty unit's 50kw radio transmitter requires seven C-141 aircraft to deploy.

The concept of operations emphasizes combat support with messages through mass media, loudspeakers and leaflets for mass military and civilian audiences. There is a tendency to think in terms of how many divisions can be supported rather than of how much key foreign influentials can be affected. Most of the current improvement planning emphasizes methods of transmitting messages and almost nothing about what the messages should say and to whom. In any event, the psychological operations units lack the intelligence information, status, and training to design and implement strategies to shape the state of mind of key foreign elites and individuals. Even the active duty unit is isolated from and poorly informed about national objectives. For Grenada, for example, they had to infer them from a Presidential speech.

CINCs are charged with psychological operations as part of their planning, and about half of the plans do contain such a component. None exist for particular Third World urban areas. CINC staff is usually one part-time person and most plans are really prepared by the one active duty unit--the 4th PSYOP Group. The Army is the executive agent for all PSYOP training, but the highest ranking officer with solely PSYOP responsibilities in an O-6.

As with civil affairs, there is only a dubious facade of capability. Tasks far exceed the capabilities to perform them and high level support seems nonexistent.

Engineers

In contrast to civil affairs and psychological operations, there are very substantial engineer capabilities. Corps of Engineers Army personnel number about 400,000 and there are also substantial Navy personnel. About 2/3 of the Army specialists are reservists. The Engineers apparently are able to selectively recall reservists to active duty, unlike the previously discussed specialist functions.

The Engineering branches are well qualified by training, equipment and experience to play a practical role in support of urban control and management. The Seabee reserves alone have identified some 50 people who deal with city management in their civil lives. General contributions could include: (1) staff support for utilities, transportation, and contract management; (2) operational capacity to construct and operate water supplies and power generation; (3) operational capacity to provide the physical elements for area control, population control, communication, access and mobility and logistics; and (4) expertise to furnish engineering intelligence on urban infrastructure capacities and vulnerabilities, including those of existing organizations and management (U.S. private sector as well as indigenous). Obviously the feasibility of the second and third contributions will depend on the needs of U.S. forces, the size of the city and degree of damage to its infrastructure, and the availability of transport.

The Engineers have an established record of quickly providing minimal, thin urban services to occupied and wartorn cities. Their effectiveness obviously benefits from prior knowledge of local conditions. Modest access will suffice to acquire that knowledge. For example, a team of 10-12 experts can grasp the engineering essence of a city in about a week.

The USAF Engineering Services provide a model of two rapidly deployable units (PRIME BEEF and RED HORSE) which could be readily adapted to support for urban control and management. A "dual-hatted" quickly available pool of skilled personnel will reappear as one of our principal recommendations.

PRIME BEEF provides base engineer emergency force units. Some 30,000 people are on the PRIME BEEF rosters. In normal times, they are responsible for the day to day maintenance of military public works associated with bases in the U.S. Reserve and Guard personnel number 14,000; active duty, 16,000. They are mostly artisans.

Their emergency mission is to bed down deploying forces, conduct emergency war repairs, provide fire protection, and (to a lesser extent) manage construction projects. They are structured into a variety of specialized teams, often as small as ten people. Deployment for them involves only the people carrying hand tools--not materials and heavy equipment. They have no experience or training with large scale public utility systems.

Operational plans developed by the CINCs are managed by the Joint Deployment Agency and fed into the computerized Joint Deployment system for the rapid transmission of messages to the units and teams for movement overseas. For contingencies where no plan exists, AF Engineering Services will determine requirements and pass them to the Deployment Agency.

RED HORSE provides the ability to rapidly assemble up to seven teams each of about 450 men. Four are active duty, 2 Guard, and 1 Reserve. The teams are self-contained in terms of functions including guards, cooks, etc. They can, if fully used, build air bases, large scale barriers, and installations. Reserve personnel can be used without mobilization as active duty training time. The teams can be drawn on for different capabilities and with different degrees of rapid deployment. Survey team subsets of about 12 people are highly mobile. Medium size repair team subsets are air liftable, but rather slowly. Complete teams with their full array of heavy equipment require surface transportation. While deployment times can be shortened by relying on locally available heavy equipment, the time saving may be illusory. It will take time to gain the use of that equipment, understand its workings, and possibly repair it.

Even with all this potential, planning for effective use to support urban control and management of Third World cities is practically nil.

OASD(ISA) Office of Humanitarian Asistance

This office was set up on June 1984 to provide transportation, excess property, and medical assistance from DoD resources in support of disaster relief and civic action. It has no budget under its control and the staff consists of one civilian professional and one reserve officer. The military Services and the CINCs for economically advanced regions opposed its establishment. It is the official DoD link with the USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. Activities are tightly constrained legislatively.

Illustrative activities include arrangements for a medical team to deal with cholera in Somalia, a U.S. Army team to operate a ferry for food and human transport in Mali, and C-141 cost reimbursed airlift for famine relief supplies to Africa.

The office does not have the capabilities needed to play a central role in managing DoD support for urban control and management.

USAID Office of U.S. Disaster Assistance

This small, lean, 24 hour a day operation is the lead U.S. government element for responding to disaster situations abroad whether caused by acts of nature or man--"civil strife, border conflict, riot, displacement of large numbers of people, explosion or fire." Its activities tend to focus on the Third World. It goes into action on receipt of a request from the U.S. Ambassador that in turn follows a request from the government of the affected country. Its activities are not limited to governments with which the U.S. has friendly relations, or countries with U.S. development assistance programs.

Notable strengths include:

-- Fast response in terms of dispatching and funding assessment teams, tasking other elements of the U.S. Government (DoD, PHS, FEMA), letting contracts to the private sector including voluntary organizations;

-- An inventory of practical lessons learned over twenty years;

-- Knowledge of and established relations with networks of relevant U.S. and foreign specialists and organizations for emergency management;

-- A mandate to engage in planning and informational activities in support of possible disaster contingencies;

-- Frequent use of their skills, well-exercised mechanisms.

The office mandate clearly precludes planning for military operations. The Office must respect Congressional concerns that it not be used to launder DoD money or support primary DoD missions. The Office has several active duty military personnel on its staff in specialist roles who are non-reimbursable. It is open to cooperation with reserve personnel who have pertinent skills, in terms of providing training opportunities and having them on its roster of specialists to call when contingencies arise. Such steps would have to be compatible with the burdens on the regular staff and their limited resources. There is no JCS or other DoD liaison presence in the Office or vice-versa.

The planning mandate includes guidance for and support to the preparation of Mission Disaster Relief Plans and Disaster Assessments. The CINCs are often involved in the disaster relief planning effort. These documents are potentially relevant to military commanders charged with support of urban control and management in two ways. First, if completed in detail and kept up to date, they provide a host of relevant information. Second, they provide pertinent checklists of information needed. Their contents overlap substantially with what military commanders will need to know (see Appendix D). In addition, the Office funds an active contract program of country profiles, and has sponsored at least one model urban profile. Their contents provide basic information, including informationabout local points of contact, fundamental to support of urban control and management. A typical AID country profile covers:

General Information
- Geographic Codes
- Country Names
- Calendar and Holidays
- Currency
- Time Zones
- U.S. Mission and Staff
- Host Country Mission and Staff in U.S.
- Sister Cities
- Treaties and Agreements
- Inernational Organization Memberships
- Travel and Visa Information
- Ethnic and Sociocultural Groups
- Languages
- Education
- Religions

Government
- National Government
- Regional Organization
- 1982 Status
- Major Government Figures

Disaster Preparedness
- Disaster Types and History
- Host Disaster Plan
- U.S. Plan
- U.S. Disaster Relief Team
- Peace Corps
- U.S. Volags
- Other International and Voluntary Organizations
- Host Resources
- Storage

Population
- National Population
- Regional Population

Health, Nutrition, and Housing
- Health Overview
- Summary of Diseases
- Vital Statistics
- Health Facilities
- Health Personnel
- Nutrition and Diet
- Staple Foods
- Cooking/Utensils
- Housing Overview
- Housing Policy and Institutions
- Disaster/Low Cost Housing
- Housing Types, Materials, Construction and Services
- Water and Sanitation

Economy
- Overview of Economy
- Recent Trends and Future Prospects
- Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
- Balance of Payments
- Imports
- Exports

Agriculture
- Overview of Agriculture
- Pesticide Use
- Crop Dates
- Agricultural Imports
- Agricultural Exports
- Current Status

Physical Geography
- Climate
- Landforms
- Land Uses
- Rivers/Coasts
- Mountains
- Volcanoes
- Seismicity

Transportation and Logistics
- Road Network
- Vehicles
- Surface Miles
- Railroad Network
- Rail Carriers
- Ports
- Shipping Lines
- Airports
- Personal Entry Requirements
- Aircraft Entry Requirements
- Airlines
- Air Distances

Power and Communications
- Electric Power
- Telecommunications
- Radio Network
- Television

These information resources together with the lessons learned file are far greater than those elsewhere available to DoD. The factual base provided by the Disaster Plan, Disaster Assessments and Country Profiles can be acted on effectively through due attention to the practical lessons learned. For example: "The use of a priest to bless the water purification operation... enhanced legitimacy in the eyes of local community members, many of whom may have been somewhat skeptical of the unit's ability to purify water." "Canned foods often do not come with can openers. It is important to procure can openers and ship them with canned food." "The people who have the most time to devote to obtaining relief are often those who least need it. The neediest are too busy recovering lost items and constructing temporary shelters, and they have no time to stand in relief lines."

U.S. Country Teams

The overseas missions operating under the Department of State vary greatly in number and type of personnel, but almost all of them are situated in urban areas and represent important reservoirs of "know-how" and intelligence about the city and country where they are loated. It is important that these reservoirs be tapped to provide timely information and advice.

The civilian personnel (State, CIA, USIA, AID, etc.) and military personnel (DIA, MAAG) of overseas missions have language skills and have developed local relationships of potential usefulness over a wide spectrum. They can identify and probably know personally the upper and middle echelon of the government and the military forces, the police, the municipal authorities, the commercial and banking community, media representatives and cultural leaders, and political leaders (including representatives of opposition and dissident groups). Members of country teams in less prestigious positions (regional security, administrative and consular) may have particularly good connections with local level officials. It is important to keep in mind that what country team members know about the urban area in which they work may be far greater than what they routinely report about it. That latent knowledge, together with the key contact rosters members of the country team maintain, can be of considerable value.

Overseas missions normally employ local residents who serve full-time in administrative, clerical, mechanical, and custodial functions. These local employees know their city more intimately than any foreigner and should not be overlooked by the U.S. military commander as a potential source of useful advice and service. The Administrative or Personnel Officer of the overseas mission can supply names and addresses, and guidance as to character, loyalty, and potential usefulness.

Detailed knowledge of the working of an urban area is not usually on the country team agenda, and embassies and consultates are not normally staffed by experts on city management and persons with civil engineering skills. One possible exception for available information consists of the evacuation plans prepared for natural and man-made disasters. These may involve learning a great deal about local service systems and key personnel, especially in the capital city. They can be of considerable help if they have been recently updated in detail. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect that detailed information on how the urban area functions will require sending a team of experts to the Embassy or consulate. Many country teams have military officers who support the foreign military sales programs of the Defense Security Assistance Agency. Increased use of these officers, many of whom already report directly to the theater CINC, could enhance the countryteam-CINC cooperation.

More generally, the usefulness of the country team will depend on the coherence of policy guidance from different Washington agencies to its members, relations between the non-DoD members of the country team and the U.S. military commander and his staff, and the extent to which the local situation has permitted the Embassy to function fully rather than making it a besieged target needing U.S. military protection for physical survival. If at all possible, intimate contact with the country team is essential. Should a country team not exist, military commanders will benefit by having recently evacuated members of the last country team or others with comparable experience assigned to them as advisors.

U.S. Private Sector

The U.S. private sector often will have a larger presence in country than the U.S. Government. American business men often will have more practical knowledge of and better contacts with operational level local officials and managers (public and private sector) than will U.S. Government officials. For example, U.S. firms may have supplied equipment and services television stations, radio stations, telephone systems, and mobile communications networks. Even if they have not, they will know what European and Japanese vendors have. Depending on the situation, different firms will fit particularly well with the following criteria: (1) large-scale overseas experience including in the pertinent country or region; (2) experience with Third World public sector administration and municipal infrastructure; (3) capability for rapid damage assessment of municipal facilities; (4) capability to repair and operate municipal facilities; (5) capability to provide emergency municipal services; (6) capability to operate globally to develop available information and to procure and deliver basic commodities in large quantities (e.g., food, fuel); (7) demonstrated flexibility to meet unanticipated managerial or operational conditions in the Third World; (8) substantial numbers of personnel employed or recruitable directly or by contract with appropriate language, managerial and technical skills; and (9) familiarity with U.S. military procedures and organizational style.

Historical experience (e.g., Vietnam) and a previous DSB study (the Currie report on Contractor Field Support) suggest that the private sector can undertake pertinent functions and do so reliably in spite of considerations of business and physical risk.

CINC Considerations

In normal times, CINCs have few relevant assets to support control and management of large Third World urban areas. Their planning tends to omit (or pay only lip-service to) reserve assets only available upon mobilization (most civil affairs and psychological operations personnel, more than half of U.S. Army engineering and medical personnel). The CINCs often have no staff in- country. They are hampered by the chronic low priority for Third World intelligence based on national means. Intelligence equipment for theater use tends to be unhelpfully manpower intensive, visible, and hard to secure. That is, the assets other than national means tend to be politically and logistically troublesome. The CINCs also are hampered by chronically low priorities for communications equipment optimized for low- intensity Third World conflicts. Communications links between CINCs and country teams and between country teams and Washington are sometimes incomplete, insecure and vulnerable. Mobility assets are unhelpfully oriented toward situations with big airfields and commodious ports. There is little "brown water" capability and too

much reliance on C-5As and, C-141s when local airfields may not even be capable of handling C-130s.

In sum, CINCs are unlikely to have timely information about Third World urban areas. They probably will have to use equipment inappropriate for the mission and put U.S. personnel into situations for which they are not prepared. These realities are known to them and their strong preference is to avoid Third World urban areas. Yet policy commitments and defense guidance lead to plans whose success requires friendly or at least acquiescent cities with little drain on combat resources. Given this situation, the status quo has a fundamental, serious defect. CINCs are unlikely to be able to provide U.S. country teams with timely information and capabilities to bring locals to act in ways that minimize U.S. involvement and prevent a situation from deteriorating. Nor are they likely to be able to respond effectively and efficiently to such a deterioration, at least short of being diverted from their primary mission.

Chapter 5.

HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Military forces, U.S. and foreign, have had substantial experience in trying to control and manage large urban areas, or in supporting locals trying to do so. No two situations are identical. The political and military objectives of the external military force and the circumstances of its presence make an enormous difference for the difficulty of urban control. Nevertheless, looking at historical experience non-mechanically can be of value. It illustrates the variety of possible situations. When the same problems and implications recur repeatedly it provides some hard-earned wisdom for planners. This section summarizes the experience discussed at greater length in Appendix E and that garnered from briefings to the Task Force.

World War II U.S. and British Experience in Europe

The World War II U.S. and British experiences in Europe represent cases one would expect to have been at a positive extreme. Planning was intense and policy objectives were crystal clear compared to many more recent cases. Nevertheless, policy guidance was usually inadequate. Civil affairs personnel requirements were severely underestimated, as were indigenous civilian supply requirements. Relations with combat commanders and combat units were often poor. The immediate consequence was that civil affairs personnel had difficulty in getting into the urban area at the beginning of the intervention. As a result they were slow in gaining control of key items already in the area (arms and fuel) which "disappeared" into local hands. In numerous cases combat units and civil affairs personnel worked at cross purposes, especially with regard to the local police. Lower echelon units had no civil affairs personnel and did not understand that part of the mission, so cooperation was poor with counter-intelligence and field security units. Lacking their own transportation, civil affairs units had to get it from combat units. They also had to plead for assets to restore minimum essential civilian services--hardly the top priority for combat commanders.

As for the locals, their initial welcome based on "horn of plenty" expectations, in part the result of Allied propaganda, faded quickly. Drift into friction and mutual frustration also followed from local realities. Locals were quick to manipulate Allied attempts to identify "good guys" and "bad guys" to even up old scores and further their own agendas. They exploited the intervenors' needs for local labor in ways that contributed to inflation, exacerbated shortages, and led to thriving black markets. Politically friendly locals often turned out to be the wrong people to make local institutions work. There also were urgent civilian needs that would not wait. Principal among these were food supply (which imposed a heavy burden on military logistics), and the care and control of displaced persons who flooded to the cities. All led to triangular friction between locals, military combat commanders, and those responsible for the civil affairs mission.

Both the British and Americans wrote of lessons learned, each in their own idiom. The British summarized them this way:

> "...the maintenance problems of modern Armies are to a large extent bound up with the maintenance of the civilians living in the operational areas and on the ...lines of communication.... These civilians had to be retained in a reasonable state of health and be given adequate food and the bare necessities of life. If this had not been done they would have become an operational hindrance which would have curtailed the radius of action of the forces in the field. In order to administer the civilian population the import, manufacture and movement of certain essential stores for civilian use had to continue. These conflicted directly with the maintenance of military forces and priorities had to be decided constantly between the military and civil requirements.
>
> "...as the requirements of Civil Affairs mounted, it became apparent that the existing Civil Affairs organization was not large enough and had not sufficient resources to cope with the problem. It would have been better if the requirements for Civil Affairs had been made the responsibility of the existing Staff and Services."*

A senior U.S. official emphasized:

- Let city officials run the city. Let them work. It's their city. Don't try to make all the decisions for them. Just don't let them interfere with military operations;
- Get interpreters--as many as you can. If you can't communicate, you can't act;
- Get into your town... at the earliest possible moment, even if fighting is still going on;
- Keep a weather eye on the relationship between troops and civilians especially in matters of police relationships;
- Lift the morale of the civilians... by sympathetic understanding of their troubles.**

The bottom line was that local politics and economics would not wait until a time convenient for Allied military commanders.

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*_Administrative History of 21 Army Group, 6 June 1944 - 8 May 1945._ Germany, November 1945.

**Major General J. Maginnis, _Military Government Journal: Normandy to Berlin_. University of Massachusetts Press, Mass., 1971.

World War II Allied and British Experience in the Third World

During and in the immediate aftermath of World War II the U.S. and the British were involved in supporting urban control and management in the Third World. Three cases (the Persian Gulf command in Iran, 1942-45, the U.S. move into Korea 1945, and the British tribulation in Saigon in 1945) yield some relevant lessons.

In each case policy guidance was inadequate being unclear, unrealistic, or tardy. In each case, involvement went far beyond what was initially conceived. In each case, the Allies found themselves drawn into local conflicts and disputes rather than being able to stay in a neutral role. In each case, local agendas were different from those of the Allies. The consequences differed. In Iran, the upper class resented interference with its prerogatives while the masses blamed the U.S. for corruption, and inefficiency in the indigenous government. In Korea, locals used the vacuum created by the collapse of Japanese rule for factional and parochial ends. In Saigon, only the British thought the war was over. They became the target of organized violence by relying on former rulers (the Japanese and their collaborators) and acknowledging French claims. These cases do not argue that bad outcomes dominate. After all, the Persian Gulf Command did manage to keep supplies moving through Iran and political order was established in South Korea. They do demonstrate that the costs and requirements go well beyond those initially projected. The British experience in Indo-China is a classic case of what can happen when too small a force with an uncertain mission is introduced into a violent and fluid political environment.

Post-World War II U.S. Experience

All the relevant U.S. experience since World War II has been in the Third World from Korea (1950-53), to Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965-66) and, most recently, Grenada. (The most recent Lebanon adventure did not have support to urban control and management on its agenda.) The Dominican Republic case presents the clearest experience centered on support to the control and management of an urban area and will be discussed last.

The dominant impression is one of repeating the inadequacies that occurred in World War II. Planning was inadequate to non-existent and intelligence was poor. Problems of displaced persons and food supply were underestimated. Appropriate mechanisms were lacking at lower levels of command to resolve conflicts between military operations and civil affairs (and civilian) needs. Nor did higher levels of U.S. military command have any integrated staff support sophisticated about the local political consequences of actions of commission or omission. The complexities of U.S. military organization both confused locals and provided them with opportunities for manipulation. Nevertheless, certain potential disasters were avoided such as epidemics and large scale riots. Success was avoiding glaring signs of failure.

Differences were largely a function of local political and military context and U.S. objectives. Korea involved a supposedly independent and allied government open to advice but resistant to direction. It was also a government then inadequate to deal with the economic disruption of massive, prolonged conventional war. The Lebanon intervention in 1958 was relatively tranquil with little military damage. The central government was friendly and in place. The ease of the U.S. intervention was aided by a well-functioning country team that could and did play a major role in

dealing with civilian problems and linking U.S. military commanders to local civil authorities. The indigeneous national military welcomed the U.S. intervention and had few other tasks to distract it from serving as a buffer between the U.S. military and the local population. Coordination between the U.S. and indigeneous military authorities, local civil elites, and the U.S. country team was effective through joint civil affairs teams--but largely fortuitous. It was not based on joint planning or clear prior policy guidance involving the U.S. military commander and our Ambassador.*

The Grenada case is marked by ad-hoc responses and serious intra-U.S. friction. Civil affairs and psychological operations personnel were marginal to preparations for the intervention and had difficulty gaining early entry into Grenada. Guidance was unclear from the JCS to the commander of the 82nd, and there was friction between those responsible for civil affairs and CINCLANT. No locator of key local officials was available and public health needs came largely as surprises. Nevertheless, the military ease of the mission and the smallness of the population involved enabled the U.S. to cope.

The Dominican case involved a U.S. military presence concentrated in the capital city for some sixteen months. It merits particular attention by illustrating the complexity of support to urban control and management in a politically unstable situation, and for the thoughtful report by the principal U.S. commander, General Bruce Palmer. A very thin pre-invasion planning effort was quickly followed by a scramble to assess relevant capabilities that began on D-Day. The assessment involved the "loyalist" government, the Dominican Red Cross (medical needs), public works and utilities enterprises (engineering needs), the Missionary Board and local clergy, State Department members of the country team (economic needs and political dynamics), USIA (media needs), the MAAG (possible contribution from the indigenous military), and the Peace Corps. Actual civil affairs operations began on D+3 and came to include distributing food daily from multiple points, establishing medical facilities, restoring electric power, providing potable water, reducing sanitation hazards, getting civilians to return to normal commercial activities, and encouraging schools to resume. It is important to remember that Santo Domingo was not a terribly large Third World city (closer to half a million than a million in population), or one that had experienced great physical damage, or had a legacy of bitter, endemic conflict locally. Far worse cases are easily imaginable.

Nevertheless, delay in introducing civil affairs elements led to inefficiencies based on a poor understanding of the local situation. Under estimation of civilian relief supply needs led to interference with military logistics. Lack of prior planning between U.S. military and civilian agencies led to inefficient, inadequate and confused food distribution. Greater use was made than anticipated of engineering and medical elements. Efforts to jam rebel communications to the population were unsuccessful because of poor equipment and underestimation of rebel capabilities.

In addition to avoiding these difficulties General Palmer urged several specific steps. First, population control requires sensitive treatment involving language capable MPs, metal detectors to check females for concealed weapons, and joint patrols with the local police. Second, local transport should be relied on for food supply by providing fuel and hiring local truckers and vehicles to bring in food from

*USMC *Military Expeditions Short of War*, 1961.

the hinterland. That reduces one possible set of U.S. targets and provides tangible rewards to some locals. Third, engineering data should be collected on key buildings. Fourth, the U.S. military profile should be kept down by relying on private relief organizations and placing them in the forefront of contact with the local population. Finally, special efforts should be made to provide youth with recreational opportunities (athletic equipment, music).

Post World War II British Military Experience In Policing Cities

Perspective. The British military have been involved in some 70 campaigns since World War II. Most were in support of or at the request of the established legal government. A painful handful have found them in the middle between rival local factions (Palestine, Cyprus, Aden, and Northern Ireland). Few campaigns were conducted in territories with which the British had no direct political connection. Most were in currently or recently British colonial, mandated, or protected territories. They either directly controlled the government as the long established metropole, or were there on a permanent or long-term basis with the full consent of the local government. Also, as some of the last vestiges of the old Empire, British officers have continued to be seconded to the armed forces of former colonies. That practice leads to a reservoir of language skills, personal connections, and experience in functioning effectively in the Third World. The implication is that the U.S. will find it harder to be effective than the British have. That is, the U.S. will find it harder to achieve the requirements for success identified by the British and may face additional requirements.

Principles. An effective intelligence network featuring human agents with suitable communications is of primary importance. That network needs to be operational before military operations begin.

Very close cooperation with the local police and communities are essential to defeat hostile groups. That cooperation rests on the opinions formed by the local population, in particular judgments about physical safety. Providing protection directly against intimidation by hostiles or by bolstering the effectiveness and morale of the local police forces become central challenges. Prophylactic fire power is no substitute. "To destroy a man's house in the process of trying to winkle out a terrorist is not the way to win a friend." All military operations must be conducted within the law. That is inherent for legitimacy with the local population and with one's own home population. Thus training, operational practices, and equipment should emphasize self-discipline and restraint (e.g., rifles with automatic fire capability removed, accounting for rounds fired).

Tactics should combine active patrol measures with personnel security. Visible operations should be combined with covert and clandestine activity. The objective is to keep hostiles and their supporters guessing and on edge. Surprise is essential so it is important to avoid routine, predictable behavior of any kind, and at the same time to foster in hostile cadres the belief that they may always be under observation and their lines of retreat are likely to be cut off. Effective tactics emphasize stealth and cleverness, not a noisy presence. Passive defense isolated in fixed bases will not suffice. Instead dynamic patrolling aided by secure communications and light armored vehicles (for personnel protection and mobile fire power) are essential. The contribution of helicopters can easily be overrated. Other particularly useful forms of equipment are night observation, surveillance, and physical and electronic warning devices.

The pertinent operations are extremely demanding on the discipline, morale and skill of junior officers and enlisted men. This sort of military effort is the war of the corporals and the second lieutenants, not of the colonels and generals. It is the young corporal on the street who is faced with the immediate decision to fire or not and thus to avoid or trigger an incident. Special training is essential, including training in the image that actions will project in the media.

Priority should go to joint efforts with the local police forces, including joint patrols. Accordingly, it is highly desirable to make the zones of operation of military units coincide with local police districts, to co-locate military units with police barracks, and to place tactical headquarters in the local police headquarters. Whenever possible, local security committees should be established, composed of senior British military and intelligence officers, and high-level local police and government officials. "C4 is the name of the game: colocation, communication, committees, and coincident boundaries."

Engineers have an especially important role to play in controlling hostiles, in restoring essential civil services, and in projects carefully selected to appeal to locals according to local desires. Engineering projects should also be viewed as an element of incident prevention and containment, e.g., facades that keep hostile indigeneous groups from physical or even visual contact with each other.

Public relations projects can be beneficial, e.g., playgrounds, but only if they are not destroyed by hostiles and do not themselves need to be protected. Here as elsewhere, the efficacy of means to secure public support depends on the capacity to prevent intimidation.

Tactical and local police and community relations imperatives combine to create a need for one person competent in the local language(s) for each patrol.

Northern Ireland/Belfast. The territory and population involved are small (1.5 million in the province, half a million in Belfast). The British have intimate, centuries long familiarity with the area and their presence was and is desired by more than half of the population. The campaign has now lasted for more than 15 years. Yet a vicious cycle has occurred. Terrorist activity leads to demands for tighter security measures which when imposed reduce terrorist activity. The population then seeks relaxation of the measures and that is done, followed by resurgence of terrorist activity. The population then concludes that security measures are not working. A climate of persistent criticism develops.

The British have not been able to prevent intimidation from terrorists estimated to number on the order of 400 incident-carrying-out personnel. That has been true with a British military to terrorist active cadre ratio of as high as 25:1. The difficulty of eliminating intimidation is seen in even starker perspective when the numbers of police and Ulster defense forces are taken into account. Doing so brings the ratio to the order of 50:1 at its peak and a low of 35:1. The British have been relatively successful at forestalling mass communal riots.

Engineers play a central role. They need to have varying construction designs and materials as political guidance changes. Engineers have performed numerous functions including providing surveys and maps, fortification and obstacle construction, search and security arrangements, (including under water and in sewers), and assistance to civil ministries and the civilian community. The security contribution has included detonation and entry defenses. Contributions to search

have involved provision of advisors, a mandatory procedure when explosive devices are suspected. Support to civil ministries has focused on the continuing functioning of public utilities. The engineer contribution has if anything increased as commanders' hopes for a clear victory based on successful searches has dwindled. Engineer personnel need to comprise one-third to one-half of the total uniformed force.

Specialized training on the order of two months is provided before assignment, much of it by a Northern Ireland training team that goes to units before they are sent to the province. Only regular force units are used--not reservists and not civilians called up.

The Belfast experience demonstrates that urban density is a key factor as distinct from total size and population of the urban area. High rise buildings pose especially severe problems.

Special requirements include: 1) for each battallion of 600 men, about 50 soft-skinned vehicles (jeeps and communication vehicles) and about 20 specially configured hard-skinned vehicles (about 8 armored cars and 10-12 APCs); 2) a large number of communications sets that work in cities (about one radio for every four soldiers) and special communications and communications security training for large numbers of soldiers; and 3) detailed, updated maps of the social composition of neighborhoods and of previous violent incidents.

French Experience Since Algeria. French experience since World War II has involved sites where they had a substantial historical presence. Keys to success have been: 1) pre-existing agreements with locals which have involved a presence prior to the crisis intervention; 2) rich intelligence provided by pre-positioned forces, military attaches, and special services; 3) experienced forces which had been rotated for training through the intervention site or essentially similar places (and whose experience there had been monitored by more senior commanders); 4) a low-profile, indirect approach featuring locals dealing with locals; and 5) acceptance that the loss of a small number of personnel is essentially part of the "business" and not something with major domestic political consequences. In Africa, for example, local French representatives are responsible for updated files on who counts locally and how to communicate with them. Pertinent forces are rotated to Africa for training, where the French plan to avoid "white" patrols. The general theme is how to do better with less.

More generally, the French view the urban medium as a great reducer of conventional capabilities. Conditions of high density degrade C^3I, firepower, and mobility. In addition, even friendly populations pose difficulties and demands. In general, personnel must be extremely self-disciplined and flexible. For C^3, decentralization is imperative together with greater reliance on short range radios, landlines, and couriers. Decentralized capabilities for obstacle construction and demolition are equally desirable. Special priorities should go to human intelligence and technical means for surreptitious and timely observation. There will be especially great needs for weapons associated with flat fire trajectories, fast and precise fire, minimal engagement ranges, and dissociation between the location of fire control observers and the weapons themselves. The ease of infiltration given ample concealment must be recognized. Mobility and counter-mobility will be heavily dependent on engineering intelligence on such matters as obstacles, chokepoints, underground utility networks, and building specifics.

The Beirut experience is particularly relevant for its counter-terrorist implications including the problems posed by explosives, booby traps, and mines. it presented the problems of a city of about one million population, with many 20-40 story highrise buildings of metal or reinforced concrete. Special problems were posed by the meshing of electronic triggering systems with modern high-power explosives, problems "for which a counter has yet to be found." Obstacle zones were created combining mines, special explosives, cluster bombs, artillery sub-munitions, and incendiary devices. Presence of the local population facilitated enemy infiltration with internal complicity that confronted the French with: 1) obstruction of necessary roadways; 2) public demonstration to interfere with planned actions; 3) neutralization of obstacles before their completion; 4) booby-trapped vehicles and truck-bombs; 5) attacks against command posts, logistical and medical units.

The lessons of that experience include numerous implications for:

-- Engineering intelligence. (location of tall buildings and underground parking lots, energy supply networks, building specifics including cross sections and visibility from main access routes, public works systems -- all of these to be continuously updated).

-- Capabilities to selectively activate or deactivate services to parts of the city and particular buildings (water, electricity, communications).

-- Denial of enemy access to high rise buildings and obstructing enemy use of roads and other access routes.

-- Security by using sturdiest buildings, protecting and camouflaging defense fire points.

-- Expecting the enemy to pursue acts intended to wear down public support at home and create dramatic shocks by incidents that exact substantial casualties.

-- Recognizing that the enemy has numerous destructive means and tactics available to him, worse than those used against French personnel in Beirut.

Measures to forestall enemy attacks through disruptive measures obviously depend on intelligence. Without such capabilities, which are hard to acquire instantly, a conventional army had best give the most serious attention to protective measures including: 1) preventing vehicle penetration; 2) exercise of full-time, complete security powers near all facilities; 3) neutralizing all sites of possible hostile fire; 4) electronic surveillance of facility security perimeters; and 5) especially trained combined engineering and intelligence teams charged to assess and develop countermeasures for changing enemy tactics and destructive devices.

In sum: "Soldiers of the World , Dig In"

Israeli Experience

Perspective. The Israelis have had substantial experience in using their military to seize and control cities outside of their pre-war borders. The relevance of their experience is doubtful in important respects. Their concern is with the control of occupied territory taken in combat from hostile forces and, primarily, hostile

central governments. The hostile political and military parties and the relevant cities are few in number, almost permanent items on a rather short list, geographically nearby, and linguistically easy for much of the Israeli population. Historically, campaigns have assumed popular consensus among the Jewish population of Israel on the legitimacy of military occupation at least for a while, and of harsh measures to maintain control. Also, campaigns culminating in occupation have taken the form of very rapid mobilization and seizure. Cautious incrementalism is not the Israeli military style. Most possible cases of U.S. military support to the control and management of Third World cities do not match these features. On the other hand, the Israeli concern with minimizing their casualties and use of small numbers of personnel to control much larger indigenous populations may well resemble U.S. priorities.

Doctrine. We have two bodies of information on the Israeli approach. The first deals with the Arab territories occupied after the 1967 War and the second with their practices and learning from the recent involvement in Lebanon. We shall deal briefly with the first which is less relevant to the Task Force problem (the occupied territories had no large cities), and then discuss the second more fully.

Treatment of the occupied territories emphasizes normalization with minimal visible presence and maximum non-intervention. The Israeli military was kept as invisible as possible (no flags, etc.). Local government matters were left alone except for budget guidance. More intrusive measures were taken only when matters posed direct risks to Israelis (e.g., sanitation, university student unrest). Resumption of prior economic and social relations with the Arab world was facilitated (open bridges). A Regional Commander has all non-security responsibilities aided by a staff seconded from various Israeli civil ministries. Under him are District Commanders who are military officers with civil and military assets.* Sporadic incidents continue.

Recently revised doctrine is structured in terms of three stages: combat, consolidation, and activation. In the combat stage, priority goes to military destruction of the enemy with secondary attention to minimizing the disruption of civil life and destruction of urban facilities and important economic and cultural features. Contacts and relations with the civil population are needed to achieve surrender and avoid disruption and destruction. Even in this stage the military government specialists are attached to the combat command headquarters. A small unit of less than ten people provides professional advice to commanders and other forces. They advise on immediate steps to control the local population and lay the groundwork for subsequent more established military government. They are users rather than producers of intelligence and psychological operations material. Clear policy guidance is assumed. Members of this "pioneering" group are drawn from the larger reserve military government unit that will arrive for the next two stages.

The second or consolidation stage involves securing the gains from combat by preventing hostile operations. The intent is to eliminate remnants of hostile forces or hostile population elements. The city is not yet quiet and violent events occur. This stage may last for only several days, or, if the war continues, may go on for a

*Israeli Ministry of Defense, Coordinator of Government Operations in the Administered Territories. Four years of Military Administration, 1967-1971. (No place, no date).

month or more. Military personnel requirements are not precise, but one case of relative simplicity involved one Israeli soldier for 40 members of the local population. In this stage, an enlarged military government group serves as a special staff to the military commander who is also the military governor. Priority goes to eliminating resistance and establishing full control. Directives are issued involving a full curfew for 24-28 hours, closing particular areas to the local population, surrender of weapons, and surrender or turning in of persons linked to the enemy. Key installations are secured by Israeli military personnel. These steps are accompanied and followed by the arrest of all enemy security and intelligence personnel, members and supporters of terrorist cells, hostile political leaders, and criminal elements. The curfew may be lifted or reduced to 22 hours(to allow for necessary economic activities) while a house to house search is conducted. Minimum essential local services are reactivated, as much as possible by the local population.

Activation of full military government, the third and final stage, has no automatic beginning point but continues until the end of the occupation. High level policy matters affect the timing of this stage as do the course of the war and the degree of organized resistance continuing in the urban area. A full-fledged military government headquarters is established. Specialized teams of reservists, e.g., water supply experts, are called in as needed. The point is to provide for as normal as possible functioning of the city compatible with Israeli government objectives. Extremely detailed knowledge is acquired on all physical, economic, political and social aspects of the urban area.

Special Considerations. It is clear that the War in Lebanon revealed several major weaknesses which were militarily and politically counterproductive. First, the Israelis were counterproductively late in dealing with the subsistence and health needs of refugees, the physical safety of non-combatants, and the requirements for orderly commerce. Second, their hostility to voluntary organizations further undermined services to and antagonized the civil population. Third, they made major misassessments about the Christian factions and about the importance and nature of the Shiite community. Whether for these or other reasons, the most current doctrine calls attention to the need to prepare for and deal with the supply burden posed by refugees, maintain water and electrical facilities, insure provision of medical and public health services, stabilize the banking and financial systems, preserve private property, and take special measures for capitol cities.

High intelligence priority goes to the names and addresses of important personalities and high military priority to their capture. Special preparations should be made to secure their cooperation, not as full-fledged collaborators but as sources of influence to get the population to return to normal habits and isolate hostiles. Arrest is the fallback position. In the capitol, high priority goes to seizure of all military and intelligence facilities, all other government administrative centers, ports and airfilds, and media facilities. After initial seizure, reserve units will take over these critical points. Secondary priority goes to financial institutions, industries and fuel supply facilities. Physical destruction and theft of economic assets is to be minimized and the use of local officials maximized. The intent is to make clear to the local population that the return of normalcy is up to them. Resistance and abstention will only hurt the local population.

Controls feature several sets of specialists. These include the military government reservists who have attended a special school and trained as a team for a particular city, the psychological operations specialists who are present in the Israeli Army down to the brigade level, the communications corps members who are to

immediately seize media facilities and focus them on the local population, and field intelligence units attached to initial combat forces who are specially trained to get information from the local population. Massive intelligence collection takes place before combat including information on key personalities in the influence networks in the city.

The philosophy at work seeks to combine an image of omnipresence (control of all key facilities and the whole city) with very regulated contact with the population including minimizing that by "ordinary soldiers". The emphasis on omnipresence leads to rejecting a strategy of control limited to a few sections of the city. The local population is held to perceive that as a sign of weakness and thus to dare to attack the occupiers. The spread of such daring marks the end of low-cost occupation.

The Soviets in Kabul

When the Soviet intervention began, the population of Kabul was about one million. It has since doubled. The Soviets have assigned about 50,000 troops to the control of Kabul and the surrounding area. Initial entry was based on a major military airfield some 40 kms from the city. Crack forces first secured control of media, major government buildings, major Afghan military garrison facilities and disarmed Afghan military in the capitol. The same troops established a defense perimeter around the city. The major invasion followed after those actions.

Kabul then and now has no particular military significance and the Soviets have kept their major operational bases and logistics termination points well away from it. Also, the Afghan central government in Kabul never has controlled most of the rest of the country. Kabul's only significance is as a political symbol to the rest of the world of who controls the official government of Afghanistan.

Since the occupation, most of the native managerial and technical class has fled the country--with no severe obstacles placed in their way by the Soviets. Before and during entry, and since, the Soviets have faced difficult problems of internal conflict within the Afghan Communist Party, most of whose members now live in Kabul. They have to spend energy controlling their erstwhile allies as well as their enemies. The dialect of Pharsi spoken by Kabulis (Dari) apparently posed no significant language problems for the Soviets. Many Afghans speak Russian, and Dari and Pharsi are mutually intelligible.

Soviet control is very limited and selective with large areas of the city and population left alone. Physical security is maintained by Soviet troops on a sustained basis only over several main roads in and out of the city, areas near Soviet used facilities (garrison quarters, hospital), radio/TV facilities, and major government buildings. The initial attempt to maintain a still lower profile by having security functions performed by the Afghan military did not work. The Soviets have made no attempt to improve impoverished living standards and the primitive utilities and public health infrastructure are overwhelmed.

Control such as they exert is more formal than real. The Soviets have to accept a continuing low level of casualties even though they avoid much of the city and stay in armed groups in the fraction of the city in which they do go. Russian "advisors" are in all civil offices with control of paper permissions. Formal government doesn't matter very much. These initially were military and now are largely civilians.

The Soviets do control much of the flow of food into the city and have had to provide bulk supplies from the Soviet Union and Pakistan to replace crops from the surrounding area that have been laid waste as a security measure. Other than special stores for their Afghan associates, the Soviets do not control grass roots food distribution. Nor have they introduced a special currency or shut down a thriving currency blackmarket. Nor do they have an effective identification system for laborers they necessarily use. Control of motor fuel is very limited, in part because of illicit sales by Soviet military personnel.

In sum, this case is one of control and management by means largely of non-control and non-management. Even then, whatever urban order exists depends in part on tacit agreements with the Afghan resistance, many of whom have sent their families to the relative safety of Kabul. Attempts to create reasonable relations with locals, e.g., by using Soviet troops that are Moslems, have largely been abandoned (in that example, because of desertion). Even with such limited aims, the Soviets still have to accept small numbers of casualties on a continuing basis. It is not clear what the Soviets could and would have done if Kabul had military importance.

Chapter 6.

RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION

The findings presented in the previous chapters lead to four sets of recommendations: (1) policy principles for adoption to provide the basis for the subsequent development of appropriate doctrine; (2) immediate steps to provide a modicum of help and awareness without delay; (3) a set of institutionally significant but financially modest actions to improve mission planning and preparedness; and (4) a variety of actions badly needed to cope with a host of more general problems affecting U.S. interests in the Third World that also provide foundation capabilities for support to the control and management of large urban areas. We provide approximate costs and time estimates for the second and third packages of recommendations. We do not do so for the fourth. We believe that the elements of the last package should not be "charged" to the urban control and management account. They are badly needed for a host of other problems--terrorism, crisis management, security assistance, and the combat aspects of low intensity conflict--and merit implementation regardless of prevailing views about the avoidability of Third World cities.

Policy Principles

The problem assigned to the Task Force is for practical purposes a policy vacuum. This does not question the existence of a preference among military commanders to avoid Third World cities. We surely concur with that preference. At the same time we find it unrealistic and wishful to assume that they always can be avoided. If anything, the current preference and policy vacuum, raise the probability of involvement in Third World cities based on a lack of realism about what involvement may well entail. A world where the Department of Defense can rely on avoiding involvement in Third World cities would be a far different world from that which prevails now--in terms of U.S. foreign policy commitments, U.S. military logistics requirements, the political stability of friendly Third World regimes, and the intentions and capabilities of those who would hurt U.S. citizens, property, prestige and influence. It would also be a world with much longer warning times than are likely to be available for planning and preparation.

We suggest the authoritative adoption of ten "policy commandments" for our problem.

1. Avoid Third World cities unless involvement is absolutely essential for the military mission and political objectives of the U.S.

2. Recognize that many contingencies will make involvement essential and unavoidable.

3. Prepare to provide pre-commitment estimates of the costs and risks of involvement.

4. Prepare to maximize intelligence and personnel skills and to minimize U.S. force logistics needs (operations concepts and doctrine compatible with austere logistics).

5. Maximize the role of indigenous and third party organizations in support of urban control and management.

6. For what remains, maximize the role of non-DoD elements of the U.S. Government and the U.S. private sector. The DoD role should be residual, temporary, and transitional.

7. Recognize that it will be impossible to provide every unified commander with his own full suite of resources to (a) minimize the support that may be needed for urban control and management, and (b) do what is needed. Instead emphasis should go to a central pool of expertise and resources.

8. Emphasize plans, preparations and measures that will fill gaps in mass communications and what locals view as minimum essential civil services so as to reduce the chances of chaos, unrest and active hostility. Those minimum essential services involve electricity, water, food, fuel and emergency and public health medicine.

9. Emphasize a low profile on the part of U.S. forces combined with and made feasible by cooperation with local elites, opinion leaders and police forces.

10. Recognize that it will lie beyond U.S. capabilities to eliminate small numbers of hostiles or avoid continuing low levels of casualties and sporadic violence.

Quick Help

We are impressed by the present lack of quickly available competence to assess what support to urban control and management will involve for particular cases, and to provide effective staff support to commanders with such needs. That weakness is compounded by the absence of arrangements to benefit quickly from the substantial capabilities available elsewhere in the U.S. government and in the private sector. Accordingly, we suggest the following set of band-aid measures that can be brought to fruition in no longer than six months and whose maintenance on an ongoing basis should cost approximately $250,000 per year.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should:

1. Direct an element of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to set up two urban assessment and management quick reaction teams. Each team should consist of about ten senior, experienced professionals representing operational skills in urban management, civil engineering, public utilities, food distribution, public safety, care of dislocated persons, and mass communications. These teams should be composed and organized so that they can be ready to go to the field in hours with no extensive U.S. mobilization or declaration of national emergency. Accordingly, they should be drawn from current active duty officers, reserve officers, retired officers, DoD civilian employees, or OSD consultants. Persons should be added now to the OSD consultant rosters as needed to staff the teams. That step should be taken as necessary after the results are in from tasking the Services and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) to identify suitable individuals in the other categories.

2. Direct the designated OJCS element to establish liason relations with the U.S.A.I.D. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

3. Request major engineering trade associations, such as the Association of General Contractors and the National Constructors Association, to establish a "military emergency committee." The members would be persons knowledgeable about the capabilities of various firms to provide support to urban control and management in various circumstances in different parts of the world. They also would be well informed about the considerations affecting firms' willingness to make such contributions.

4. Inform unified commanders of the existence of the quick reaction teams and engineering committees.

5. Request CINCs to include these groups in appropriate theater exercises. Doing so is critical for the relationships and experience necessary for effective work in the heat of a crisis.

Longer Term Mission Preparedness

The package of quick help measures is in no way a substitute for systematic policy, planning, and preparedness. The following package of steps tries to meet those needs. In arriving at these suggestions, we were acutely aware of constraints on funds, the numerous functions support to urban control and management involves, and the principle that functions outside the mainstream of weapons development and procurement and preparations to deal with the Soviet Union languish and atrophy without a strong institutional base in the DoD. The Corps of Engineers is the organizational lynchpin of this set of recommendations. That is not because we hold the Corps itself to contain the full range of appropriate skills, equipments, and current missions. It is because the Corps presents a combination of characteristics which make it far more attractive than any alternative known to us--and indeed make it likely to be as effective with the task as international and domestic circumstances will allow.

We have looked for an organization that meets the following criteria: (a) current assignments to complimentary missions; (b) substantial human and material and bureaucratic resources; (c) historical involvement with support to civil functions; (d) close ties with non-DoD operating agencies with relevant capabilities; (e) massive cooperative involvements with foreign governments in overseas projects of a civil nature; (f) developed cooperative ties with relevant parts of the U.S. private sector; (g) demonstrated capacity to respond quickly to civil emergencies at home and abroad; (h) good working relationships with relevant elements of other Services; and (i) senior representation in the unified commands. The Task Force takes no position on the question of whether giving the Corps the role outlined below implies reorganization of some existing entities and functions external to the Corps. We are firmly convinced that the key question is how to provide what does not now exist, not how to rearrange a fragmentary set of inadequate pieces.

The Secretary of Defense should:

1. Designate an OSD (Policy) element to prepare and be responsible for ongoing policy level relations with other elements of the U.S. Government for support to urban control and management. Other key elements include State, A.I.D., U.S.I.A., and C.I.A.

2 Direct that element to complete a policy paper within a year, in cooperation with JCS, that will embody the policy ten commandments stated previously.

3. Support the designation of the Corps of Engineers as the responsible agent for preparedness for support to urban control and management with designated, fenced funds on the order of $50 million per year.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should:

1. Designate an OJCS element to develop policy in cooperation with OSD.

2. After development of that policy, direct the Army to make the Corps of Engineers the responsible agency with the powers and responsibilities identified below.

3. Request the unified commanders to look to their component Army commander and in turn that commander's principal engineering officer as the primary link to the Corp's preparedness role and for mission execution, unless special circumstances argue otherwise.

The Corps of Engineers should:

1. Be empowered to task all the Services and OSD (Reserve Affairs) to identify and pre-designate personnel and other resources. These powers must amount to a genuine hunting license.

2. Secure from the principle engineering officer of Army component commands (or another CINC designated official) statements of priority contingency urban areas and of requirements (including those for intelligence).

3. Retain persons knowledgeable about high priority cities to monitor them and provide information support to and serve as "desk cadres" for OJCS and CINC planners.

4. Conduct and contract for games, simulations and exercises to clarify and identify requirements.

5. Enter into contracts with the private sector for needed capabilities.

6. Prepare quick reaction assessment and management teams to support unified commanders as needed.

7. Establish cooperative understandings and information transfer arrangements with other parts of the U.S. Government.

8. Prepare operations and logistics plans for urban contingencies.

9. Prepare asset packages to meet those contingencies.

10. Prepare intelligence requirements for consideration in the national intelligence resource allocation process after submission through JCS and OSD.

11. Develop and maintain directly or under contract "who to call" directories for locating expertise on particular urban areas.

12. Be responsible for and empowered to insure the currency of all the lists and plans mentioned above.

13. Maintain direct liason with the principal engineering officer of component Army commands.

14. Submit recommendations and status reports directly to the responsible elements in OJCS and OSD.

The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should jointly:

Request the intelligence community to designate a coordinator for support to urban control and management who should work closely with the responsible office in the Corps of Engineers.

The arrangements for this package of mission preparedness recommendation should be completed in 18-24 months. We envision a continuing cost on the order of $50 million per year.

Foundation Capabilities

We conclude with a set of recommendations useful for decision and mission performance involving the Third World, including but going well beyond support to urban control and management.

The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should:

1. Raise the intelligence priority for classified and open source information on the Third World emphasizing "how to find out quickly" rather than heavy routine estimative requirements.

2. Request the intelligence community to conduct pilot efforts to assemble and provide the types of information and information dissemination identified in Appendix C, including video discs, social composition maps, biographical rosters.

3. Request the intelligence community to conduct one week quick response, all source exercises on what are at that time low priority Third World cities.

4. Institutionalize "from the beginning" intelligence community participation in Third World operations planning and pertinent games, simulations, and exercises.

5. Request the NSC to direct the addition of a CINC representative to each country team as the unified commander deems useful.

6. Request the National Security Council to place greater priority on the completion, updating and dissemination of mission disaster relief plans (Appendix D).

7. Request the National Security Council to develop and exercise inter-agency arrangements for Third World contingencies.

8. Encourage the unified commanders, the Army and the Marines to develop and fund requirements for the types and numbers of equipments essential for effective and secure operations in Third World cities (warning sensors, patrol vehicles, hand radios). Priority and money are the best forms of encouragement.

9. Direct the Air Force and the Navy to develop more personnel like the Army Foreign Area Specialists.

10. Task the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) to develop a computerized retrieval system for U.S. personnel identified by language competence, foreign area experience, and civil skill.

11. Task the Navy to be prepared to provide Lion or Cub advanced base packages to minimize the need for intervention in large Third World cities.

12. Establish a central, high quality psychological operations staff, expert in mass persuasion and shaping elite perceptions (in contrast to the physical aspects of message transmission).

13. Task the Army to provide the Fourth Psychological Operations Group with modern mobile mass communications assets including: (a) for television, a mobile studio, quict erect antennas, power generators, and large screen TV sets; (b) large numbers of pocket transistor radios; and (c) equipment to use direct broadcast satellites.

14. Task the Services to institutionalize ongoing education and training, simulations and games on Third World conflicts with urban control and management aspects in the Service academies and the command and staff colleges.

APPENDIX A

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

11 FEB 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Conflict Environment

You are requested to form a Task Force to examine military operations in large metropolitan areas. The key questions include: How do we control and manage large urban areas with small numbers of forces? What are the key methods of control and management? What special measures should be considered if the local population remains present? The Task Force should include in its considerations: What sort of barrier planning is required? What role in control and management can be played by the existing functional elements of metropolitan areas--water sources and distribution systems, medical facilities and sanitation, transportation facilities and patterns of use, power sources, communications media, food sources and distribution systems, and cultural/educational institutions.

The Task Force should examine and devote special attention to the role of intelligence assets, engineer and sapper units, civil affairs functions, and PSYOP units. That consideration should recognize the variety of possible enemy threats and metropolitan environments. The examination should include existing concepts of operations and relevant current U.S. capabilities. These should be compared with the requirements that follow from the answers to the key questions. If feasible, the Task Force should identify what changes are necessary.

The Task Force will be sponsored by General John W. Vessey, USA, Chairman, JCS. Dr. Davis B. Bobrow, Professor, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, has agreed to serve as Chairman of the Task Force and Lt. Col. Herbert R. Vadney, USAF, DSB Military Assistant, will be the Executive Secretary. It is not anticipated that your inquiry will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of Section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code.

James P. Wade, Jr.
Acting

APPENDIX B

TASK FORCE PARTICIPANTS

CHAIRMAN

DR. DAVIS B. BOBROW
PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT & POLITICS, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

DSB MEMBERS

DR. IVAN L. BENNETT, JR., PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
DR. EUGENE G. FUBINI , PRIVATE CONSULTANT
MR. RICHARD P. GODWIN, VICE CHAIRMAN & DIRECTOR, BECHTEL, INC.
ADMIRAL ISAAC C. KIDD, USN (RET.)
GENERAL DONN A. STARRY, USA (RET.)

ASSOCIATE MEMBERS

MGEN. JAMES A. JOHNSON, USA (RET.)
DR. PAUL A. JUREIDINI, BDM CORPORATION.
MR. WILLIAM E. KRIEGSMAN, PRESIDENT, MESA CONSULTING GROUP
DR. REUVEN LEOPOLD, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD & CEO, NKF ENGINEERING
DR. SAYRE STEVENS, GRP VICE PRESIDENT, SYSTEM PLANNING CORPORATION
DAVID SHORE, PRIVATE CONSULTANT
AMBASSADOR EMORY C. SWANK, PRES. & CEO, CLEVELAND COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS

ADVISORY GROUP

MR. PETER BAHNSON, ASST FOR SPECIAL OPS, OUSDRE/C3I
MS. BESS BURTON, DEPUTY CHIEF, GEOGRAPHY DIVISION, CIA
DR. GEORGE DEMKO, THE GEOGRAPHER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COL. JOHN DOWDEY, USAF, OFFICE OF COLLECTION MANAGEMENT, NSA
LT. COL. JOSEPH ROBINSON, USMC, OJCS/J-5, FPP DIVISION
COL. ROBERT WHITLEY, USA, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

LT. COL. HERBERT R. VADNEY, USAF, MILITARY ASSISTANT, DSB

IDA SUPPORT

DR. JEFFREY GROTTE DEP. DIRECTOR, STRATEGY, FORCES & RESOURCE DIVISION
DR. LEONARD WAINSTEIN, STRATEGY, FORCES & RESOURCES DIVISION

APPENDIX C

URBAN AREA INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Biographic Intelligence	Directory, organized by functional sectors (communications, public health, utilities, etc.), of principals in the public and private sector. Brief biographic information especially U.S. training, connections, political leanings.
Engineering Intelligence	Set of files containing technical information on major systems.
Institutional/ Services	Computerized register of services and institutional facilities in city--schools, hospitals, fire stations, etc.
Demographic/ Sociological	Maps and profiles of socioeconomic information broken down by internal subdivisions of city. Useful for targeting public information messages, food distribution requirements, etc.
Cultural/ Anthropological	Profile of do's and don'ts for operating within the cultural milieu of the particular city.
Political/ Administrative	Handbook containing information on political-administrative structure of city and structure of municipal government.
Cartographic	City plan with streets and main institutional facilities named and located.
Attitudinal	Profile of attitude toward U.S. and U.S. personnel.

APPENDIX D
MISSION DISASTER RELIEF PLAN GUIDANCE

This document provides guidance to posts on the preparation and maintenance of the Mission Disaster Relief Plan (MDRP); and in so doing supplements 2 FAM 060, AID Handbook 8 (Foreign Disaster Assistance) Chapter 3, and the recently published Emergency Action Manual.

General Policy

In the event of foreign disaster the United States may provide emergency relief assistance as a humanitarian service consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals.

Relief and rehabilitation assistance, to have maximum impact in responding to a natural or manmade disaster, must address specific needs with as much precision as possible and must be provided promptly. Assistance should respond to needs clearly articulated by or concurred in by the host government. Each post, therefore, should think through possible disaster scenarios which might occur in its diplomatic jurisdiction, and should maintain currently accurate information and procedural checklists in appropriate detail for possible use in making disaster relief decisions and in mounting and coordinating emergency assistance programs.

Disaster Relief Planning Strategy

Plans should be attuned to the state of a country's development and vulnerability to disasters. Each post should determine that which constitutes the minimum degree of detail needed in contingency planning for possible disaster relief assistance in its diplomatic jurisdiction. Each post should issue or update a directive regarding contents of the disaster relief plan, frequency of its periodic review and testing for adequacy and accuracy by the Emergency Action Committee (EAC), and assignment of staff responsibility for plan oversight and implementation.

If there is an AID presence in a disaster prone country, the annual AID CDSS or relevant document should include a statement on disaster implications, such as factors or trends in disaster proneness and the possible impact of disaster on planned progress of the development program or specific projects.

All posts should formally designate Mission Disaster Relief Officers (MDRO), both primary and alternate, to oversee preparation and maintenance of the Mission Disaster Relief Plan, and to implement the plan. The MDRO should be a regular member of the post Emergency Action Committee, and a

senior officer of the Embassy or one of its constituent agencies, e.g., the Director or Deputy Director of USAID. In some cases, the post may wish to appoint a post disaster relief committee, under the leadership of the MDRO, consisting of individuals with expertise or interest in sectoral areas such as health and sanitation, agriculture, transportation, engineering, etc.

In general, U.S. disaster emergency assistance is least likely to be needed by those countries which are economically well developed, reasonably well administered, and which do not have a recent history of requiring foreign disaster assistance. Posts in such countries require minimal disaster relief plans, i.e., contact lists of government agencies and officials with disaster responsiblity, which are kept up-to-date by the EAC. The Disaster Relief Plan should be filed with the Emergency Action Plan (EAP).

Posts in other economically developed countries which have local administration of varying effectiveness and histories of foreign disaster assistance should maintain more detailed plans. Posts in these countries should have plans which enable them to monitor and assess needs ensuing from sudden disasters. The posts should give particular attention to local political complexities associated with relief operations, and to Washington needs for information to evaluate rehabilitation and reconstruction plans and respond to legislative and public inquiries. These posts should also be aware that reimbursable disaster relief or preparedness assistance is possible and may be desirable in some circumstances. Posts should therefore identify those situations in which reimbursable assistance might effectively be offered and provided.

Posts in developing countries without a history of disaster proneness are encouraged to organize a system, as part of the MDRP, which is alert to hazards which may evolve unintentionally from development efforts (in addition to maintaining government agency and official contact lists). Hazards such as deforestation, erosion, drought, famine, disease patterns, weather vulnerable housing, etc., may lead to future situations requiring foreign assistance.

Posts in developing countries whose disaster prone status has been identified should incorporate a substantial amount of detail in relief plans. Sudden natural disasters (earthquakes, storms), civil strife, and slowly unfolding disasters (famine, disease) can slow or reverse the fragile and costly processes of development and can have a high cost also in terms of human life and suffering. In addition to planning for possible emergency relief, posts should design and implement strategies to encourage host governments to assess the country's disaster vulnerability. The explicit consideration of possible disaster implications such as erosion resulting from agricultural practices, and earthquake vulnerability of

housing due to construction practices and design, can help reduce the risk of future disaster. PVOs, other donor embassies, and international organizations should also be encouraged to consider disaster implications.

Format & Maintenance of MDRP

A looseleaf or other flexible format should be developed to facilitate revision. Copies should be filed with the EAP to assure ready access in the event of an emergency. A copy of a statement by the EAC of the plan's adequacy and currency should be filed periodically (annually in disaster prone countries), with each copy of the MDRP. A copy of the plan, revisions, and periodic statements should be forwarded to OFDA for reference in the OFDA Operations Center, and to the appropriate Regional Liaison Group shown in Section 020.5 of the Emergency Action Manual.

The MDRP for a post in a country for which U.S. disaster assistance may be needed in the future should include three types of information: general or background, specific or technical, and programmatic or procedural.

-- General background. The country's disaster environment and history should be provided in as much detail as needed to indicate trends, periodically, seasonality, etc. It may be useful to discuss specific geographic regions and their potential hazards, such as earthquakes, floods, disease, famine, etc. The host government organization and role in relief, and the response of the local community and other donor nations to past disasters should also be described. OFDA Country Profiles if available, may be used to supplement a section on general information.

-- Specific/technical. In-country resources available for response to disasters should be catalogued and indexed in terms of government agencies (national and other, including military); nongovernmental agencies, including the Red Cross and PVOs (U.S. and indigeneous); other embassies representing potential donor governments, international organizations such as the UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, etc.; and commercial resources available. Government resources listings should focus on disaster management agencies, as well as on agencies concerned with food, water, sanitation, health, logistics, public works, energy and communications. Commercial resources should include truck, rail and air carriers, and distributors or stockers of food, medical supplies, blankets and eating utensils, hand tools and heavy equipment, and materials with which shelter can be repaired or improvised.

In each case it is of critical importance to maintain current names, titles, and office and home telephone numbers of officials and businessmen who have authority to commit or release resources in time of emergency. Security service contacts should be identified who can facilitate access to restricted areas, e.g., the disaster zone, and airport cargo areas to oversee arriving relief materiel.

-- Programmatic or procedural information should itemize the resources available and/or needed to monitor a disaster, assess needs, and deliver possible U.S. relief and rehabilitation assistance in a timely and effective fashion. Organizational and procedural guidelines should be provided in as much detail as possible, with checklists of steps to be taken or considered in an escalating emergency situation.

A suggested Table of Contents for a Mission Disaster Relief Plan in a less developed disaster prone country follows, as well as guidance for the preparation of individual sections of such a plan. Posts with a lesser need for detailed planning are encouraged to abstract from this guidance as appropriate. Each post should design its MDRP based on its perception of needs within the country; a standard format is not required.

U.S. MISSION DISASTER RELIEF PLAN

Suggested Table of Contents

1. Introduction (purpose, authority, responsibility)
2. Background Information
3. Host Country Resources
   - 3.1 Government Organizations and Officials
   - 3.2 Non-governmental Organizations and Officials
   - 3.3 Commercially Available Services and Supplies
4. International Organizations and Officials
5. Other Donor Embassies
6. Country Team Resources
7. Post Organization for Relief Assistance
8. Assessment of Damage and Needs
9. Coordination with Host Government
10. Situation Reporting

1. Introduction

-- Purpose. A statement of post plan of action which provides internal guidance and organization to be adopted in responding to disaster relief situations, ready reference on resources available (local and U.S.), and procedures to be followed.

-- Authorities and Responsibilities. A statement on chain of command or alternative chains of command and emergency roles to be assumed by agencies and individuals within the Country Team. If a military presence other than DAO exists within the jurisdiction of the post, parameters of military initiative in responding to a sudden disaster occurrence should be described.

Responsibility. The designation of named officers as MDRO and alternate MDRO to oversee Mission Disaster Relief Activities and to act as principal staff officer to the Chief of Mission in time of emergency, and a statement of EAC responsibility in assuring that the MDRP is adequate, maintained current, and tested periodically.

2. Background Information

-- A brief description or graphic illustration of government structure, national and local.

-- A geographic description of the country and its regions (with maps).

-- A statement of hazard proneness of each region, and descriptions of past disasters and disaster responses in as much detail as practicable. Copies of any hazard maps which have been prepared by in-country or foreign experts should be obtained and filed in accessible locations.

-- Description of transportation routes (land, water, air) and types, and payload capabilities of carriers, ports, etc.

-- Description of health care system and resources; hospital/clinic locations and bed capabilities; emergency generators; water reserves; medical cold chain.

-- Description of source areas and marketing patterns for food and shelter supplies.

-- Description and appraisal (subjective if necessary) of electrical generation and distribution facilities.

-- Description of petroleum (gasoline, diesel, gas) distribution system.

-- Description of prevailing cultural or religious constraints on diet, preferences, etc.

-- Description of food preparation and consumption practices, fuels used in cooking, and fuel sources.

3. Host Country Resources

3.1 Government Organizations and Officials

Names, addresses mandates, appraisal of effectiveness (subjective if necessary) of individuals in key Ministries with potential for disaster response involvement (such as Civil Defense, Emergency management, Health, Agriculture, Public Works, Transportation, Security, Defense, etc.), as well as; watch office telephone numbers; names; titles, office and home telephone numbers of key officials.

3.2 Non-governmental Organizations with Potential for Disaster Response Involvement

Names, addresses, mandates, appraisal of effectiveness (subjective if necessary); watch office telephone numbers; names, titles, office and home telephone numbers of key officials of Red Cross/ Red Crescent, American and indigenous PVOs registered with AID.

3.3 Commercially Available Services and Supplies

Common and charter carriers (truck, air) and trucker associations through which vehicles may be obtained quickly: names, addresses, office and home telephone numbers of key officials. Also, repair facilities and spare parts inventory.

Staple foods: wholesalers-distributors, storage depots; names and telephone numbers of managers.

Blankets, cooking/eating utensils, basic clothing wholesalers-distributors: names and telephone numbers of managers.

Medical and pharmaceutical supplies wholesalers-distributors: office and warehouse locations; names and phone numbers of managers.

Heavy construction equipment distributors and repair facilities: names and phone numbers of managers.

Hand tools (agricultural, road repair, construction) wholesaler-distributors: names and telephone numbers of managers.

Shelter materials (cement, plastic sheeting, corrugated sheeting, lumber, fastenings, etc.) wholesalers-distributors: names and telephone numbers of managers.

Agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizer, pesticides) wholesaler-distributors: names and telephone numbers of managers.

Airports - cargo handling facilities and equipment, e.g., fork-lifts, on-off loaders; procedure for obtaining emergency passes to cargo areas.

4. International Organizations and Officials

UNDP, WHO, FAO, WFP, OAS, PAHO, etc.; current lists of principal and key officers, and skills and resources available in-country which can be mobilized in disaster situations; guidelines for coordination and sharing of information and standardized criteria (where possible) for reporting disaster situation to organization headquarters. What host government initiatives are required for these organizations to respond to disaster situations?

5. Other Donor Embassies

Listing of embassies and development assistance agencies of other traditional donor governments, and key officers; guidelines for coordination and sharing of information, and recommended roles in disaster assistance; embassies of traditionally non-donor governments whose assistance may be encouraged.

6. Country Team Resources

Listings of Country Team individuals with skills or interests of potential value in assessing damage and needs, monitoring USG and other donor assistance, staffing the post command center, assuring commodity accountability, situation reporting, handling the press, etc. (Note: FSN employees throughout the Country Team offer an extraordinary resource in collecting and tabulating local information of all types.)

Maps and technical data available in Commercial Library and Country Team component offices.

Possible AID participation in in-country radio nets of Agriculture, Health and other ministries.

Cars and trucks available for assessment travel; state of maintenance; spare parts/repair capability; fuel stocks and containers; field trip camping equipment.

7. Post Organization for Disaster Relief Assistance

-- Most instances of USG disaster relief assistance will fall in this category. The MDRP should establish explicit lines of authority and responsibility for monitoring and reporting the disaster situation, and managing USG response.

-- Specific tasks of the MDRO, alternate MDRO, and technical officers should be delineated. These include: liaison with government agencies, other embassies, international organizations and PVOs to identify needs and apportion assistance load among donors;

-- Field Assessments of situation and needs, and interim evaluation of factual information from government and other local and foreign observers; preparation of numbered Situation Reports (SitRep summaries should be cabled IMMEDIATE or NIACT IMMEDIATE to Department for OFDA); and identification of material and in-country transport needs and local resources.

-- The MDRP should provide for principal and alternative locations for use as Command Center. Command Center space should be convenient to post communications facility, and should be equipped with work tables, telephones, typewriters, emergency generator, and office supplies. Copies of the MDRP and maps should be readily accessible.

-- The MDRP should establish responsibility within the Country Team for checking and securing all material purchased or arriving in country until receipt by an authorized official of a disaster relief implementing agency; provide for supply logistics monitoring by post personnel to assure timely distribution to the intended recipients and identify supplies in excess of needs for warehousing or subsequent recovery.

8. Assessment of Damage and Needs

-- Assessment is a key tool of the disaster manager, providing basic data upon which decisions can be made. Without good assessment, the disaster assistance offered may be inappropriate or irrelevent.

-- Assessment information is most useful to the decision maker when it identifies what needs have been created by the disaster; what resources are available within the stricken community and surrounding area, and from various other donor governments and organizations, and; what is the remaining gap which must be filled. Baseline data are extremely important in answering these questions. Such data should be included in the MDRP or appropriate annexes.

-- Posts should include provisions in MDRPs for every effort possible to assure that professional or responsible American officers (post staff or TDY) and FSN employees observe the disaster situation before recommending a major relief undertaking.

-- The MDRP should provide for the assessment of rehabilitation needs as well as relief needs; and should designate post staff responsibility for developing and monitoring rehabilitation plans.

9. Coordination with Host Government

-- The MDRP should identify and provide telephone numbers for that individual or agency, such as the Foreign Ministry, empowered to make official requests for assistance or approve the requests of others.

-- The MDRP should provide procedural guidance for informing the government of the determination and, at this time, suggesting that the government publish general instructions on reviewing and approving requests for external assistance (gracefully rejecting donations of unsolicited and inappropriate items, for example).

-- If assistance is to be provided, the government should be requested to direct customs and airport management, etc., to arrange for immediate entry and secure storage until supplies are forwarded to the disaster area.

-- The MDRP should assure that the post is alert to the substance of requests from other than the official source, but require that all requests have the approval of government before they are acted upon.

-- The post should assure that government appeals for assistance are made to other potential donors as well as the U.S., or report the rationale for an exclusively bilateral initiative in a cable classified as appropriate.

-- The MDRP should include a caution for any discussion with the host government of possible U.S. assistance in reconstruction until the post has discussed the matter with the Department and the appropriate regional Bureau of AID.

10. Situation Reporting

-- The MDRP should offer guidance for preparation of a series of numbered Situation Reports, to be transmitted by immediate cable to OFDA, beginning with the actual or threatened disaster and continuing through the period during which emergency actions may be required.

APPENDIX E

DISASTER ASSESSMENT

The attached sector assessment draft checklists, Food and Agriculture, Health and Sanitation, Shelter, Logistics and Management, and Infrastructure, were prepared by a group of worldwide disaster experts convened by OFDA in June 1981. All U.S. diplomatic posts are encouraged to adapt these checklists to local needs in developing and implementing Mission Disaster Relief Plans, translate the checklists into local languages as appropriate, and encourage other actors on the disaster scene to use them as well. (Copies of the checklists have been distributed to selected other governments, international organizations, and PVOs for use in disaster damage and needs assessment.)

Comments on the checklists and their utility and relevance under field conditions are welcome; the checklists will be modified and produced in final form in response to Mission comments. Please forward any recommendations on the format, content, and usefulness of the assessment checklists to the Director, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C. 20523.

Sector Assessments

Food and Agriculture	I
Health and Sanitation	II
Shelter	III
Logistics and Management	IV
Infrastructure	V

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

I. General Principles

A. In assessing food needs, it is important to specify whether actual food stocks have been destroyed or whether access to food has been disrupted.

B. Except for vulnerable groups, most disaster victims can go without food, if need be, for days following the disaster. The need for food may be more psychological rather than physiological during this time. (The World Food Program has noted that in famine situations, the need for food is variable. Lacking any hard data, one could assume that for every 1,000 people: 100 will require full feeding, 200 one-half feeding, 400 one-quarter, and 300 will require no feeding.)

C. Though food may not be an immediate need, the need for information about food becomes an immediate one because of the long lead times associated with delivering food.

D. The need for food must be reviewed in concert with damage assessment of the logistical infrastructure since warehousing and trucking, for example, could become binding constraints on any food aid.

E. Food aid has great potential for disrupting local markets and social interaction as well as for straining disaster relief management capabilities. Complete data on food/agricultural needs are therefore especially important.

F. An earthquake does not generally destroy food stocks or crops. Access to food may be destroyed.

G. A hurricane may actually increase local food availability in the first days because tree crops are blown out of trees or root crops must be harvested. There may be a need for food in the medium term.

H. When disaster victims are evacuated, for example during a volcanic eruption, food aid may be required even though food stocks have not been destroyed.

I. In describing agricultural inputs such as seed, fertilizer, and pesticides, it is imperative to specify varieties and application rates used in and familiar to the affected area. New varieties or new practices should generally not be introduced during a disaster relief effort.

II. Food

A. Baseline Data

(_) 1. Describe the normal consumption pattern (food basket) of the affected population, any taboos, and acceptable substitutes.

(_) 2. Describe the normal food marketing system (including gov't. involvement, imports, subsistence).

(_) 3. Indicate what food aid programs, if any, exist and describe them.

(_) 4. Outline the indigenous food processing capacity.

B. Effect of the Event on Food

(_) 1. Ascertain the disaster's effect on actual food stocks and standing crops (damaged/destroyed?)

(_) 2. Determine if access to food (e.g., roads, milling facilities) has been disrupted and, if so, how long it is likely to remain disrupted.

(_) 3. Check market indicators of food shortages, such as:

a. Absence/shortage of staple grains and other foods on the market,

b. Price differential,

c. Change in supplies on the market (e.g., an increase in meat supplies may indicate people are selling animals to get money),

d. Change in wholesale grain availability,

e. Unusual public assembly at warehouse or dockside when grain is being unloaded,

f. Changes in warehouse stocks,

g. Black-market price changes; increase in black-market activities,

h. Commercial import changes or proposed changes, and

i. Sale of land, tools, draft animals, etc..

(_) 4. Check nutritional indicators of food shortages, such as:

a. Signs of marasmus, kwashiorkor, or other signs of malnutrition,

b. Increased illness among children, and

c. Change in diet, i.e., quantity, quality, and type.

(_) 5. Check social indicators of food shortages, such as:

a. Increased begging/fighting, and

b. Migration from rural to urban areas.

C. Food Availability

(_) 1. Determine how much food can be expected from future and/or specially planted, quick-maturing crops. At what point in the production cycle did the affected area find itself when the disaster struck?

(_) 2. Estimate the local gov't. stocks on hand and scheduled to arrive. Is borrowing of stocks on hand a possibility?

(_) 3. Estimate the local commercial stocks on hand and scheduled to arrive.

(_) 4. Estimate the local volag/international organization stocks on hand and scheduled to arrive. Is borrowing a possibility?

(_) 5. Estimate local personal stocks on hand and scheduled to arrive.

(_) 6. Determine regional availabilities.

(_) 7. Canvass other donors to find what they expect to contribute.

(_) 8. Estimate how much food aid would be required during specific time periods.

D. Distribution Systems

(_) 1. Describe existing food aid distribution systems, e.g., gov't. ration, volags, WFP (FFW, MCH, Canteen).

(_) 2. Describe gov't. marketing mechanisms.

{_} 3. Judge the capacity of the above to expand/begin emergency aid. What is their record of accountability?

4. Mass feeding

{_} a. Explain the country's (agency's) previous experience with mass feeding.

{_} b. Determine the availability of facilities and materials, including fuel.

{_} 5. Determine whether repackaging facilities exist.

E. Social and Market Impact of Food Aid

{_} 1. Analyze the likely price impact on normal food suppliers. Describe the suppliers.

{_} 2. Decide whether food aid would free cash and labor for other aspects of relief, or would divert labor and create a dependent attitude.

F. Other

{_} 1. Research any legal impediments to importation of certain foods.

III. Agriculture

A. Baseline Data

{_} 1. Describe crops grown in the affected area following the points listed below:

a. Crop name

b. Average area planted (per data available)

c. Average production (per data available)

d. Planting season/s (dates) and time to maturity

e. Are crops climate specific?

f. Are hybrid seeds being used in the area?

g. Cash or subsistence?

{_} 2. Describe domestic animals present in the affected area following the points listed below:

a. Approximate number of animals in the area

b. Value of individual animals

c. Use of animals for food

d. Use of animals for work

e. Use of animals for cash production

f. Are bred stocks used in the area?

{_} 3. Describe the agricultural system, including the following:

a. Land use systems

b. Agricultural labor system/land tenure

c. Crop preferences

d. Inputs

1) Seeds (reserved or purchased?) Is treated seed known?

2) Fertilizer

3) Machinery/tools

4) Pesticides

e. Storage (on farm, gov't., private?)

f. Agro-business facilities, processing of local or imported commodities

{_} 4. Describe the local fishing industry.

E. Effect of the Event on Agriculture/Livestock/Fisheries

{_} 1. Ascertain the extent of damage by crop/livestock/fisheries and by area, noting at what point in the production cycle the event occurred. State the source of the information.

{_} 2. Estimate the loss in production (tonage/head) by crop/livestock/fisheries and by zone within the affected area.

{_} 3. Analyze whether losses will increase over time and state why.

{_} 4. Describe damage to agricultural machinery.

{_} 5. Describe damage to irrigation systems.

{_} 6. Describe damage to seed, fertilizer, and pesticide stocks.

{_} 7. Describe damage to fishing gear.

{_} 8. For a drought, compare current rainfall to the normal or recent past precipitation.

{_} 9. Identify any unusual or untimely grazing changes.

{_} 10. Describe any threats from insects or disease that might follow the disaster.

C. Availability of Inputs - by type (e.g., seed, fertilizer, pesticides, tools, machinery, veterinary medicines, fishing boats, nets, breeding stock)

{_} 1. Estimate the local government stocks on hand and scheduled to arrive.

{_} 2. Estimate the local commercial stocks on hand and scheduled to arrive.

{_} 3. Estimate the local personal stocks on hand and scheduled to arrive.

{_} 4. Elicit from the victims information on how they plan to cope with losses.

{_} 5. Determine regional availabilities and elasticity of supply.

{_} 6. Ascertain what other donors plan to supply.

{_} 7. Outline what further inputs would be required to restore minimum productivity.

{_} 8. Find out if repackaging facilities for seed, fertilizer, and pesticides exist.

D. Distribution Systems/Technical Infrastructure

{_} 1. Outline host government (Ministry of Agriculture) operations in the affected area. Does it provide:

a. Extension service,

b. Crop storage/silos,

c. Veterinary services,

d. Irrigation services,

e. Research facilities,

f. Hybrid seed,

g. Fertilizer,

h. Other plants (fruit trees) and/or,

i. Pesticides?

{_} 2. Describe any agricultural projects and inputs provided by foreign organizations/governments.

{_} 3. Describe the operations of rural or agricultural credit organizations, cooperatives, or credit sharing organizations that exist in the affected area.

{_} 4. Judge the capacity of the above to incorporate rehabilitation disaster assistance.

HEALTH AND SANITATION

I. General Principles

A. Identify and talk with any and all available components of the host government (or affected area's) "chain of command" for health issues. Find out what data gathering has begun and who is gathering it. Coordinate plans for your own data gathering activities with health officials so that subsequently arriving people/teams do not needlessly duplicate your efforts.

B. All information should be quantified whenever possible, including (a) number of people and (b) the extent to which they are involved. Rates should be determined by any available sampling procedures and these rates then multiplied by estimates of the total number of people in an area.

1. (eg) For trauma :
   a. Villages or other habitational units probably representative of other affected areas should be chosen.

   b. A quick "walk through" survey should be done observing the first 20-30 houses encountered and noting how many people are injured and require major treatment.

   c. The injury rate should then be calculated and multiplied by the entire estimated affected population in order to obtain an estimate of the total number of injured people.

C. Sources of all information should be clearly specified. Examples might include whether it was observed, reported by an informant in a discussion, collected through a survey of a randomly sampled population, heard by rumor, etc. The information collected will then be much more meaningful to those having to interpret it, especially if there are conflicting reports.

D. Reliable population data are essential for quantifying estimates of disease or injury (or almost any other disaster-related need). If such information does not exist prior to the team's arrival, the epidemiologist on the team should have the expertise to begin gathering population data.

E. Health conditions often change rapidly after a natural disaster. For this reason, it is best to concentrate on immediate needs, one of which is creation of a disease surveillance system to provide data for medium-term and long-term needs assessment.

F. Preventive rather than curative medicine should be stressed, except

in cases of acute trauma.

G. Fear of an outbreak of disease after a disaster is largely unfounded. While endemic diseases will continue to exist, a disaster introduces no new ones.

H. Vaccines, especially cholera and typhoid, have no place in an emergency relief effort.

I. "Field" hospitals, large quantities of curative medicines, and unskilled labor from the outside world are almost never needed.

J. Corpses are not a source of disease except for anthrax, smallpox, and plague. There is, therefore, no health reason for mass burials (which may lead to social disruption). The only diseases transmitted by animal carcasses are rabies or, if the dead animal had fleas, plague and tularemia.

K. Halazone tablets are generally not an appropriate response to contaminated water.

II. Trauma

{_} A. Determine or estimate* numbers of deaths and death rates in affected areas.
* Methodology must be specified for estimates (e.g., rumor, information from local leaders, spot surveys, random sample, etc.).

{_} B. Determine or estimate* numbers of major injuries and rates for each. Specify traumatic injuries requiring surgery, hospitalization (e.g. fractures, head injury, internal injuries).

{_} C. Determine** numbers and locations of health facilities which existed prior to the disaster.
** or estimate

{_} D. Determine** numbers of facilities which are still functioning and reflect the total number of usable beds.

{_} E. Determine** numbers of indigenous health personnel who are available.

{_} F. Determine** amounts of medical supplies and drugs which are available on site or in country.

{_} G. Determine** additional amounts which will need to be quickly obtained from sources outside the stricken area.

(_) H. Determine** what additional medical equipment is needed, and can be readily obtained, to deal with major injuries.

I. Suggested data sources for these and following data:

1. National/provincial health officers
2. Hospitals
3. Clinics
4. Traditional healers
5. Local leaders
6. Fly over
7. Walk-through surveys

III. Water

(_) A. Describe the types of systems that existed prior to the disaster in affected areas.

(_) B. Describe how they relate to population concentrations still remaining in the area.

(_) C. Determine who is in charge of local water system(s). (Community group? Committee? National authority?)

(_) D. Ascertain whether the officials are aware of chlorine use.

(_) E. Determine whether the system is still functional.

(_) F. Specify how many people have been deprived of functional water supply.

(_) G. Determine what material the system is constructed of.

(_) H. Describe any evidence of unusual sanitation problems, e.g., ponding of water.

(_) I. Establish a point for a controlled water supply to be put in, once resources become available. The assumption is being made that, after earthquakes and other natural disasters, water should be considered contaminated until proven otherwise.

(_) J. Determine if there is any early evidence of water-related disease.

IV. Nutritional Status

{_} A. Determine the pre-existing nutritional status of the population. For example, what percentage of children are "malnourished" by objective standards? (This information may be available in a country profile.)

{_} E. Determine the nutritional status of a small sample of children, using weight (Satter scale) for height (height based) and standards and by doing an edema count.

{_} C. Determine at a local level if access to food has been disrupted.

{_} D. Estimate the number of individuals requiring emergency food supplies and the duration of this need.

V. Communicable Diseases

{_} A. Determine endemic disease levels by reading a country profile (should be done prior to arrival) and by talking with national and provincial health officers.

{_} E. Encourage (and teach how, if necessary) local health personnel to set up a simple surveillance system designed to detect increases in communicable diseases and to help dispel rumors.

{_} C. Determine which social disruptions could lead to communicable disease problems (e.g., crowding, interrupted vector control programs).

{_} D. Ascertain which, if any, communicable diseases are being diagnosed. Document the method of diagnosis (clinical judgment vs laboratory test vs rumors).

{_} E. Determine which health officials can/will investigate rumors of disease outbreaks.

{_} F. Support national authorities in their efforts to restrict vaccine use to specific indications.

VI. Vectors

{_} A. Determine what endemic vector borne diseases are problems and which control programs have been functioning.

{_} B. Include these diseases in your surveillance system to detect any future increases.

VII. Waste Disposal/Sewage

{_} A. If the disaster occurs in a rural area, waste disposal is almost never a problem unless sewage "ponds" in a public area. Determine if this is occurring.

{_} B. If you are on an island affected by hurricane, or in an area affected by flooding, determine if the sewage drainage system is still open. [See also infrastructure.]

{_} C. Determine the adequacy of sewage disposal facilities in any public buildings or other areas being used to temporarily shelter homeless people.

SHELTER

I. General Principles

A. Shelter assessment should be done in direct coordination with the affected government, since the government will usually have a preponderant role in all aspects of a shelter program (e.g., timing, location, type, distribution).

B. It is equally important to ascertain the desires and plans of the victims themselves, since they are so closely related to rehabilitation of agriculture/cottage industry and to duration of outside assistance.

II. Private Dwellings

A. Damage

(_) 1. Determine the type (urban/rural) and size of the area affected through field visits.

(_) 2. Determine accessibility to the affected areas, for both assessment and delivery.

(_) 3. Approximate the percentage of units of private dwellings (i.e., single family, attached, low-rise and high-rise multiple family) damaged and destroyed by village or region.

(_) 4. Determine the number of damaged dwellings that are habitable without immediate repair, that are habitable only after repair, that are not habitable and must be destroyed.

(_) 5. Inventory existing structures and public facilities that can be used as temporary shelters, giving careful consideration to access to sanitation and water.

B. Victims

(_) 1. Determine the number of homeless victims.

(_) 2. Determine the average number of people in an individual dwelling (if not already known).

(_) 3. Elicit the perceived needs of the disaster victims and how they are currently meeting or planning to meet their own needs (temporary as well as permanent).

(_) 4. Determine the number of victims that will need some form of temporary shelter.

(_) 5. Identify obstacles that prevent victims from meeting their own needs both for temporary and permanent shelter.

C. Materials

(_) 1. Identify construction styles and materials normally used in the affected structures.

(_) 2. Determine the availability (and costs) of indigenous materials to meet both cultural and disaster resistance requirements.

(_) 3. Identify any suitable material substitutes, indigenously or externally available, that would appropriately meet the cultural and disaster prevention requirements.

(_) 4. Identify the type and quantity of building materials that the victims can provide for themselves for temporary and permanent shelter.

(_) 5. Identify the type and quantity of building materials that the affected government can provide for the victims for temporary and permanent shelter.

(_) 6. Determine the type and quantity of materials needed from external sources for temporary and permanent shelter.

D. Sites and Conditions

(_) 1. Assess the suitability, i.e., infrastructural support, of available sites for both temporary and permanent shelters, including, where necessary, mass sheltering.

(_) 2. Determine if relocation is necessary due to the nature of the disaster.

(_) 3. Assess the potential disaster vulnerability of available sites for both temporary and permanent shelters.

(_) 4. Assess the environmental conditions that affect needs for temporary shelter.

(_) 5. Assess the environmental conditions that would impose constraints on permanent shelter.

(_) 6. Identify any problems related to land use and land tenure.

E. Distribution

{_} 1. Determine availability of a distribution mechanism (local, regional, national, or international) to distribute shelter materials (temporary or permanent) to the victims.

{_} 2. Identify committees, credit unions, government agencies, co-ops, etc., that can mobilize forces to help implement a shelter program.

{_} 3. Determine an equitable means of allocation and an appropriate medium of exchange for the building materials.

III. Public Buildings & Mass Shelter

A. Damage

{_} 1. Assess the number of buildings destroyed, damaged, repairable by category (schools, churches, community centers, etc.).

{_} 2. Identify those public buildings designated as public shelters (prior to a disaster) that are in usable condition.

{_} 3. Determine what repairs, if any, are needed to make the structures usable for their intended purpose or for mass shelters.

{_} E. Analyze the likely impact of public buildings not being available for their intended use, i.e., if they are destroyed or being used as mass shelter.

C. Sites and Conditions

{_} 1. If necessary, identify suitable (i.e., with adequate infrastructural support) new premises to be used as public shelters.

{_} 2. Verify whether public shelters have clearly identified management personnel to operate the centers.

{_} 3. Verify that shelters have necessary utilities (sanitation, water supply, electricity).

{_} 4. Assess the number of people that can be accommodated in public shelters.

D. Materials

(_) 1. Identify construction materials and styles normally used in the affected structures.

(_) 2. Determine the availability (and costs) of indigenous materials to meet both cultural and disaster resistance requirements.

(_) 3. Identify any suitable material substitutes, indigenously or externally available, that would appropriately meet the cultural and disaster prevention requirements.

(_) 4. Identify the type and quantity of building materials that the affected government can provide for the victims for temporary and permanent shelter.

(_) 5. Determine what repairs the victims can make themselves to make the affected structures occupiable.

(_) 6. Determine the type and quantity of materials needed from external sources for temporary and permanent shelter.

E. Distribution

(_) 1. Gather pertinent information as under II.E. above.

IV. Personal Protection Effects

(_) A. Make a general determination of numbers and type of personal articles lost in the disaster or needed because the victims are displaced.

B. Blankets

(_) 1. Estimate the number and type (according to climatic conditions) of blankets needed.

(_) 2. Identify what is available within the country from personal, commercial, volag, or government stocks.

(_) 3. Determine what is needed from external sources.

C. Clothing

(_) 1. Describe the clothing traditionally worn, by season and area.

(_) 2. If clothing is needed, estimate the amount by age group and sex.

(_) 3. If clothing is needed, determine if used clothing is acceptable and, if so, for which groups.

D. Heating/Cooking Fuel

(_) 1. Describe normal heating/cooking practices.

(_) 2. Determine whether heating equipment and/or fuel are required.

(_) 3. Estimate types and quantities needed over a specific time period.

(_) 4. Determine appropriate storage and distribution mechanisms.

(_) 5. Identify what is available locally.

(_) 6. Identify what is needed from external sources.

E. Other

(_) 1. Determine if other personal effects, such as cooking utensils and small storage containers, are needed.

LOGISTICS AND MANAGEMENT

I. General Principles

A. Assessment of the logistical capabilities of a disaster stricken country is a prerequisite to the formulation of reasonable requests for assistance and to the delivery of the right things to the right place at the right time.

B. There are ample statistics and detailed information on port and airport facilities available in Washington (and world wide). Assessment should concentrate on identifying changes created by the disaster or by excessive use during relief operations.

C. Baseline data on port facilities are available in Ports of the World and from carriers serving the port(s) in question. These are summarized in OFDA Country Profiles, where they exist.

D. Baseline data on airports of the world, including grass strips and unpaved airports, are available from the Federal Aviation Administration (Bill Hamm or Mr. Webb - 202-426-3163) and from aircarriers serving the airport(s) in question. These are also summarized in the OFDA Country Profiles.

E. Baseline data regarding storage and distribution systems may be available from voluntary agencies in country.

F. Some of the requested information is needed before civil or military cargo aircraft can be dispatched. Other information is aimed at maximizing flexibility and efficiency.

II. Airports

{_} A. Identify the airport being assessed, by:

1. Name,

2. Designator,

3. Location, and

4. Elevation,

{_} B. Describe the current condition of facilities.

{_} 1. Ascertain whether the airport is fully operational. Daylight hours only?

{_} 2. Furnish usable runway lengths and location(s) of any interruptions.

{_} 3. Determine whether taxiways, parking areas, and cargo handling areas are intact.

{_} 4. Establish whether runway and approach lights are operating.

{_} 5. Specify which navigational aids are operating. VOR, NDB, ILS?

{_} 6. Describe available communications facilities.

{_} 7. Determine whether the terminal building is operating.

{_} 8. Check the availability and cost of aviation fuel.

{_} 9. Find out if facilities exist for mandatory aircrew rest.

{_} 10. Explore whether the cargo-handling area can be lighted for night cargo operations.

{_} C. Determine what cargo-handling equipment is available, including fuel and operators.

1. Forklifts (number, capacity)

2. Scissors Lift (capacity)

3. Cargo dollies (number)

{_} D. Determine what start-up equipment is available, including fuel and operators.

{_} E. Describe maintenance possibilities.

{_} F. Outline what storage is available.

1. Covered?

2. At the airport? Off airport? How far?

3. Capacity and suitability for storage of foods or other perishables

{_} G. Civil Air

{_} 1. Find out whether arrangements can be made for prompt overflight and landing clearances.

{_} 2. Ascertain that the air controller service is functioning.

{_} 3. Specify working hours for airport personnel.

{_} 4. Explore having "No Objections" fees or "Royalty" fees waived or paid locally. (This applies principally to the Middle East and to parts of Africa where a charge, equal to 15% of the charter cost, may be levied against chartered aircraft.)

{_} 5. Find out if arrangements can be made to work around the clock, including customs.

{_} 6. Identify personnel to tally and document cargo as it is received and transshipped.

{_} 7. Ascertain that the host government will accept deliveries by means of military as well as civil aircraft.

{_} H. Describe security arrangements.

{_} I. Determine what repairs and/or auxiliary equipment would be needed to increase airport capacity. How soon can local authorities be expected to restore service?

III. Seaports

{_} A. Identify the port being assessed, by:

1. Name, and

2. Location.

{_} B. Describe the current condition of facilities.

{_} 1. Ascertain whether the port is fully operational. Daylight hours only?

{_} 2. Determine whether the disaster has altered the physical characteristics of the port, e.g.:

a. Depths of approach channels

b. Harbor

c. Turning basin

d. Alongside piers/wharves

e. Availability of lighters

{_} 3. Determine whether the disaster has blocked or damaged port facilities.

a. Locks

b. Canals

c. Piers/wharves

d. Sheds

e. Bridges

f. Water/fuel storage facilities

g. Security fences/facilities

h. Communications facilities

i. Customs facilities

{_} 4. Describe the berths.

a. Number

b. Length

c. Draft alongside

d. Served by rail? road? sheds? lighters only?

e. Availability

{_} 5. Check the availability and cost of fuel.

{_} C. Determine what cargo-handling equipment is available, including fuel and operators.

1. Heavy lift cranes (number, capacity)

2. Container and pallet-handling (with port equipment? with ship's gear only?)

{_} D. Outline what storage is available.

1. Covered?

2. Hard stand space?

3. Capacity

4. Security

E. Operations

{_} 1. Find out if pilots, tugs, and linehandlers are available.

{_} 2. Specify working hours for the port.

{_} 3. Specify working hours for customs.

{_} 4. Determine whether arrangements can be made with port and host country authorities to obtain priority berthing for vessels delivering disaster relief shipments.

{_} 5. Identify an adequate number of personnel to tally and document cargo as it is received and transshipped.

{_} 6. Check the history of turnover time. What effect has the disaster had on turnover time?

{_} F. Determine what repairs and/or auxiliary equipment would be needed to increase port capacity. How soon can local authorities be expected to restore service?

IV. Transfer Points

{_} A. Identify transfer points by location.

{_} B. Determine whether surface transportation for cargo is available from air- and seaports.

1. Road?

2. Railroad?

3. Canal/river?

{_} C. Estimate the capacity of transfer points, including handling.

{_} D. Outline what storage is available.

{_} E. Describe security arrangements.

{_} F. Identify an adequate number of personnel to receive and document cargo for transshipment.

V. Trucking

{_} A. Describe damage to the road network as it relates to the possibility of delivering assistance by truck.

{_} 1. Indicate any restrictions such as weight limitations and width, length, or height limitations at bridges, tunnels, etc..

{_} 2. Determine whether it is possible to bypass damaged sections of the road network and what weight restrictions would apply.

E. Availability

(_) 1. Determine whether containers can be moved inland.

a. 20-foot

b. 40-foot

c. To the disaster site or to a transfer point?

(_) 2. Check the availability and cost of host government-owned trucks.

(_) 3. Check the availability and cost of volag-owned or -operated vehicles.

(_) 4. Check the availability and cost of commercial vehicles.

(_) 5. Judge whether the relief program could or should contract for any of the above trucks. Could an established price be maintained under a contract?

(_) C. Ascertain that maintenance facilities and spare parts are available.

(_) D. Outline measures to provide for security of cargo in transit.

(_) E. Check the availability and cost of fuel.

VI. Railroads

(_) A. Identify any railroads in the disaster stricken area. Locate the railheads.

(_) B. Assess their current condition.

(_) 1. Describe any damage to the electrical power system.

(_) 2. Identify any interdictions - damaged bridges, tracks, fallen trees, etc.

(_) C. Judge the reliability of the rail system.

(_) D. Determine whether cars can be made available for relief shipments on a priority basis.

(_) E. Determine the capacity and cost of rail shipments.

(_) F. Outline security measures to protect cargo in transit.

VII. Alternative Aircraft

(_) A. Identify any usable airports or suitable helicopter landing sites in the disaster zone.

(_) B. Determine the availability and cost locally of helicopters and/or fixed wing aircraft.

(_) 1. Estimate their capacity.

(_) 2. Identify the owners/agents.

(_) C. Determine the availability and cost of fuel.

VIII. Warehousing

(_) A. Identify undamaged, or damaged but usable, warehouses located in reasonable proximity to the disaster site.

(_) B. Find out the capacity of these warehouses.

(_) C. Determine their availability over a specific period of time.

(_) D. Specify whether the warehouses are government, vclag, or privately owned.

(_) E. Assess the adequacy of the warehouses' construction.

1. Ventilation

2. Lighting

3. Hard floor

4. Fire proofing

5. Loading docks

(_) F. Describe loading/unloading equipment that is available.

1. Pallets?

2. Forklifts and fuel for them?

(_) G. Ascertain that adequate security exists.

1. Perimeter fence

2. Lighting

3. Guards

(_) H. Determine whether any refrigeration is available.

(_) I. Determine whether sorting and repackaging facilities exist.

(_) J. Determine whether fumigation is necessary/available (for food, medicaments, etc.).

IX. Managerial Capacity

(_) A. Evaluate the managerial capacity of the following by identifying personnel, program descriptions, opinions on effectiveness.

(_) 1. Embassy/Mission

(_) 2. Host government. Describe coordination & cooperation ~~among~~ various levels of government and their ability to provide liaison with outside donors.

(_) 3. Volags. Do volag field staff have the authority to sign grants? What is their past history on accountability?

(_) 4. U.N. System. Do U.N. field staff have the authority to sign grants? What is their past history of accountability?

(_) 5. Local service agencies, e.g., credit unions, cooperatives

(_) B. Describe coordination mechanisms, including meetings.

(_) C. Determine whether a lead agency has been designated.

INFRASTRUCTURE

I. General Principles

A. Infrastructure needs should be addressed in the following order of priority: communications, electric power, water/sewerage, hydro facilities, and roads and bridges.

B. All infrastructure needs may be considered immediate needs; variation comes in the degree of restoration that is required immediately.

C. In lesser developed countries, the pre-disaster condition of infrastructure is frequently less than ideal; so the gap between current and pre-existing conditions may be smaller than an outside assessor might assume.

D. Setting minimum needs for communications, power, etc. is a function of decision making, not of information gathering. Minimum needs should be determined by officials in the stricken country before launching appeals to donors because many donors tend to overreact in this sector.

E. Minimum needs will rise over time, as a relief effort progresses.

F. At the onset of disaster recovery, deal with damage to infrastructure by bypassing infrastructure where possible and by "load shedding."

G. Look at damage from the perspective of responding to the stricken population's minimum need. Determine what action should be taken to restore a vital service immediately, e.g., switching to another power source in an electrical grid (when damage is localized).

II. Communications

{_} A. For communications, first determine what facilities exist which are operable or easily repaired and which could be used to pass assessment information and to assist in coordination of life-saving responses.

{_} B. Identify the type of system being assessed, e.g.:

1. Radio

a. Private Ownership

1) Commercial

a) Broadcast

b) 2-way

2) Amateur

3) Citizens Band

b. Public Systems

1) Police

2) Armed Forces

3) Government agencies (Which ministries have communications facilities?)

4) Other

2. Telephone

3. Cable & Wireless

4. Television

5. Newspaper

6. Other

C. Baseline Data

{_} 1. Describe where the system's facilities are located.

{_} 2. Determine the broadcast/reception area or zone of influence (e.g., towns serviced by system).

{_} 3. Identify the organization/firm that is responsible for operations and maintenance of the system. (Is there a disaster response plan with identification of priority facilities, materiel supply, priority screening of messages?)

{_} 4. Obtain technical information, e.g.:

a. Broadcast power

b. Operating frequencies, call signs

c. Relay/transmission points

d. Hours of operation

e. Standby power sources

f. Mobile capability

g. Repair/maintenance facilities, including capabilities of manufacturer's local agent

h. Language of transmission

(_) 5. Identify key personnel (owners, management, operations, maintenance).

(_) 6. Determine the degree of integration of military and civilian communications networks.

(_) 7. Note the source(s) of the above information.

(_) D. Describe specific reasons why a system is not operating.

1. Unavailability of:

a. Personnel

b. Power

c. Fuel

d. Access to facilities

e. Other

2. Damage to system:

a. Broadcast/transmission equipment

b. Antennae

c. Buildings

d. Transmission lines

e. Relay facilities

f. Power source

g. Other

(_) 3. Note source(s) of the above information.

(_) E. Outline options for restoring minimum essential services.

F. Repair Capability

{_} 1. Identify local/regional suppliers of communications equipment and materials. Check cost and availability.

{_} 2. Determine the local/regional availability of technical services.

III. Electric Power

A. Baseline Data

{_} 1. Describe the power system including:

a. Base load facility

b. Peaking facility

c. Number of units

d. Fuel source

e. Plant controls

f. Output capability (specify voltage and cycle)

g. Mobile plants

h. Other standby capability

i. Switching facilities

j. Transmission facilities

k. Distribution facilities (number of substations)

l. Interconnections

{_} 2. Inventory auxiliary equipment that may be available locally from construction companies, for example.

{_} B. Determine why power is not available, i.e., at what point the system has been damaged.

{_} 1. Ascertain the condition of generating units.

{_} 2. Check the integrity of the fuel system.

{_} 3. Determine whether towers, lines, and/or grounding lines are down.

(_) 4. Assess the condition of substations.

(_) C. Outline the impact of power loss on key facilities such as hospitals, water pumping stations.

(_) D. Describe options for restoring minimum essential services.

E. Repair Capability

(_) 1. Ascertain whether load shedding and/or switching to another grid can restore minimal services.

(_) 2. Identify local/regional suppliers of equipment and materials. Check cost and availability.

(_) 3. Determine the local/regional availability of technical services.

IV. Water/Sewerage

A. Baseline Data

(_) 1. Describe the pre-existing systems; i.e., for water the source, treatment facilities, mains, pump stations, and distribution network; and for sewerage the treatment facilities and pump stations.

(_) 2. Estimate the numbers of people who depend on the water sources by type (e.g., river, city water system).

(_) E. Determine why water (especially potable water) is not available, i.e., at what point the system has been damaged.

(_) 1. Check the integrity of the water source.

(_) 2. Assess the condition of water and sewerage treatment facilities and of the distribution network. Are pump stations operational?

(_) 3. Determine whether water mains are broken. Are leaks in the sewerage system contaminating the water supply?

(_) C. Outline the impact of water loss on key facilities and on individual users. How quickly can the responsible ministries be expected to restore services?

(_) D. Describe options for restoring minimum essential services.

E. Repair Capability

(_) 1. Evaluate possible alternative water sources.

(_) 2. Identify local/regional suppliers of equipment and materials. Check cost and availability.

(_) 3. Determine local/regional availability of technical services.

V. Hydro Facilities (Hydroelectric, Irrigation)

A. Baseline Data

(_) 1. Describe the function of the facilities, their proximity to the stricken area, and their relationship to the disaster itself.

(_) 2. Identify the host country organization that controls and operates the facilities.

(_) 3. Identify the suppliers, contractors, and/or donors that built the facilities. (i.e., what were the equipment and technical sources?)

(_) E. Describe any damage to systems.

(_) 1. Check the soundness of structures and outlet works. Are reservoirs watertight?

(_) 2. Identify any immediate or near-term safety risks. (generating and control machinery, structural defects, power to operate gates, etc.)

(_) 3. Assess the condition of canals and/or downstream channels.

(_) 4. Identify any changes in watershed conditions, e.g., saturation, ground cover, streambed loading, new impoundments.

(_) 5. Determine whether water is being contaminated.

(_) C. Evaluate the management of the facilities.

(_) 1. Determine whether storage and outflow quantities are being managed in accordance with prescribed curves.

(_) 2. Identify preparations for follow-on storm conditions, e.g., emergency drawdown of reservoirs.

(_) 3. Describe the probable impact of discharging on downstream damage and/or relief efforts (e.g., depth at river crossings, releases into damaged canals). Is there a need to impound water until downstream works can be repaired?

(_) D. Outline options for restoring minimum essential services.

E. Repair Capability

(_) 1. Outline repair plans of the responsible host country officials.

(_) 2. Check on any proposed assistance from the original donors of the facilities.

(_) 3. Identify local/regional sources of equipment and technical expertise.

VI. Roads and Bridges

A. Baseline Data

(_) 1. Describe road networks in the affected area by type. What is the load capacity of the bridges?

(_) 2. Identify the responsible ministries and district offices and constraints on their operations.

(_) B. Describe any damage to the network.

(_) 1. Determine which segments are ok, which can be travelled with delays, and which are impassable.

(_) 2. Describe any damage by type, e.g.:

a. Blockage by landslides, fallen trees, etc.

b. Embankments

c. Drainage structures

d. Bridges/tunnels

e. Road surfaces

(_) 3. Identify alternate crossings and/or routes.

(_) C. Evaluate the importance of the road network to the relief effort and to rehabilitation.

(_) D. Outline options for restoring minimum essential service.

(_) 1. Determine which elements must be restored first.

(_) 2. Describe needs for traffic control (police, military, other) on damaged or one-way segments.

(_) 3. Determine how long emergency repairs can accommodate relief traffic (size, weight, volume?). Will emergency maintenance and fuel points be needed in remote areas?

E. Repair Capability

(_) 1. Identify host country agencies, military, and/or civilian forces available to make repairs. Do they have equipment, spare parts, maintenance support?

(_) 2. Check whether local or expatriate construction companies can loan equipment and/or expertise.

(_) 3. Check regional sources of equipment and/or expertise.

(_) 4. Ascertain that arrangements can be made for standby forces at damaged sections to keep roads open.

APPENDIX F

A SAMPLING OF AMERICAN AND FOREIGN EXPERIENCE IN CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT: SOME LESSONS LEARNED

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COMMENTARY

These "lessons learned" are drawn from the experience of American, British, Japanese and Israeli armies in the forty years, 1942-1982. They represent only a surface sampling, since it turned out, when the research was undertaken, that surprisingly, data on the civil affairs and military government aspects of these several wars and interventions as not easily available in the normal secondary sources. It also became evident that such coverage was existed usually did not separate the problem of civil affairs in cities from the function countrywide or regionwide. Consequently, the generalizations that are found hereafter refer to the broad problems of civil affairs and military government, and only in a few cases--Singapore, Hong Kong, Manila, Santo Domingo-- are they specific to cities. The basic problems for civil affairs and military government are in essence the same for cities and non-urban areas, but the differences in degree make them almost a new type, especially when the cities are large Third World cities.

It is almost impossible to compare experiences since the differences among even the few cases presented here represent such a wide spectrum of circumstances. The largest city liberated in Western Europe was Paris which was totally unscathed by the war. The very heart of Manila, in contrast, was totally leveled. While a crucial factor determining the extent of U.S. involvement in civil affairs will be the degree of damage, that term is imprecise and relative. The writer has seen references to Santo Domingo suffering "heavy damage" in the civil war of 1965, yet having seen the city shortly after the U.S. intervention, he can testify to the damage as being a bare scratch compared to the wounds suffered by cities in World War II, Korea, or in some Vietnam instances. Nevertheless, there were similar kinds of demands on U.S. resources and capabilities.

The intention of the occupier varied among the cases drawn upon. They came as a liberator in some, as a conqueror in others, and as a military presence in still another set. Their intentions determined in the last analysis their civil affairs and military government actions. The extent and degree of permanency in the CA/MG structure were a reflection of those intentions.

Only in the Western European operations of 1944-45 can it be said there was adequate planning and preparation for both liberation and conquest. In all the others (with the possible

exception of the American reoccupation of the Philippines) the circumstances compelled hasty actions for which little or no preparation had been made for CA/MG affairs. As a result the lessons learned tended to be the same old ones.

Contingency operations by definition will arise with little warning and permit little CA/MG preparation, but certainly the major usual problems are known and have been encountered before. Preparations can be made to deal with those, and at the same time, the unusual problems can be expected. They must be dealt with by resourcefulness and improvisation.

The list of American military occupations and interventions is fairly sizeable, as shown on the table that follows. Future inadequacies cannot be blamed on inexperience; the weakness has lain in lack of corporate memory.

U.S. MILITARY OCCUPATIONS

Louisiana (annexed territory)	1803-1812
West Florida (forcible annexation)	1810-1812
East Florida (forcible annexation)	1813-1821
Mexico (belligerent occupation)	1836-1848
New Mexico (belligerent occupation, subsequent annexation)	1846-1850
California (belligerent occupation, subsequent annexation)	1846-1850
Southern States (insurrection; under executive authority)	1862-1866
Southern States (disturbed conditions; under Congressional authority)	1866-1867
Alaska (annexed territory)	1867-1884
Cuba (belligerent occupation; subsequently under peace treaty)	1898-1902
Philippines (belligerent occupation; subsequent annexation)	1898-1901
Puerto Rico (belligerent occupation; subsequent annexation)	1898-1900
Tientsin-Peking area, China (joint intervention, subsequently consensual)	1900
Panama Canal Zone (intervention, subsequently consenual)	1903-1979
Cuba (consensual)	1906-1909
Nicaragua (consensual, except for brief period in 1926, when intervention)	1916-1933
Haiti (intervention; subsequently consensual)	1915-1934
Mexico (intervention)	1916-1917
Dominican Republic (intervention)	1916-1924
Siberia (intervention)	1918-1920
Rhineland (belligerent occupation)	1918-1923
Bases in British, Dutch possessions, etc. (consensual)	WWII
Iceland (consensual)	WWII
Greenland (consensual)	WWII

North Africa (civil affairs, consensual)	1942-1944
Sicily (belligerent occupation)	1943-1947
Italy (belligerent occupation)	1943-1947
Austria (belligerent occupation; zonal control)	1944-1955
Germany (belligerent occupation; zonal control)	1944-1955
Germany (under High Commissioner)	1949-1955
Berlin (belligerent occupation; zonal control	1945-
Norway (civil affairs)	1944
Belgium (civil affairs)	1944
Netherlands (civil affairs)	1944
Luxembourg (civil affairs)	1944
France (civil affairs)	1944
Japan (belligerent occupation)	1945-1951
Ryukyu Islands (belligerent occupation)	1945-1950
Ryukyu Islands (under High Commissioner)	1950-1975
South Korea (belligerent occupation)	1945-1949
South Korea (consensual)	1950-1953
Lebanon (intervention)	1958
Thailand (consensual)	1962
South Vietnam (consensual)	1964-1973
Dominican Republic (consensual)	1965-1966
Grenada (belligerent occupation, subsequently consensual)	1983

I. WESTERN EUROPE 1944-45

The scale of operations and nature of the war were such that the lessons derived may not be directly applicable to future Third World contingencies. Some points, however, re-echo the problems encountered in other World War II theaters and in operations since 1945.

The North African operation had pointed up the need for greater cooperation among civilian agencies, numerous such agencies having operated independently.

In early 1943, the War Department directed that military planners must make preparations to do the following:

1. feed the civilian population
2. house the civilian population
3. maintain law and order
4. acquire raw materials available
5. maintain the health of the populace
6. restore civil control over the area in question.

Restoration of civil control was to be effected either through restoration of sovereignty to the locals or by delegating sovereignty to civil agencies of the occupying forces. It was to be expected that for some time after the military operations this matter would be handled as part of the military operations.

However, as one source put it, "Of all the initial assumptions concerning CA in World War II, none was more fallacious than the idea that there is a distinct boundary between the military and political aspects." It was assumed that under military government local politics would have to wait, but we learned again that "politics would not wait" and in North Africa, Italy and Northwest Europe our CA efforts almost immediately became involved with the revival of local political maneuvering. Furthermore, there were invariable clashes between the CA/MG teams and the local authorities or the new incoming local authorities.

One of the major difficulties lay in deciding who had been a collaborator or pro Nazi and who a patriot. Old personal and political enmities flared and accusations of treason abounded, often unfairly.

A factor too that became important quite rapidly was the fading of the glow of liberation. Disillusionment grew in the newly liberated territories because relief was slow in coming and because it soon became apparent to the populace that their needs and wishes would have to be

strictly secondary to those of the military. It was necessary for the military to ride roughshod at times over the civilian city needs.

Some major problems that characterized the CA/MG experience were:

1. An old lesson from Italy--control agencies are easier to establish than to coordinate.

2. The procurement of labor and control of inflation were both crucial and interlocked. Since money paid to labor could buy little on the open market, food was used as an inducement. This added to the overall military supply problem, however, since increasing quantities of food were required.

3. In densely populated areas the restoration of public utilities was a top priority concern. This often led to clashes between military and civilian needs. In Cherbourg, the first sizeable city to be liberated in Normandy, the CA people wanted the trolleys to be started up in order to speed the normalization of life. The military command wanted those same roads, usually, obviously, the main ones, for movement of troops.

One other form of public utility, the brothels of Cherbourg were not reopened, never having been closed, but were put off limits to Allied personnel.

4. Planning and operations were greatly handicapped by lack of policy guidance.

5. CA personnel with proper training and aptitudes helped relieve military commanders of much of the burden inherent in relations with civilians whenever armed forces operated in populated areas.

6. Personnel with varying skills, aptitudes, and knowledge were required in far greater numbers than the World War II planners had foreseen.

7. No two countries, friendly or enemy, presented identical CA problems.

8. Care and control of displaced persons was an enormous burden but one necessary to keep roads open for military operations. If there is damage in the countryside, it is to be expected that displaced persons will head toward cities where they will expect to find aid. Thus urban poplulations can rapidly mushroom, compounding already massive CA problems.

9. Food supply is always critical. As one report put it, "It had always been clear that the first civil affairs task on entering Paris would be to safeguard the food of the people." Yet there was always the balancing of civilian and military needs. The official British history of CA points out that "no more supplies could be brought in for the people of France than were necessary to prevent such shortages as might result in sickness, starvation and disorder of such a degree as would hamper military operations."

10. The choice of new local administrators was not easy. The lesson was learned that work for the Resistance or detention in a concentration camp were not, of themselves, qualifications for administrative office.

11. While CA should attempt to avoid involvement in local political strife, internal dissention could not be allowed to interfere with military operations or the security of lines of communication.

Many of the above points were included in two succinct statements of the problems of CA. The first is from the British Administrative History of the 21 Army Group and concerns "The Army Relationship with Civil Affairs and Military Government"

> "The campaign confirmed the fact that when operating in civilized countries, the maintenance problems of modern Armies are to a large extent bound up with the maintenance of the civilians living in the operational areas and on the L of C. These civilians had to be retained in a reasonable state of health and be given adequate food and the bare necessities of life. If this had not been done they would have become an operational hindrance which would have curtailed the radius of action of the forces in the field. In order to administer the civilian population the import, manufacture and movement of certain essential stores for civilian use had to continue. These conflicted directly with the maintenance of military forces and priorities had to be decided constantly between the military and civil requirement.
>
> In the later stages of the campaign as the requirements of Civil Affairs mounted, it became apparent that the existing Civil Affairs organization was not large enough and had not sufficient resources to cope with the problem. It is doubtful whether it is sound policy to produce in the later stages of a war, with depleted resources in manpower, a new organization which is designed to perform the combined functions of already existing Services. It would have been better if the requirements for Civil Affairs had been made the responsibility of the existing Staff and Services. As it was, it became necessary to hand over a large part of the import and holding of supplies, stores, and equipment to S and T and Ordnance.[1]"

[1] Administrative History of 21 Army Group, 6 June 1944 - 8 May 1945. Germany, November 1945.

The other source is a list of recommendations made by a senior American CA officer based upon his experiences in France and Germany:

1. Your primary job is to be helpful to the army. Don't think that the commanding general in the area doesn't appreciate having civilian matters taken off his hands. He does.

2. Let city officials fun the city. Let them work. It's their city. Don't try to make all the decisions for them. Just don't let them interfere with military operations.

3. Know what reports you must submit before you go in. Send them in on time. The staff back at corps or army wants to know what's going on so they can help you. Prompt, efficient reports will also help you personally.

4. Keep your foot in the door on all matters that effect you. Help the civilians in every way. By so doing you are helping the army. Know what is going on.

5. Have a clear understanding of your functions and responsibilities--and those of others such as MI, MP, town major. Don't let people give you jobs that don't belong to you, and don't let others try to take over your responsibilities.

6. You have a definite duty to lift the morale of the civilians. Do this by your personal example, by sympathetic understanding of their troubles, and by playing fair with them.

7. Get interpreters--as many as you need. If you can't communicate, you can't act.

8. Watch certain areas closely. Recognize your most pressing trouble areas and stay close to them. Keep a weather eye on the relationship between troops and civilians, especially in matters of police relationships and liquor, for these are potential trouble spots.

9. Get into your town or location at the earliest possible moment, even if fighting is still going on, and get your CA location signs up at the earliest moment. Only then will you be on top of the job from the first moment.

10. Watch the welfare of your unit closely. This is hard work, but overwork will ruin your effectiveness. If you have a square peg in a round hold, don't hesitate to ask for a replacement.

11. Although your time may be limited for such matters, learn all that you can about your area--its history, points of interest, and such. It will bring you closer to the civilians and make them more responsive to you.

Finally, a British list of the elementary lessons:

1. Importance of planning before occupation
2. Importance of coordination during occupation--need to avoid bureaucratic quarrels

3. Revive local government
4. Problem of refugees
5. Differentiating among good guys and bad guys in cities
6. Installation of competent local leaders
7. Prevention of looting and vandalism by troops.[2]

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[2]Major General J. Maginnis, Military Government Journal: Normandy to Berlin. (University of Massachusetts Press, Mass., 1971).

H. Coles and A. Weinberg. The U.S. Army in World War II. Special Studies. Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors. (OCMH, Dept of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1964).

United Kingdom Series, History of theSecond World War. C. Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-45. (HMSO, London, 1947).

....F. Donneson, Civil Affairs and Military Government Northwest Europe, 1944-46. (HMSO, London 1961)>

Dept. of the Army, Civil Affairs Division, Field Operations of Military Government Units, Washington, D.C., January 1949.

U.S. Army, Civil Affairs School, Training Packet No. 7--Case Studies on Field Operations of Military Government Units in World War II. Fort Gordon, n.d.

II. CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER

The Anglo-American invasion of Sicily in July 1943 (OPERATION HUSKY) brought our forces into an enemy country but where the local populace was at worst cool and at best very friendly. Lessons learned here were taken to heart for operations later in Western Europe.

Conditions in cities were bad because of the fighting and bombing. Shortages of food, clothing, housing and medical supplies were far worse within cities than in the country. Despite the destruction accompanying the invasion, the Sicilians were cordial and at times enthusiastic. The friendliness, however, was probably based less on anti-Fascist sentiments than on the expectation of the reign of plenty that the Allies were expected to bring with them. When this failed to materialize, Sicilian morale, which had initially been good, dropped and disappointment and resentment became evident.

Standard procedures for occupying a town were as follows:

1. The CA officer occupied the most prominent building (city hall, etc.).
2. He posted standard proclamations covering the establishment of military government, the punishment of war crimes, and the regulation of currency and exchange.
3. He called the head of police and directed him to maintain order and to guard banks and food supplies.
4. All local officials were interviewed and ordered to continue in their duties.
5. Local officials were urged to secure all available civilian transport and efforts began to organize caravans of carts and trucks to move food.
6. Food and goods prices were fixed as of the day of the Allied troop arrival. Rationing systems in effect were to be retained.
7. The communal health officer was ordered to establish first aid stations and to submit an inventory of all available medical supplies.
8. The communal engineer was directed to check the water supply and to arrange for the clearing of debris and repair roads needed by the military.
9. Officials were sent into the countryside to survey the quantity of food on hand and to find means to transport it to locations where it was needed.
10. Banks were seized and placed under Allied supervision.

Once the island was conquered, AMG officers ran every aspect of life. "The question of food was, as always, the most vital, and related to it were the problems of inflation and the black market."

The AMG began to improve local police quality; to encourage resumption of normal economic activity--banks were reopened, a moratorium on all financial transactions was ended 6 September; the AMG found jobs for many with the Allied forces as well as private employers.

A. LESSONS OF SICILY

1. Inadequate coordination and cooperation between AMG and combat commanders. The HQs of both allied armies had reduced the numnber of AMG officers assigned them and were unwilling to allow more than a minimum to accompany the assault and follow up waves. Initial phases of the occupation thus were hindered by insufficient personnel.

2. Military units were uniformed as to the role of CA and often worked and acted at cross purposes (disarming local police who had been given tasks by the CAOs).

3. The most serious conflict between AMG and the tactical units was over transportation. AMG was completely reliant upon tactical units.

4. Failure of propaganda efforts--did not alert Sicilians to true nature of the occupation and raised unreal hopes.[3]

The official British history of the occupation covers many of the same points of the AMGOT (Allied Military Government Occupied Territories) experience:

(a) The functions of AMGOT were not always understood by the combat commanders. As a result attached civil affairs personnel often were not permitted to enter the combat zone with the assault troops or were improperly used.

(b) The failure to attach military government personnel to lower echelons until shortly before embarkation made it difficult for them to coordinate with counterintelligence and other field security agencies.

[3]Robert W. Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1948.

(c) Civil affairs officers frequently were needed immediately in captured towns and villages to prevent dissipation of critical stores. Such officers needed their own transportation since in the stress of battle the units to which they were attached were apt to give their requests low priority.

(d) AMGOT personnel suffered initially from lack of enlisted men for use as clerks, interpretors, and guards. This shortage heavily handicapped civil affairs officers in posting proclamations, enforcing curfews, and in protecting national monuments and works of art. Often as assault troops moved through a liberated town the the assigned civil affairs officer would be the only Allied person in uniform left behind.

(e) The requirement for civilian supply was far above that estimated by the HUSKY planners.

(f) Sufficiently prompt steps were not taken to locate and place guards over captured enemy equipment. Arms and ammunition thus passed into questionable hands leading to banditry, and gasoline and other petroleum products, always in scarce supply, were pilfered.

(g) Combat units can hardly be expected to think about the restoration of public utilities required by civilians. Therefore it was found desirable for specialists to be on the scene promptly to ensure restoration of minimum essential civilian services. Such personnel were not provided for HUSKY.

(h) To coordinate the combat requirements for local resources with essential civilian needs, local Resources Boards were established, composed of representatives of the supply services and AMGOT. This system was transplanted to the mainland where difficulties and conflicts caused by indiscriminate competition in the procurement and payment of labor were thereby reduced.[4]

AGMOT in Sicily and Italy showed the need for two classes of CA officers; generalists to be responsible for supervision of government in the cities, towns and provinces, and technical specialists to supervise such functional activities as legal, financial, public safety, and public utilities.

One American source claimed that the problems encountered in Sicily and Italy, varied little--and then principally in degree-- from those that faced American commanders in similar roles in earlier wars--Scott in Mexico, Shafter in Cuba. These problems included removal of civilians from the battle area, procurement of local civilian labor, curbing prostitution and the illicit sale of liquor to troops, enforcement of security measures (including nightly curfews) and the survey and

[4]C. R. Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy. (HMSO, London, 1957).

utilization of local resources both for successful prosecution of military operations and for the well being of the local populace.[5]

[5]H. Coles and A. Weinberg, The US Army in World War II, Special Studies. Civil Affairs: Soldier Become Governors. (OCMH, Dept. of the Army, Washington, D.C. 1964).

III. JAPANESE CONTROL IN SINGAPORE AND HONG KONG

The cases of the Japanese conquests of Singapore and Hong Kong, like those of the Germans in Europe, are different in nature from the U.S. occupations in Europe or Asia. It was never the American intention to annex the conquered territories or to stay indefinitely. The Japanese and Germans did intend to do both. Their approach to government and occupation policy was therefore fundamentally different. Futhermore, their conquests came early in their wars, unlike ours that came at the end. They therefore faced long term problems of occupation and control.

Information on Japanese control of the two major cities they captured during the war is very sparse.

A. SINGAPORE

The first step for the Japanese was to ask all British civilian officials to remain at their posts, appealing to them for help. Firemen, doctors, health workers, water engineers were particularly solicited. The Japanese had not expected such an early victory and were thus not prepared to assume responsibility for the control of such a large urban area. British prisoners of war were immediately put to work clearing the streets and the Japanese acted swiftly to stop looting by establishing a policy of summary on-the-spot execution of those caught looting.

Within the first month all former municipal workers were ordered to report to work. Japanese officials, where available, were appointed to head departments. Schools were reopened and this often meant taking schools back from the Japanese military who were using them as barracks. Food supplies were carefully conserved and the Japanese launched wide searches for supplies of rice that the Britsh were reported to have concealed on rubber plantations.

The Japanese were eager to get their information services working. Newspapers began publishing again within days of the surrender while radio station staffs were summoned back to work, broadcasting commencing again in March.

The Japanese established a special municipality for Singapore, renaming it "Syonan", and installed a Japanese mayor. About a thousand Japanese administrators, technicians, and businessmen were based in the city, in addition to the army and navy garrisons. A shortage of senior administrators led the Japanese to bring in lower quality Koreans or Taiwanese. Large numbers of local residents were induced to leave Singapore Island and move to the mainland to

avoid starvation. The Japanese administration employed many natives, laborers receiving part of their pay in food. The Japanese Army raised their own revenue through the tax system.

There was considerable collaboration from the native population, much of it enforced by economic necessity, but the Japanese still required an extensive system of military police. The local police were eventually reorganized according to the Japanese model after having originally followed the British pattern.

Overall the Japanese military administration was rather confused. The existence of various military command levels above the military administration led to a situation where military commanders at all levels issued orders to the city military administration, usually disregarding lines of command. Control over the native population was reasonably effective, but the administration of public service departments was generally unsatisfactory.

Control of the population was assisted by the policy of playing on the various ethnic groups with their respective grudges and resentments, a policy expecially hard on the Chinese whom the other groups resented. The population was divided into groups of 30 families which were given collective responsibility for each other's behavior. The Japanese did make a major effort to win the good will of the populace through use of the schools.

B. HONG KONG

The intention of the Japanese was to rule Hong Kong as a captured fortress under military bureaus. Their declaration of material law on the day the city surrendered (Christmas Day, 1941) served to give some semblance of established legality to any action the Japanese military chose to take. When it became clear to the Japanese that they could count upon at least a minimum of Chinese cooperation, they began to attempt the restoration of order, at the same time seeking the revival of the separate phases of the community's existence, imposing upon each the forms of control which they felt most likely to bind it to their purposes.

On January 2, 1942, the first regular governmental organization was declared and all officials except British were ordered to report to their jobs. The Japanese commander of the city announced the steps in his program for Hong Kong's reconstruction:

1. Public order--this was the responsibility of the military authorities but the civilian police were encouraged to report for reemployment.
2. Currency issuance
3. Relief of business to get the economy moving

4. Return of all to employment
5. Clearing up the city.[6]

[6]Namoru Shinozaki, Syonan, My Story: The Japanese Occupation of Singapore. Asia Pacific Press, Singapore, 1975.

Office of the Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, Singapore Under Japanese Domination. Sept. 1944, Washington, D.C.

Noel Barber, The Singapore Story: From Raffles to Lee Kuan Yew. Fontana Collins, London, 1978.

C. M. Turnbull, A History of Singapore, 1919-1975. Oxford University Press, London, 1977.

R. S. Ward, Hong Kong Under Japanese Occupation: A Case Study in the Enemy's Techniques of Control. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Dept. of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1943.

IV. THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF MANILA

With the entry of the Japanese into Manila on 2 January 1942, steps were taken immediately to establish control over the city. Japanese officers and interpreters set up card tables and checked pedestrians. Japanese troops occupied private hotels and some public buildings as billets. The next morning the only cars on the street were those driven by Japanese officers and civilians. The vault of the national treasury was sealed. The doors of banks and restaurants were also shut. Newspaper publication was briefly suspended and then begun again under Japanese control.

Governmental departments of the Philippine Commonwealth were placed under "protective custody." Courts were suspended, utilities taken over by the Japanese and a bewildering list of licenses and permits was issued to control the economic life of the Islands. Citizens were warned that any attacks on Japanese personnel would be punishable by death, but if the assailant were not caught, then hostages from around the scene of the attack would be taken.[7]

[7]Louis Morton. The U.S. Army in World War II. The War in the Pacific: The Fall of the Philippines. OCMH, Dept. of the Army, Washington, DC, 1953.

V. AMERICAN EXPERIENCE DURING THE LIBERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1944-45

The American return to the Philippines brought the first experience of the war for CA in dealing with a large but friendly Third World population.

A Civil Affairs unit based at Tacloban, Leyte, after the American recapture of the island reported some lessons learned:

1. Place guards immediately on all captured warehouses, supply dumps, government buildings and public utilities.

2. Indiscriminate and uncontrolled giving away of military supplies to civilians seriously handicaps the recruitment of labor needed by U.S. forces. (As an indication of the need for such labor, another CA unit based in Manila after its recapture in February 1945 hired 750 laborers a day to clean up the city and to build temporary shelters.)

3. "Souveniring" has a similar effect and makes price control difficult.

4. Municipalities should be pressed to pass ordinances prohibiting:

   a. Manufacture, sale, or possession of intoxicating liquors,
   b. Sale to military personnel of any foodstuffs made from relief supplies.
   c. Resale of any military supplies and equipment not specifically authorized.

5. Failure of agencies using labor to adhere strictly to a wage scale set by higher HQ causes discontent. This includes modification of wage scales by gifts of food or clothing to workers.

6. Areas should be set aside as civilian sanctuaries so that families may be moved promptly and with as little discomfort as possible.

7. Rigid rationing and controlled distribution of food is needed in order to have fair distribution.[8]

A. MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS

1. Recruitment of Labor. Recruitment of labor was one of the most important CA functions. As the battle lines on Leyte, for example, reached inland, the need increased for Filipino workers

[8]Dept. of the Army, Civil Affairs Division, Field Operations of Military Government Units, Washington, D.C., January 1949

to carry supplies to the troops and to maintain roads and trails. At one time as many as 8000 laborers were engaged in this work. In recruiting labor, CA personnel worked through political and labor leaders and parish priests, these people being most cooperative. Later competition for labor was so keen that CA units had to establish priorities among using units.

2. Difficulties Encountered in Recruiting Laborers. Labor recruiters had to overcome two handicaps to get workers in the numbers required. The first was the generosity of the American soldier in giving away food and clothing, which diminished the incentive to work. Finally, Sixth Army prohibited such gifts.

The second handicap under which recruiters labored was the almost complete absence of consumer goods in local markets. Money meant little to hungry men if they could not exchange it for food and other items needed. To meet this situation, on 26 October an army sponsored general store was opended to the public offering for sale clothing, rice, biscuits, salmon and candles, as well as items indicating little knowledge of Filipino customs. "The people would not buy or use the 4,000 rat traps or the rolls of toilet paper furnished nor would they buy or use canned or powered milk."

3. Reestablishment of Local Government. As soon as a combat engagement was over and the combat forces, with attached PCAU personnel, moved on, "a civil affairs unit of the Sixth Army stepped in and started to restore the normal community life." Temporary local officials were appointed. These were limited to men who had been screened by CIC personnel or who were sponsored by Filipinos of unquestioned loyalty. Once local governments were established, the Army seldom interfered with civil administration unless the military situation made it imperative.

4. Emergency Relief. There were many problems too large for the temporary governments to handle. Among these were care, feeding, and medical aid for the thousands of undernourished, ill, and in some instances, wounded refugees who flocked into the army's zone. By D + 4, 24 October 1944, Sixth Army was caring for approximately 45,000 people--most of the population of 56 communities.

Food was only one of the needs of these people, many of whom were homeless. Temporary shelter in comparative safety was provided, wells were dug, water purification units put into operation, field hospitals for civilians established and local staffs of doctors and nurces recruited.

5. Eduction. Civil affairs units of Sixth Army also opended schools in the principal barrios. In many places it was necessary to repair or rebuilt the duldings, and in a few instances textbooks were reproduced by Army units. Teachers who returned to the classroom often assisted in other

facets of rehabilitation. They assisted in dispensaries and hospitals or served after school hours in other relief or welfare work.[9]

[9]W. E. Daugherty and M. Andrews, A Review of U.S. Historical Experience with Civil Affairs, 1776-1956. ORO-TP-29, Bethesda, MD, May 1961.

VI. IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF COMMAND, 1942-1945

In August 1941, Britain and Russia jointly invaded Iran and occupied the country. German influence had been considerable and the Iranians pro-German, so the purpose of the invasion was to protect the oilfields and to open a supply route to Russia. There was minor fighting and Teheran was occupied within a few days. Under terms of the armistice that followed, certain areas were to be temporarily occupied, all Germans had to leave, facilities had to be offered for the dispatch of supplies to Russia. The Allies in turn promised economic assistance and guaranteed the territorial integrity of Iran.

The British were aware from the start of Soviet scheming to keep control of the north, but their main occupation problems were described by a British officer as "bread and brigands."

After the U.S. entered the war, the Persian Gulf Command was established to expedite massively the flow of materiel to Russia: In 1943, 30,000 Americans were involved. There was an eleven man military mission to the Iranian Ministry of War and U.S. advisors in the fields of health, police administration, irrigation, agriculture, and education. The most important advisor was in the field of finance.

In the course of 1942, the U.S. and U.K. became deeply involved in Iranian affairs, building roads and railroads. The need for protecting the LOC led us into some curious fields. We were forced to take an interest in tribal policies in order to secure local peace and we were involved regularly when local administrators could not handle problems among warring tribes. The compelling need to save shipping forced a considerable degree of U.S. interference in local Iranian affairs, leading the U.S. into largely controlling road transportation and into exercising a major influence on agriculture.

However, American popularity did not grow with time. The Iranians were not hostile but the measures the U.S. and U.K. urged on the Persian Government were not popular, especially efforts to control hoarding and speculation. The upper classes opposed measures aimed at nationalization and control of the economy, while the mass of the populace tended to blame us for the corruption and inefficiency of their own government.

While U.S. troops individually did a good job as ambassadors of good will, they were limited by being inadequately informed as to the U.S. role in and policy toward Iran. That policy

was itself unclear. The old American tradition of anti-imperialism was manifest in our relations with both the British and the Russians and regularly came into conflict with military expediency.[10]

[10]T.A. Vail Motter, The U.S. Army in World War II. The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia. (OCMH, Dept. of the Army, Washington, D.C. 2952).

VII. THE U.S. OCCUPATION OF KOREA, 1945

With the surrender of Japan U.S. forces entered Korea on 8 September 1945, occupying the sourthern half of the country. Korea was the only Pacific territory for which no occupation planning or preparation had been done, nor had any personnel been trained for the job. The XXIV Corps of the Tenth Army on Okinawa was designated as the occupation force. The Corps Commander designated the CG of the Tenth Army's anti-aircraft command to be his deputy for military government, a role for which he was totally unfitted. He was given a dozen other professional officers but none had any MG experience. No civil affairs teams arrived until October and then they turned out to be men who had been trained for nine months for the Philippines occupation and had received only a single one hour briefing on Korea.

The first important decision that had to be made was whether to continue the in-place Japanese administration until the Koreans could set up a government of their own. Clearly, the Koreans would have resisted this step so the U.S. adopted direct military government. The initial stumbling efforts were further hampered by the supervision that the U.S. tactical units had over the U.S. military administration. The Military Government was given little support and received no policy guidance from the State Department until January 1946.

The weakness in the American administration was obvious to the Koreans who were accustomed to strict Japanese rule, and they quickly saw room to maneuver on the political scene. The U.S. was looking for some consensus to set up a new government but such a consensus did not exist. The rapid collapse of Japanese rule left the country in a stare of near chaos. There was no incentive to work, the inflation rate rose enormously, and youth groups turned into criminal gangs.

Nevertheless, the American Military Government administrators made do as they went and were blessedly free of the prior or existing disputes at higher levels of authority that dogged other American MG and CA activities in the war. Accordingly, they were able to move rapidly and, on the whole, successfully in stabilizing the state of the country.

American experience in Korea suggested that the following steps taken in advance of the occupation would contribute greatly to its success:

1. Preparation of unit tables of organization related to the government structure of the country to be occupied,

2. Selection of MG officers on the basis of their personality, belief in democratic government, and personal integrity, as well as training and experience,

3. Thorough training on the area and its people,

4. Language training and a good number of good interpreters.

5. Provisions of adequate initial supply, especially vehicles, radios, telephones, and office equipment,

6. A military government chain of command paralleling that of the civilian government.[11]

[11] C. J. Friedrich et al., American Experiences in Military Government in World War II. Rinehart & Co., New York, 1948.

G. Henderson, Korea, the Politics of the Vortex. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1968

INITIAL ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA

C.G. XXIV CORPS

MILITARY GOVERNOR

CIVIL ADMINISTRATOR

SECRETARIAT

Administration Affairs	Foreign Affairs	Intelligence & Information	Personnel
Army Administration	Accounts	Planning	Property

(Liaison only)

BUREAUS

Mining & Industry	Agriculture/	Comms. Commerce	Transportation
Finance	Education	Justice	Public Safety

Provincial and municipal

MG Teams (attached to tactical units)

VIII. THE BRITISH REOCCUPATION OF BURMA, 1944-45

Lord Mountbatten reported two relevant civil affairs problems that arose when British forces began reconquering Burma. Despite the fact that the country had been a part of the Empire since 1881, it was found that there was a shortage of military officers with Burmese language capability and experience in Burma. The available ones had to be allocated between the Military Administration set up as British forces advanced and the incoming British colonial administration that was eventually to take over responsibility.

A second issue was that of finding acceptable local Burmese administrators. Those who had remained in place and had served under the Japanese regime were now suspected by their fellow Burmans. At the same time experienced replacements were not available and the British were generally compelled by this circumstance to keep all but the most flagrant collaborators on the job.[12]

[12]Vice Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 1943-1945. (HMSO, London, 1951).

IX. THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF SAIGON, 1945

With the collapse of Japan the independence movement in French Indo China seized Saigon and declared their independence. In the absence of any French forces, a small force of British Indian troops was sent to disarm the Japanese forces in Saigon and to arrange the surrender of Japanese forces throughout the country. However, the British commander, General Gracey, was given no clear mission in light of the very confused situation. The newly elected British Labor Government was not anxious to restore French colonial rule but was bound by previous commitments to the Free French.

Even in a less volatile situation the British force dispatched was far too small to accomplish much. Initially consisting of a single Gurkha battalion, it eventually grew over several months to a full division. However, from the outset Gracey was compelled to employ Japanese troops to assist in attempting to restore order, since the Vietminh attacked both French civilians and the British troops. Use of the Japanese incurred a heavy political penalty and added to the rapidly growing hostility of the British public to the British involvement in a hopeless situation. Gracey added fuel to the problem by overstepping his authority in publicly stating that the issue of the future form of government was exclusively a French responsibility.

The episode was an example of the dangers inherent in introducing too small a force with an uncertain objective into a turbulent political situation in a Third World city. The British force, instead of being an arbiter and police presence, became involved in the fighting and was never able to extricate itself.

When within three days of Gracey's arrival attacks on Europeans by the Annamites had begun, he ordered the Japanese commander (whose force was far larger than Gracey's) to take steps to restore law and order. Gracey stopped the publication of Saigon newspapers, all of which had been stirring up trouble by inciting the populace; he ordered the puppet president of the newly proclaimed republic to stop requisitioning buildings and to return some of those already seized; he demanded a list of the Annamite Armed Police units and other forces of the Vietminh with their present locations and ordered them to remain where they were. He also issued a proclamation forbidding demonstrations, processions and public meetings, prohibited the carrying of arms,

including sticks and stones, warned that wrongdoers would be summarily shot, and extended the curfew the Japanese had attempted to impose.[13]

[13]United Kingdom History of the Second World War. Major General S.W. Kirby, The War Against Japan, Volume V--The Surrender of Japan. (HMSO, London, 1969)

X. THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-53

A year after the last of the U.S. occupation forces left Korea in 1949, the North Korean invasion was launched, leading to the three year Korean War. Maximum American military strength reached 440,000 while the presence of military contingents from fifteen other countries complicated the Civil Affairs function. The capital at Seoul was lost to the invaders twice and twice retaken while Pyangyang was taken and lost by the UN forces. Most major cities changed hands and were extensively damaged.

The most critical civil affairs problems arose during the first year so it is on that period that these comments concentrate.

A. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM

In Korea, as elsewhere, the primary objective of civil affairs was the support of military operations. This objective included both the prevention of conditions that would prejudice military operations as well as constructive efforts to obtain maximum utilization of indigenous resources.

Thus, the first civil affairs efforts were in the fields of public health, welfare, and sanitation, for the purpose of preventing disease, starvation, and unrest. In the winter of 1950-51 the movement of several million refugees threatened interference with the use of vital communication lines. Later still, removal of civilians from combat areas and their subsequent care and disposition were deemed necessary, not only for humanitarian reasons, but as a security measure as well.

Suppression of guerilla activity which threatened the security of both troops and communications required effective liaison with indigenous police, and at times the assignment of military units for this purpose.

The restoration of public utility, transportation, and communication facilities needed for essential military and civilian purposes was an important civil affairs requirement in Korea. The recruitment of Korean laborers to assist tactical and service troops involved the Army directly in the management of large numbers of the indigenous civilian population.

The Republic of Korea military forces were a significant component of the United Nations forces, and constituted the principal instrument for the security of South Korea when and if other United Nations forces were to be withdrawn. Supplies of food and clothing for these forces had to be provided either from the Korean economy or from foreign sources. All efforts to support the Korean economy, therefore, had an indirect bearing upon the military situation.

B. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM

Civil affairs in Korea were closely bound up with the economic conditions of the country. Although Korea was an underdeveloped and recently liberated nation its economic problems were of the same kind as those which beset any nation at war: to mobilize all resources in support of the military effort and the civilian economy, and to supplement them by imports when necessary.

In this task the Republic of Korea faced three major hardships: a serious inflation, so that scarce commodities tended to flow only to these who had wealth or influence; severe shortages of raw materials and essential services, curtailing the production of items needed for essential military and civilian purposes; and a limited supply of foreign exchange. The Korean government thus confronted problems of over-all economic management, the solution of which would involve such measures as wage price controls, rationing, restrictions on the importation of foreign commodities, and measures to restore and increase production.

As a result of over 40 years of Japanese colonial rule the Koreans did not possess the administrative skills required by the emergency. The government had not yet been organized to manage a wartime economy efficiently, its personnel having been demoralized and, to some extent, corrupted by the wide disparity between fixed official salaries and highly inflated living costs.

This was one of the major reasons why the Korean Government was not able to control inflation, distribute commodities equitably, direct scarce resources to the most essential uses, make the best use of the aid provided by the UN, or use its foreign exchange for only the most essential imports. Under these circumstances optimum results from UN economic aid could only be obtained if the definciencies in the Korean government's ability to manage its economy were compensated by appropriate measures.

C. OBSTACLES TO EFFICIENT OPERATIONS

The decision to treat the ROK government as sovereign, and to introduce UN agencies to the maximum extent possible imposed severe limitations on the civil affairs effort. It made difficult an integrated approach due to the number of agencies involved and their vague spheres of jurisdiction. It led to friction with ROK authorities who considered even an advisory relationship an infringement of their sovereignty. It enabled the indigenous governnment to "play" off the various agencies against each other. It handicapped the policy of obtaining maximum contribution to military operations and to rehabilitation of the indigenous economy due to the low level of

technical competence and corruption of the Korean administration. These problems were compounded by the absence of both a comprehensive civil affairs directive from the CA as well as of a formal instrument definign the scope of civil affairs functions and the Army's role in their execution.

D. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS POLICIES

If the determination of whether the stated objectives were in fact attained represents the most basic test for policy, then the U.S. civil affairs effort in Korea can be judged a qualified success. Epidemics were prevented; no significant unrest on the part of the civilian population occurred. It must be emphasized, however, that the prevention of disease and unrest represented a minimum objective and essentially a negative one. Large scale riots or epidemics would have conclusively proven the complete failure of civil affairs policies; their absence did not, however, indicate more than a minimum effectiviness. After the first year it was still uncertain whether the existing policies represented the most efficient utilization of resources for civil affairs and whether the instruments selected contributed to the most effective operational pattern.

E. METHODS OF CA/MG OPERATION

Three methods exist for the operation and execution of CA/MG programs: (a) by U.S. military personnel or under the direct supervison of U.S. personnel; (b) by the indigenous government under U.S. direction; or (c) by the indigenous government with outside advice, but not direction. The first two alternatives involve a de facto surrender of sovereignty on the part of the indigenous government, and all three possibilities require a definition of the respective functions of U.S., UN (where applicable), and indigenous authorities.

The civil affairs effort in Korea utilized all three methods. First, the U.S. Army directed the operation of all transportation into and within Korea and procured supplies for its relief programs. In addition, throughout the campaign, the UN commander reserved the right of taking whatever action "military necessity" dictated, formally recognized in the directive from the UN of 6 July 1950. The determination of the nature of "military necessity" was left to the discretion of CINCUNC. Second, the doctrine of "military necessity" was also invoked by tactical commanders in assuming directive powers over civil affairs functions from corps areas forward. The evacuation of refugees, the distribution of relief supplies, and various security measures were carried out by ROK authorities, wherever possible, but at the direction of the tactical commander.

Finally, the ROK authorities were responsible for the distribution of relief supplies and other measures to prevent disease and unrest, subject only to the "advice and assistance" of U.S. or UN agencies, particularly the United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea (UNCACK), the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), and UNKRA. In practice the distinction between direction and advice proved very tenuous.

The complex Army organizational pattern had undersirable consequences, putting a premium on attempts by ROK officials to bypass the chief operating agency. ROK officials frequently did not know with whom to deal in the civil affairs structure. Thus when the Deputy Commander of EUSAK returned to the U.S., reportedly with no prospect of replacement, genuine confusion regarding liaison existed at the very top level of the ROK administration.

The Army's complex civil affairs organization even made it difficult for the commander to obtain advice regarding the political implication of his actions. There existed in Korea no single staff section charged with surveying the whole field of civil affairs and possessing the authority to integrate all the various civil affairs activities.[14]

[14]C.D. Stolzenbach and H.A. Kissinger, Civil Affairs in Korea, 1950-51. ORO, Washington, D.C. May 1952.

F. A SUMMARY OF KOREAN EXPERIENCE

1. The nature of the problem was clearly understood. The first handicap under which CA in Korea was conducted was the failure fully to appreciate the nature of the problem: the need to provide civilian relief for military as much as for humanitarian reasons.

2. The scope of the need was not clearly visualized. The second handicap was that in establishing machinery to fulfill the responsibility involved it was literally a case of "too little too late." It was not until four months after the U.S. forces were committed that CINCFE (McArthur) directed the Army in Korea to assume "complete and overall responsibility for many CA functions necessary for the attainment of the military objectives of the UN Command." The Army Commander was directed to use the resources of the U.S. civilian agency, the Economic Cooperation Agency, as much as possible.

3. Authority widely differed. Counting U.S. and UN agencies, civilian and military, there were dozens of organizations involved in CA. While ultimate responsibility rested on the commanding generals, it became very difficult for them to know what the overall picture was.

4. Frequent changes in organization. The unwieldy structure of CA affairs was constantly being changed from the top down.

Overall, it was felt the major needs in this sort of situation included the following points:

1. Detailed intelligence of the political, economic, social, psychological, and military aspects of an areas where operations may be conducted must be gathered in advance and used in planning.

2. It is not sufficient to undertake CA planning and organization after troops have been committed.

3. To be effective a CA operation must have a focal point for the resolution of political-military questions at every echelon of command.

4. Frequent and piecemeal changes in organizational patterns should be avoided.

5. For policy guidance to be effective staff coordination through all echelons is essential.[15]

[15]Daughtery and Andrews, A Review of U.S. Historical Experience with Civil Affairs.

XI. THE INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958

In July 1958, the Western-oriented Lebanese Government, facing an insurgency believed to be Communist inspired and supported, requested the U.S. provide troops to assist in putting down the insurgency. The Lebanese Government had appealed to the U.S. on several occasions for military assistance and possible direct intervention in their internal problems. They cited the Eisenhower Doctrine as the basis for their request and stated that Lebanon's territorial integrity and national independence were threatened by foreign forces.

Beginning 15 July four USMC battalion landing teams which had been exercising in the eastern Mediterranean began landing in Amman, Jordan. A U.S. Army brigade from Germany was also deployed but did not arrive until late August.

Although the Lebanese insurgents bitterly denounced the landing of the U.S. forces as an act of aggression, the military operation proceeded peaceably and without physical resistance. When the commander of the Lebanese Army objected to the landing of U.S. Marines, a compromise was reached and U.S. forces were deployed to secure and remain in the port area of Beirut, a zone around the Beirut International Airport, and along a communications corridor between these points.

The overall mission of U.S. forces in Lebanon was to safeguard the lives and property of Americans, prevent the overthrow of the Lebanese Government, protect its members, and provide a stablizing influence in the country.

Relations with the Lebanese people were generally good despite the evident tension which existed in the crisis atmosphere that covered the country. A million leaflets were dropped by the U.S. Air Force throughout Lebanon to explain the U.S. presence. Cooperation between U.S. and Lebanese forces which acted as a buffer between American forces and the insurgents, was evident when within a few days after the landing, combined patrols were initiated in Beirut. Later, U.S. forces conducted a series of field exercises in which Lebanese military observers participated for training purposes. While these activities were not officially labeled as civil affairs activities, many actions taken do lend themselves to current civil affairs definitions. The actions of the Lebanese military as a buffer between U.S. forces and the people of Lebanon, served as a means of limiting the civil affairs problems of the command. It is not clear whether this condition was planned for or was merely a fortuitous accident of circumstances.

There were some problems for the forces ashore involving unloading of ships, warehousing, and medical facilities. In finding satisfactory solutions the civil affairs officers often

found they were consulted only after the military forces were unable to solve these problems on their own initiative. When the forces found they did not know whom to contact or got bogged down in Lebanese channels with which they were unfamiliar, they hunted for some way out of their difficulties, and having discovered the CA officers, only then took their problems to them.

Given the odd circumstances of the introduction of U.S. forces, civil affairs did not become a major preoccupation. The several military civil affairs officers worked closely with U.S. Embassy personnel who were fully familiar with the local scene and who carried the burden of responsibility. As such the Lebanon operation was not a real test of civil affairs/military government capabilities, one involving much broader contact between the U.S. military and local populace. That would have required more specific policy guidance, staff augmentation and trained CA units.

The several command reports on the operation suggest the following "lessons learned":

1. The need to get a broad Status-of-Forces agreement immediately.
2. Quickly establish a CA committee representing military command, the local authorities, and the U.S. Embassy.
3. Establish an American Embassy liaison office.
4. Establish a well defined position on claims for damages, etc., and a capability to handle the problem.
5. Try to provide enough guidance to enable the military commander and the Ambassador to make preparations in advance.

Official reports indicate the Lebanon operation was efficiently conducted and generally regarded as a successful show of military force to accomplish a political objective. U.S. forces sustained only one casualty during the operation and were withdrawn in October 1958. The presence of U.S. troops was generally regarded as having had a positive influence on the course of events; troop conduct was exemplary, and the mutual cooperation of both military and political officers gave evidence of U.S abilities to play a difficult role in a complex case of counterinsurgency.

This insurgency produced civil affairs problems for the Government of Lebanon. Among them were: paralysis of production in the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy; setback of tourism; destruction and damage to communications facilities and other public property; large numbers of casualties to civilians; and equally large numbers of displaced persons and refugees, all requiring food and medical assistance due to insurgent/government force battles. The

U.S. provided assistance in the solution of these problems, both advisory and substantive, by the employment of foreign service officers assigned to the U.S. Embassy.[16]

[16]U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Mix of Civil Affairs, Active and Reserve. May 1972.

M. Dyer and A. Hausrath, Civil Affairs and the Lebanon Operation (15 July - 25 October 1958). ORO-TP-23, Bethesda, MD, Feb 1961.l Secret.

XII. THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1965

The collapse of the Domican government on 24 April 1965 and the outbreak of widespread disorder led to fears in Washington of another Cuba. The 82nd Airborne Division and three USMC battalion landing teams were deployed, for a final total of some 25,000 men. The force was very soon wrapped into an Inter-American Peace Force which remained in Santo Domingo (then some 600,000 in size) until free elections had been held and a government constituted by September 1966. Only the capital city was occupied, with a few US Special Forces teams deployed to the north coast and along the Haitian border.

Civil affairs personnel were not introduced into the operational area until after introduction of combat and combat support troops. This resulted in a lack of specialized intelligence essential to effective civil affairs operations. When civil affairs elements were called forward into the Domican Republic, the absence of early civil affairs reconnaissance in the area resulted in the introduction of unnecessary civil affairs teams and the omission of required elements.

There was no workable civil affairs plan in existence for the operation. Civil relief supplies were underestimated and when introduced into the area, were transported at the expense of previously planned logistics. The few civil affairs personnel present in the Domican Republic were relegated to low-level civil action projects and distribution of food supplies. Coordination of activities was accomplished on the spot by the units involved in food distribution activities. Prior planning had not taken place for coordination or cooperation between the military and civilian agencies and units working in the same functional areas. The result was duplication of effort, waste of already inadequate civil relief supplies, failure to cover the entire population in need, and confusion.

As U.S. troops moved into Santo Domigo, they began at once a Civil Affairs program both in the city and the surrounding countryside. Streeting fighting, the air raids, and rioting had caused damage to the city that had no electric power or water in most areas, while garbage and debris filled the streets. The people were hungry and needed medical attention. The 82nd Airborne Division medics began providing medical care and the distribution of rice and dry milk brought by airlift from the U.S. was started. The troops also helped restore power to the city.

The Army issued rules for "controlling" personnel in the corridor, permitting access by unarmed persons at designated checkpoints controlled by U.S. troops. Thus an unarmed person could enter the corridor to obtain food, water, or medical assistance. The Division Civil Affairs section established a program of food and medical supply, which supplied over 15,000 tons of

food and 15,000 pounds of clothing to the Dominicans. In addition, Division wives sent over 2000 pounds of used clothing.

Distribution of food to needy Dominicans was a difficult task. At first relief agencies distributed food stored in Santo Domingo by AID and CARE but in mid-May naval ships began bringing in food from the United States. Relief agencies established distribution points throughout the cleared areas of the city, each point caring for as many as 4000 people daily. Hungry crowds sometimes threatened to get out of control, but generally distribution proceeded smoothly.

Individual troops sharing rations were the best ambassadors. Some problems were created by lack of proper cultural training for U.S. troops (particularly attitudes toward and pursuit of Dominican women). Part of the Dominican resentment arose too from the nature of the duties of the American soldiers which included breaking up demonstrations, forcing teenagers to collect garbage.

While most work of the 82nd was done in the city, doctors and medical teams were sent upcountry. Mobile medical centers treated 350 people in the first four days of operation. Division doctors were to treat 58,000 Dominicans for all causes, from serious to minor. Engineers of the Division cleared mines and later established water supply points in outlying towns and trucked water into Santo Domingo to alleviate the water shortage. They also made daily trash runs, assisting in restoring sanitation to the city.

The U.S. commander stressed in his final report that the operation had been characterized by diversity and the oddity of the tasks performed by the military. Pure military operations dominated activities for a relatively short period. The military aspects were quickly "woven into a mesh of almost Oriental intrigue." The U.S. bias against the rebels changed to a more even handed approach.

General Palmer categorized the civil affairs aspects of the operation in three phases.

A. Phase I preceded deployment and involved an attempt (very feeble) to estimate civil affairs needs and to determine the nature of whatever government existed.

B. Phase II began on D Day. This involved determination of the capabilities of the various U.S. agencies in order to develop courses of action--the "loyalist" government; the U.S. Embassy (for information concerning the economy and the assistance that was to be administered); Public Health agencies; the Peace Corps; the Dominican Red Cross (to determine the requirements, if any for medical CA projects); public works and utilities (to see where the engineer resources of the 82nd might be needed); the MAAG (to determine the CA capabilities, if any, of the loyalists);

USIS (to learn the status of public information facilities). Contacts were also made with the Missionary Board and the local clergy.

C. Phase III began on D+3 and involved a continuing series of activities.

1. Daily food distribution, requiring multiple distribution points.
2. Establishment of medical facilities.
3. Restoration of electric power
4. Provision of potable water
5. Reduction of sanitation hazards
6. Assumnption of engineer civic action projects for road improvement and drainage.
7. Exhortation of civilians to return to their normal activities, banks and merchants to reopen. Commercial transactions were limited by a shortage of currency.
8. Encouragement of a resumption of educational activities. A special youth center for 650 children was set up.
9. Institution of a series of band concerts.
10. On the arrival of the CA detachment, they undertook to procure real estate for use of the U.S. forces and a labor force to support it, and did a quick survey of the CA functional areas needed to support the tactical mission.

General Palmer also suggested several other points to remember:

1. Particular care is needed at checkpoints for population control. Lanugage-capable MPs were needed. Metal detectors are needed to check females for concealed weapons.
2. Bull horns are needed for crowd communication.
3. Athletic equipment is useful in engaging young people.
4. Candy should be available for distribution by the troops to the populace.
5. Joint patrols of U.S. military and local police were useful as a means of gradually preparing the local police to resume responsibility for order.
6. Keeping road and other signs posted was a full time job.
7. If gasoline is not made available to civilian gas stations, trucks cannot get out to the hinterland to bring food into the city.
8. We should hire local truckers to haul relief supplies whenever possible, instead of using U.S. military vehicles. There is less chance of their being attacked and money is pumped into the economy.

9. Information is required very early on private relief organizations and coordination established with them. Palmer recommended that these organizations be encouraged to assume full responsibility for relief operations with continual support from the military.

10. Engineering data are needed on the construction of key buildings in the city.

A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND PSYOPS

Special Forces went upcountry in helicopters for intelligence purposes and listening posts were established on the North Coast and the Haitian frontier to watch for any sort of Cuban supplies being infiltrated. The CIA sent about 50 officers to set up outposts in rural areas for reporting on popular support for the rebels. Reports were radioed directly to the United States.

The Army Special Forces units not only established a U.S. presence outside the capital, but they surveyed economic needs, reported on local political conditions, developed working relationships with local police and military units, and prevented defections to the rebels. They were also used in psychological warfare operations.

In the program the United States employed the Voice of America, locally generated radio broadcasts, truck and ground emplaced loudspeakers, and air dropped and truck distributed leaflets to carry its message. The purpose was primarily to explain the presence of U.S. forces and their intended role.

The USIA, under the policy guidance of the State Department, had overall responsibility for psywar, and teams from the 1st Psywar Battalion at the Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, were deployed early in the airlift. Units from this battalion conducted leaflet, loudspeaker, and radio psychological operations. Psywar teams with specially equipped helicopters carrying loudspeakers, flew over Santo Domingo on 2 May, broadcasting President Johnson's explanation of U.S. policy.

Army personnel from the 1st Psywar Company (loudspeakers and leaflet) included experts in radio station and mobile broadcasting, printing, and the Spanish language. Radio teams from this company and Voice of America personnel rehabilitated a 1000 watt transmitter for relay of VOA broadcasts to the Dominican Republic from Greenville, North Carolina. On 5 May an American mobile 5000 watt broadcasting station became operational and later two mobile army transmitters and fixed broadcasting station augmented this unit. Psywar teams mounted loudspeakers along the east bank of the Ozama River and used loudspeaker trucks that attracted large crowds. Psywar teams completed 600 hours of loudspeaker operation and 900 hours of locally produced radio broadcasts.

Production of propaganda leaflets by copying machines began even before the arrival of portable presses. After the mobile printing equipment arrived, trucks distributed printed material, with the information leaflets becoming sought after items selling locally for a nickel a piece. Over 25 million propaganda items were distributed.

On 30 April the Special Air Warfare Center at TAC sent two C-47 aircraft for psywar operations. Shortly after four C-123s and two V-20s and a small photographic lab had also been sent. The two C-47s begain by 3 May operations over Santo Domingo, dropping leaflets and broadcasting messages using 400 watt aircraft mounted speakers. The speakers, however, required the C-47s to fly no higher than 1500 feet, thus putting them at risk from ground small arms fire. USIA personnel insisted that entire speeches be broadcast, increasing the length of time the planes were at risk. This problem was solved by broadcasting only key excerpts of speeches.

Allied to the psywar program was a communications jamming effort to counter rebel radio propaganda, the rebels having occupied the government radio station. U.S. teams attempted to jam the station using electronic interference equipment located on ships, aircraft and at ground installations. The effect was largely unsuccessful because of the lack of suitable interference equipment, the high power of the rebel transmitters, and the rebel capability of varying broadcast frequencies over a wide band. The United States cancelled the program late in May.[17]

[17]Herbert G. Schoonmaker, United States Military Forces in the Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965. Univ. of Georgia, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1977.

Commander U.S. Forces Dominican Republic, U.S. Stability Operations Dominican Republic, Part II. September 1965.

XIII. ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORY AFTER JUNE 1967

In the aftermath of the Six Day War, the Israelis began an occupation of pieces of Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian territory that was to continue in part to the present. The areas involved comprised 70,000 square miles with a population of one million, and no cities of any size.

The territories were divided into four administrative districts under a military commander. The Regional Commander's staff and HQ were structured to answer the special needs of a command that was active in all political and civil matters. Staff officers in the Regional Commands represented various Israeli Government ministries and each worked in his own sphere within the framework of the region. Two branches functioned in conjunction with staff officers, the economic branch that centralized the activities of the economic ministries and the administrative and services branches that coordinated such various services as health, education, posts, etc. There was also a legal advisor to the Regional Command.

To enable the Regional Commands to concentrate their efforts on the civil aspects of administration, separate authorities were set up to cope with security.

The practical conduct of civil and security affairs was carried out by the District Commander whose staff included a military and a civil arm. The military arm was charged with maintenance of order and security and military forces were at its disposal to fulfill its objective. This is where active cooperation took place among various security agencies.

The civil arm was involved in administration, licensing, etc. It also coordinated the operations of civil and economic programs in the territory.

From the first day of military rule the policy followed was one of normalization, to permit the territories to live uninterruptedly as they had before June 1967. The active expression of this policy was found in three spheres: non-presence; non-intervention; open bridges.

All conspicuous demonstrations of the presence of the Israeli government, the buildings of the regime, the Israeli flag, reconnaissance, signs of the military command could have created friction and conflict between administration and populace. The policy that was decided on was unequivocal. Whenever possible one had to be invisible. The less one seems or feels a foreign government and military presence, the easier it is to bear.

The sphere of economic and administrative activity was entrusted to Arab hands, the Israeli government remaining aloof and limiting itself almost entirely to deciding the budget for the different needs. The guiding principle was that the locals should govern themselves with their own people. Except for those spheres in which there might be a decisive influence upon Israelis (such

as sanitation or economic activity that could be of direct harm), the government apparatus would not interfere with what was done and would not try to force development upon the population against its wishes.

The informal contact between Israeli authorities and the locals naturally aroused a desire to imitate, to develop and to progress. If the initiative came from the local side, only then did the Israelis do everything to extend help. The tangible expression of this situation was seen in the small number of Israeli personnel that managed civil and economic matters in the territories.

The next sphere, open bridge, was to allow complete freedom of movement by the locals in and out of their own territory to the other Arab states. The first step was renewal of commercial activity, the second the movement of people.[18]

[18]Israeli Ministry of Defense, Coordinator of Government Operations in the Administered Territories: Four Years of Military Administration, 1967-1971. (No place, no date).

IXV. CIVIL AFFAIRS ASPECTS OF THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON, JUNE 1982

On 6 June 1982, the Israeli Defense Forces entered southern Lebanon and within five days had occupied almost half the country. When it became apparent that an invasion seemed imminent, towns in Southern Lebanon began to empty as thousands of civilians began moving north to Beirut or east to the Bekaa Valley. In an effort to reduce non-combatant casualties, the Israelis compounded the refugee problem by dropping leaflets on the cities and towns, urging citizens to flee. Rarely were refugees given adequate time to get clear of the danger area before bombing and shelling began, nor was there any provision made to handle the refugees once they had attempted to flee. In Tyre, for example, the inhabitants were instructed to go to the beaches to avoid the bombing, and over 40,000 fled there where they waited two days without food, water, or shelter. Many civilians died as a result of inadequate planning for their care beyond the immediate warning of impending danger.

As areas were secured by the combat forces, Military Government personnel arrived to become Civilian Administrators. The two main towns of South Lebanon had both suffered damage, Sidon to 10 percent extent, Tyre to 30 percent. The initial action of the military government was to issue identification cards to the residents as a mechanism to flush out PLO members who had merged into the civil population.

The military government forces do not appear to have been prepared to assist in humanitarian endeavors, there being no preparations, for example, to remove bodies from the towns. The health problem was magnified by the Israeli arrest of medical personnel who had been providing medical care to the PLO. Most hospitals had been damaged or destroyed by shelling and bombing. Israeli engineers did reestablish water in the towns although this was primarily through a supply point system. Other problems in the sanitation area arose, resulting from damaged sewer systems, uncollected garbage, and large numbers of rats. A number of typhoid cases were reported.

The closing of banks and destruction of some led to a severe problem for the civilian populace. The Bank of Lebanon was unaccountably closed for several weeks throughout the Israeli controlled area and people had to rely upon only the funds in their immediate possession. Around 16 June the military government provided mobile units of Israeli banks, intended primarily for the benefit of Israeli military personnel but also offering exchange services for local merchants

doing business in Israeli currency. Due to shortages and the lack of available currency, prices rose and a black market was soon in operation.

Despite the existence of a Military Government Division in the Operations Branch of the Israeli General staff and the early appearance of Civilian Administrators, it does not appear that the Israeli forces were prepared to deal with the non-combatant situation it encountered and created. Part of the problem lay in the direct chain of command from the Operations Branch to the Military Governors in the field which apparently allowed the Governors to have operated independently of the IDF combat forces rather than in a combat support role. With the exception of the military government teams there is no indication that there were any IDF units specially trained to deal with the problems of non-combatants. The single approach used most commonly was to attempt to evacuate the area, but no provision existed for handling the population displaced as a result of this approach.

Responsibility for civilian personnel in a combat area ultimately rests with the combat commander, but he is obviously one indirectly and secondarily concerned with the problem. The concern should be specifically delegated to a subordinate commander who has the sole mission of civilian management. Because of the lack of a central control for handling refugees in Lebanon, non-combatants were denied food, water, and shelter while troops sought PLO members hiding among the refugees. Also voluntary relief organizations waiting to provide assistance found their efforts hampered by the absence of a central authority.[19]

[19]Colonel P. J. Orelli, Civil Affairs Requirements Evident in the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon. US Army War College, 9 May 1983.