



Table of Contents

Executive Summary	2		
Introduction	2		
		Recommendations	
		Appendix A: Task Force Terms of Reference	A-1
Appendix B: Task Force Membership	B-1		
Appendix C: Briefings Received			
Appendix D: Acronyms			

Executive Summary

Introduction

Our Nation's missions around the globe are enabled by robust Military Satellite Communication (MILSATCOM) and tactical networks. These networks transport command and control (C2), sensor, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) information to enable timely and decisive operations. Advances and proliferation in advanced electronic warfare (EW), kinetic, space, and cyber capabilities threaten our ability to maintain information superiority. Preserving the reliability of these networks requires not only improved communication techniques for low probability of detection, interception, and denial, but also an enhanced infrastructure for protection.

The estimated and projected electronic threats against satellite communication (SATCOM) have rapidly escalated in the last few years and will continue to increase in the foreseeable future. Under severe stress situations, jamming can render all commercial SATCOM and most defense SATCOM inoperable, except for the low- and medium-rate modes of defense extremely high frequency (EHF) SATCOM. This reality should be considered a crisis to be dealt with *immediately*. In addition, network operations in stressed situations can be spotty to non-existent.

To address this situation, this Task Force undertook a year-long study to review the current U.S. military satellite communication, tactical networking, and emerging commercial communication technologies and capabilities and identified shortfalls within existing and planned capability development. This report conveys the Task Force findings and proposes near-, mid-, and long-term system, enterprise, and technology improvements needed to allow effective operations against advanced threats.

Scope of Study

In December 2014, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) signed the "Terms of Reference – Defense Science Board Task Force on Military Satellite Communication and Tactical Networking." As a result, the Chairman of the Defense Science Board established a task force on MILSATCOM and tactical networking. The study's Co-chairmen led an investigation on areas of interest related to military communications capabilities.

The Task Force convened a series of meetings from April 2015 to April 2016 and received briefings on MILSATCOM and networking topics from subject matter experts in the Department of Defense (DoD), the broader U.S. Government, think tanks, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), and the private sector. All Services were invited to provide their perspectives on satellite communications, tactical networking, and anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) challenges. The Task Force focused its discussions and this report on what it believes are the most urgent communications and networking issues for the DoD, within the broad Terms of Reference.

Major Findings

MILSATCOM will be contested by a myriad of effects ranging from reversible to destructive.

- The current ground network architecture does not scale beyond a few tens of users and lacks anti-jam (AJ) capabilities. Ground tactical networks must be better connected and protected, accommodate ever increasing traffic, and require fewer resources to operate.
- There is no single unifying tactical network for the air layer.
- Minimum essential communications and connectivity needs are not well-defined or exercised.
- DoD communications are managed as a set of stovepipes, with acquisition authority for space, ground, and terminal components spread across multiple organizations and Services.

Recommendations

- 1. The Air Force Acquisition Executive should accelerate production and increase the quantity of Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) terminals for bombers and C2 aircraft. The Army Acquisition Executive should produce and increase the quantity of AEHF terminals for battalions.
- 2. The USD(AT&L) should accelerate the deployment of the Protected Tactical Waveform (PTW) and the Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES) for use over commercial and MILSATCOM and the development of the PTS; the Army Acquisition Executive should accelerate PTW modem development and deployment to the Soldier Network Extensions (SNEs) and should plan to incorporate the PTS into all SNEs.
- 3. The Army should migrate a Blue Force Tracking (BFT) capability to the Protected Anti-Jam Terminal System (PATS) system to provide more protection for this critical service.
- **4.** A low-rate, AJ, low probability of detection (LPD), and low probability of intercept (LPI) "random access packet" network should be developed.
- 5. The Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) should establish a pathfinder program to leverage and utilize existing/evolving commercial communication satellite systems.
- **6.** The Air Force and Navy Acquisition Executives should accelerate Link-16 enhancements and development of a next generation directional network.
- 7. The Army Acquisition Executive should redirect investments from the current Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW) and use these funds to: (1) acquire additional HNW capability; and (2) evolve HNW to increase AJ capability and address scalability. At the same time, the Army Communications-Electronic Command (CECOM) should re-design the ground wireless network for scalability, capacity, resiliency, and ease of configuration.
- 8. A Master Control Plane should be developed for internetworking and improved information assurance. The Task Force believes this initiative will be best led by a DoD network architect office with the involvement of DISA, the Navy Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), and other Service network offices.

- 9. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)) should apply science and technology (S&T) investment toward alternative, protected, beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) architectures.
- **10.** The National Security Agency (NSA), working closely with DISA and the U.S. Cyber Command, should address fiber network vulnerabilities.
- 11. The Navy should reduce its reliance on commercial providers by developing an organic capability to architect the network and pursue non-commercial solutions when appropriate.
- 12. All Services and Combatant Commands (CCMDs) should develop and exercise with Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for operation with degraded MILSATCOM services. The Services should identify their minimum mission essential information exchange requirements and train with that thin line of communication.
- 13. The Secretary of Defense should appoint a single, central authority for communications with responsibility to architect the overall DoD interconnected network and allocate resources and work with operational elements to create the necessary training and material solutions.

Appendix A: Task Force Terms of Reference



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

DEC 0 1 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference – Defense Science Board Task Force on Military Satellite Communication and Tactical Networking

US defense systems have become increasingly reliant on military satellite communication and tactical networks for integrating significantly larger amounts of information. New command and control networks, sensors for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and weapon systems for tactical operations are creating orders of magnitude larger amounts of data to be transferred across military communication networks. Advanced electronic warfare and cyber threats have the potential of significantly reducing the reliability of these networks, and covert operations require improved techniques for communication with low probability of detection and interception.

The study will review the current US military satellite communication and tactical networking capabilities, identify shortfalls within existing and planned capability development, and then propose mid- and long-term system and technology improvements needed to allow effective complex operations against advanced threats. Specifically, the study will investigate military satellite communications systems and address questions such as: what is achievable for assured communications within current modernization and development programs; what is the potential of new technology; what are the new satellite architectural concepts that will offer greater robustness for wideband communication with greater resistance to kinetic, electronic, and cyber attacks. Additionally, the study will investigate military tactical networks and address questions such as what is the current state of military tactical network interoperability across heterogeneous platforms; what are the recommended future tactical network architectures and systems; and how can the rapidly evolving commercial networking systems and technology be best applied, when applicable, to military tactical networks.

I will sponsor the study. Dr. Vincent Chan and Mr. Alfred Grasso will serve as Cochairmen of the study. Lt Col Michael T. Manor, USAF, (Joint Staff) will serve as Executive Secretary. Lt Col Michael Harvey, USAF, will serve as the DSB Secretariat Representative.

The study will operate in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act" and DoD Directive 5105.04, the DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this study will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of title 18, United States Code, section 208, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of action as a procurement official.

Frank Kendall

Appendix B: Task Force Membership

Co-Chairmen

Dr. Vincent Chan Mr. Alfred Grasso

Members

Mr. Gregory Neal Akers LTG Steve Boutelle, USA (Ret.) ADM Archie Clemins, USN (Ret.) Dr. Cynthia Dion-Schwarz Dr. Kenneth Hetling Dr. Malina Hills Dr. Joseph Mitola

Government Advisors

Dr. John Chapin (through Dec 2015)

DARPA

Mr. Randall Conway

DOD CIO

Executive Secretary

LTC Michael Dean, USA *JS/J6*

DSB Secretariat

CAPT Jeff Nowak, USN Defense Science Board

Support

Mr. Matthew Lytwyn, SAIC Ms. Kathleen McGlynn, SAIC Honorable Arthur Money

Mr. Marc Richard Mr. James Shields Mr. George Spix Dr. J. Scott Stadler Dr. Robert Wisnieff Mr. Vincent Vitto

Mr. Richard Pino
OUSD(AT&L)
Mr. Mark Segal
NSA/CSS

Lt Col Victor Osweiler, USAF Defense Science Board

Appendix C: Briefings Received

April 23-24, 2015

Intelligence Community Threat Briefing

Defense Intelligence Agency

Intelligence Community Threat Briefing

Central Intelligence Agency

Military Services Network/Satellite Capabilities

and Campaign

U.S. Army

Military Services Network/Satellite Capabilities

and Campaign

U.S. Air Force

Intelligence Community Threat Briefing
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Military Services Network/Satellite Capabilities

and Campaign

U.S. Marine Corps

Military Services Network/Satellite Capabilities

and Campaign

U.S. Navy

June 2-3, 2015

RDA Task Force

OUSD(AT&L)

Air Force Red Team Briefing

Air Force Red Team

Near Peer C4ISR Architecture

MIT Lincoln Laboratory

PACOM Concept of Operations

PACOM

Protected Tactical Modem The MITRE Corporation

.

June 25-26, 2015

MILSATCOM Constellation Lead-Off

The Aerospace Corporation

MILSATCOM Orbitology

The Aerospace Corporation

MILSATCOM WGS

The Aerospace Corporation

COMSATCOM Strategy/Air Force Pathfinders

U.S. Air Force

MILSATCOM Terminals

U.S. Air Force

FAB-T

U.S. Air Force

MILSATCOM AoAs and AEHF POR

The Aerospace Corporation

July 13-14, 2015

Ground Tactical and Wireless Networks

U.S. Army

RAND 2013 Wireless Study

RAND Corporation

Link 16 Link 16 and CDL Resiliency

DOD CIO U.S. Air Force

Airborne Networking CDL

MIT Lincoln Laboratory OUSD(AT&L)

APM Discussion on Navy's ADNS Capabilities

(PEO-C4I)
U.S. Navy

Ground Tactical Networks MIT Lincoln Laboratory

August 6-7, 2015

Multiple NSA Briefings Enterprise (Teleports and Gateways)

NSA DISA

Command Center Mission/Orientation Commercial SATCOM/EMSS-Global

DISA DISA

Gateway SATCOM Operations

DISA

September 24-25, 2015

PNT Resiliency Wooden Chalice

The Aerospace Corporation The MITRE Corporation

A2/AD Wargaming and Network Assessments MILSATCOM Threat Analysis

RAND Corporation Lincoln Laboratory

Spectrum Operations
Lincoln Laboratory
Lincoln Laboratory
Lincoln Laboratory

Current Research in WB HF Cyber Defense of SATCOM

The MITRE Corporation Lincoln Laboratory

December 16-18, 2015

Tactical Waveforms/MANETs Protected Band SATCOM

Harris Corporation AFSPC

Posturing the Satellite Communications Space Security & Defense Program

Enterprise AFSPC

AFSPC

Schriever Wargames

Fighting SATCOM AFSPC

AFSPC Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations

SATCOM Requirements

AFSPC

Center

AFSPC

PSCS AoA USSTRATCOM Briefing

AFSPC USSTRATCOM

ARSTRAT Briefing MHS
ARSTRAT DARPA

Tactical SATCOM Discussion for Defense C2E Science Board DARPA

Lockheed Martin

WND

Kratos Briefing

DARPA

Kratos

XS-1 Rapid Access

ViaSat Briefing DARPA ViaStat

SeeMe

Inmarsat Briefings DARPA Inmarsat

CSP Seedling
ntelsat General Briefings

DARPA

Intelsat General Briefings DARPA
Intelsat

ART OUSD(AT&L)
DARPA

ONR Briefing ELASTx ONR

DARPA

AFRL Space Vehicles Directorate: Space
PNT Portfolio Communications S&T for MILSATCOM

DARPA AFRL

SSPARC RDECOM (CERDEC) Briefing

DARPA RDECOM (CERDEC)

February 11-12, 2016

NRO Briefing

NRO

Cisco Brief

Cisco Systems

Microsoft Cloud Brief

Microsoft

Google Brief

Google

Juniper Brief Networking in a Hyperscale Cloud

Juniper Networks Amazon Web Services

April 28-29, 2016

Raytheon Brief Boeing Brief

Raytheon The Boeing Company

Northrop Grumman Brief NRC Brief

Northrop Grumman National Research Council

Lockheed Martin Brief Lockheed Martin

Appendix D:Acronyms

A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial

ADNS Automated Digital Network System
AEHF Advanced Extremely High Frequency

AFSPC Air Force Space Command

AJ Anti-Jam

AoA Analysis of Alternatives

ARSTRAT Army Forces Strategic Command

ASD(C3I) Assistant Secretary of Defense For Command, Control, Communications, and

Intelligence

ASD(R&E) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

ATH At-the-Halt

ATIP Advanced TDMA Interface Processor

BCT Brigade Combat Team
BFT Blue Force Tracking
BLOS Beyond Line-of-Sight

C2 Command And Control

C2E Communications in Contested Environments

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

CCMD Combatant Command CDL Common Data Link

CECOM Communications-Electronic Command

COTS Commercial Off the Shelf
CSS Central Security Service

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DDR&E Director of Defense Research and Engineering

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DoD Department of Defense
DSB Defense Science Board

EHF Extremely High Frequency
ELF Extremely Low Frequency
EPS Enhanced Polar System
EW Electronic Warfare

FFRDC Federally Funded Research and Development Center

GaN Gallium Nitride

GIG Global Information Grid GMR Ground Mobile Radio GPS Global Positioning System

GRRIP Global Rapid Response Information Packet

HAIPE High Assurance Internet Protocol Encrypter

HF High Frequency

HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

HMS Handheld, Manpack and Small Form Fit

HNR Highband Networking Radio HNW Highband Networking Waveform

IFDL Intra Flight Data Link
INTOP Integrated Topsides
IP Internet Protocol

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System

LOS Line-of-Site

LPD Low Probability Of Detection
LPI Low Probability Of Intercept

MADL Multifunction Advanced Data Link
MAJE Mitigation and Anti-Jam Enhancement

MANET Mobile Ad Hoc Networking

MCX MILSATCOM Advanced Concepts Division

MHS Mobile Hotspots

MHz Megahertz

MILSATCOM Military Satellite Communications
MILSTAR Military Strategic and Tactical Relay
MNVR Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NC3 Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

NCW Network-Centric Waveform NDI Non-Developmental Item

NDIA National Defense Industrial Association

NIPRNet Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network

NRO National Reconnaissance Organization

NSA National Security Agency

ONR Office of Naval Research

OTM On the Move

OUSD(AT&L) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and

Logistics

PACOM Pacific Command

PATS Protected Anti-Jam Terminal System

PHY Physical Layer

PLI Position Location Information

PoP Point of Presence POR Program Of Record

PTES Protected Tactical Enterprise Service

PTS Protected Tactical Satellite
PTW Protected Tactical Waveform

QoS Quality of Service

RF Radio Frequency
RHN Regional Hub Node

S&T Science and Technology
SA Situational Awareness
SATCOM Satellite Communications

SMC Space and Missile Systems Center

SEV Space Enterprise Vision SHF Super High Frequency

SINCGARS Single Channel Ground-Air Radio System
SIPRNet Secret Internet Protocol Router Network

SITREPS Situational Reports

SMART-T Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical Terminal

SMC Space and Missile Systems Center

SMC/MCX Space and Missile Systems Center MILSATCOM Advanced Concepts Division

SNAP SIPR/NIPR Access Point
SNE Soldier Network Extension
SONET Synchronous Optical Network

SPAWAR Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command

SRW Soldier Radio Waveform

STT Satellite Transportable Terminal

T2C2 Transportable Tactical Command Communications

TCN Tactical Communications Node
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access
TIP TDMA Interface Processor

TTNT Tactical Targeting Network Technology

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UHF Ultra-High Frequency

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

USSTRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command

VLF Very Low Frequency VWP Vehicle Wireless Package

WBHF Wideband High Frequency

WGS Wideband Global SATCOM System

WIN-T Warfighters Information Network Tactical

WND Wireless Network Defense

WNW Wideband Networking Waveform

XDR Extended Data Rate