

*Report of the  
Defense Science Board Task Force*

*on*

**Managed Information Dissemination**



**October 2001**

**Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  
For Acquisition, Technology and Logistics**

**Washington, D.C. 20301-3140**

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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DEFENSE SCIENCE  
BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination

Attached is the report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination.

The Task Force determined that U.S. civilian and military information dissemination capabilities are powerful assets vital to national security. They can create diplomatic opportunities, lessen tensions that might lead to war, help contain conflicts, and address nontraditional threats to America's interests. In the information age, no diplomatic or military strategy can succeed without them. Yet America's political and military leaders too often appreciate their value only during a crisis or in retrospect when hostilities are concluded.

Despite the positive benefits that accrue from a robust information dissemination program, the Task Force determined that the U.S. Government's information dissemination organizations today are understaffed and underfunded. They suffer from poor coordination, and they are not integrated into the national security planning and implementation process.

Therefore, the United States needs a sustained, coordinated capability to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics that is rooted in the information age. It should be multi-agency and multi-service, adequately funded and adequately staffed. Its communications channels must be highly differentiated; its technologies state-of-the-art. Products and messages must be credible, consistent, and tailored to different audiences in different cultures. Channels and brand identities must be firmly established in peace so they can be used successfully in war. America's leaders need to give information dissemination a much higher priority and be willing to use it to communicate effectively to foreign publics. It is a critical element in all policy planning and implementation. Without it, no policy or strategy is complete.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Vincent Vitto", is positioned above the typed name.

Vincent Vitto  
Task Force Chairman

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DEFENSE SCIENCE  
BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed  
Information Dissemination

Attached is the report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination. This Task Force was sponsored jointly by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD/SO/LIC) and the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DOS/R).

In their report, the Task Force concluded that the U.S. Government requires a coordinated means to speak with a single voice abroad. The following recommendations will enhance the Government's capabilities in this area:

- The President issue a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on international information dissemination to strengthen the U.S. Government's ability to communicate with foreign audiences and coordinate public diplomacy, public affairs, and overt international military information.
- The NSPD establish a NSC Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on International Information Dissemination with an expanded Secretariat in the DOS and ensure it possesses adequate authority, staff and funding to coordinate timely public diplomacy, public affairs, and open military information planning and dissemination activities.
- The President and his senior national security advisors strengthen U.S. international information dissemination by harnessing the Internet revolution to civilian and military information capabilities, taking full advantage of commercial media production methods, and significantly increasing foreign opinion research and studies of foreign media environments and influence structures.
- The Secretary of State strengthen the Department of State's International Information Bureau under the leadership of an Assistant Secretary; substantially increase funding for Bureau activities intended to understand and influence foreign publics, with much of the increase for contracted products and services; and make these assets available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives.

- The Secretary of Defense establish an International Public Information Committee within DoD under OASD(SO/LIC) to coordinate all DoD open information programs carried out under the authority of the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination.
- The Secretary of Defense implement DoD's draft OASD (SO/LIC) guidelines to increase coordination between PSYOP forces and the CINC/JFC staff, revitalize the CINCs' Theater Engagement Plans, strengthen PYSOP capability to support the U.S. Government's strategic information programs, and effectively integrate these programs into the activities of the Policy Coordinating Committee's Secretariat.
- The Secretary of Defense enhance DoD's information dissemination capabilities worldwide in support of the regional CINCs' Theater Engagement Plans and in anticipation of crisis response requirements.

I endorse all of the Task Force's recommendations and recommend you forward the report to the Secretary of Defense.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "William Schneider, Jr." with a stylized flourish at the end.

William Schneider, Jr.  
Chairman

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## *Executive Summary*

U.S. civilian and military information dissemination capabilities are powerful assets vital to national security. They can create diplomatic opportunities, lessen tensions that might lead to war, help contain conflicts, and address nontraditional threats to America's interests. In the information age, no diplomatic or military strategy can succeed without them. Yet America's political and military leaders too often appreciate their value only during a crisis or in retrospect when hostilities are concluded.

Used effectively, public diplomacy, public affairs, and international military information can mobilize publics to avert or resolve a short-term crisis. Sophisticated strategic communications can set the agenda and create a context that enhances the achievement of political, economic, and military objectives. Over time, they may shape foreign perceptions in ways that support America's interests.

The U.S. Government's information dissemination organizations today are understaffed and underfunded. They suffer from poor coordination, and they are not integrated into the national security planning and implementation process.

The United States needs a sustained, coordinated capability to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics that is rooted in the information age. It should be multiagency and multiservice, adequately funded and adequately staffed. Its communications channels must be highly differentiated. Its technologies state-of-the-art. Products and messages must be credible, consistent, and tailored to different audiences in different cultures. Channels and brand identities must be firmly established in peace so they can be used successfully in crisis and in war. America's leaders need to give information dissemination a much higher priority and be willing to use it to communicate effectively to foreign publics. It is a critical element in all policy planning and implementation. Without it, no policy or strategy is complete.

The Task Force on *Managed Information Dissemination* was charged with determining the need for and feasibility of a coordinated U.S. information dissemination capability.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, the Task Force was asked to examine strategic information activities of the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DOS). To this end, the study is sponsored jointly by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD/SO/LIC) and the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DOS/R).

The Task Force investigated a broad range of issues including:

- The roles of DoD, State, and nonmilitary U.S. international broadcasting services in a coordinated strategic information dissemination capability.
- Acquisition and use of communications channels and the value of established "brand identities."

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<sup>1</sup> The Terms of Reference are set forth in Appendix I. The Task Force membership and the individuals (both inside and outside the U.S. Government) who met with the Task Force are presented in Appendix II and Appendix III, respectively.

- Policy, legal, and resource limitations on U.S. information dissemination capabilities.
- New and emerging technologies capable of enhancing U.S. information dissemination capabilities.

The Task Force assessment went beyond the Departments of State and Defense to include other U.S. entities such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and U.S. international broadcasting services as well as nongovernment organizations and individuals skilled in emerging media and strategic communications. The briefings received and extensive internal discussions form the basis for the findings and recommendations in this report.

Early on, the Task Force addressed several basic questions:

- Why study managed information dissemination at all?
- Assuming a study is needed, what do we mean by information dissemination and what should be the appropriate level and scope of analysis?
- What are the salient historical, political, organizational, and technological considerations?
- How should information dissemination be coordinated and carried out?

Arguments against the need for coordinated information dissemination include the notion that CNN, AOL-Time Warner, and other global media already provide an abundance of credible information. In a pluralistic society with a government based on divided powers, there inevitably are diverse, deeply held views on significant national security issues. Some contend this means it is futile even to try to achieve coordinated information dissemination. Others suggest multiple, uncoordinated voices are a positive good—a beneficial consequence of a free society.

Mindful of these arguments, the Task Force concluded that the U.S. Government does require a coordinated means to speak with a coherent voice abroad. Private media, however credible, have their own goals and priorities. They are selective in ways that serve news and business interests. They cannot and should not be relied on to act as advocates for national security policies. At the same time, media increasingly will carry the statements of America's leaders, when and if they have something of consequence to say to foreign publics, without the need for Government-sponsored channels.

Moreover, there are moments of crisis and issues of long-term importance to which only the Government can speak with full authority. Information—not as "spin," but as policy—is not simply a rhetorical flourish in which solutions to a crisis are presented, it is an integral part of the solution itself. If an authoritarian regime threatens U.S. interests, its population should understand the consequences of its government's actions. If hate radio broadcasts incite to genocide, rational voices should respond. If epidemics threaten populations, accurate information must be provided quickly. If terrorists deploy biological weapons, publics need to know.

Coordinated information dissemination is an essential tool in a world where U.S. interests and long-term policies are often misunderstood, where issues are complex, and where efforts to undermine U.S. positions increasingly appeal to those who lack the means to challenge American power. Whether the issue is missile defense, the Kyoto Protocol, or long-term conflict in the Middle East, effective communications strategies and well-coordinated information systems can shape perceptions and promote foreign acceptance of U.S. strategic objectives.

The Task Force assessed requirements at the strategic level and focused on public diplomacy, public affairs, and international military information activities. This report does not address the topics of information warfare, computer attack, and computer defense. The Task Force looked closely at U.S. international broadcasting services directed by the Broadcasting Board of Governors. The Task Force determined that the mission, culture, and statutory authority of these broadcasting organizations do not permit their use by policymakers in tailored communications strategies intended to shape and influence public opinion on national security issues.

Although there is ample room to improve operational and tactical information dissemination activities, the Task Force concluded that the U.S. Government's highest priority is to provide an adequate framework to help coordinate strategic international information dissemination. For this reason, the Task Force looked at previous coordination efforts, particularly Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68 on International Public Information. The Task Force found the core principles of PDD-68 to be valid, but also concluded that PDD-68 suffered from a lack of sustained leadership interest and was deficient in its implementing authorities and structure. PDD-68 did not assign specific responsibilities to the Departments of State and Defense. Its interagency coordinating group was understaffed, underfunded, and focused on crises situations. In addition, the coordinating group was underutilized at the strategic level and coordination was episodic.

The Task Force also examined U.S. Government information dissemination systems coordinated in varying degrees under PDD-68: the Department of State's Office of International Information Programs, Department of Defense psychological operations (PSYOP) and public affairs activities, and U.S. international broadcasting services. In each case the Task Force found deficiencies. The State Department's International Information Programs are underfunded and underutilized within the Department, and they have yet to realize their full potential for information dissemination using the Internet and satellite television. Military public affairs, CINC Theater Engagement Plans, and operational and tactical PSYOP activities need improved coordination. Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), and other U.S. broadcasting services face structural weaknesses and fundamental challenges presented by emerging technologies, television, language priorities, and clarification of broadcasting's appropriate role in national security.

The Task Force found that all U.S. Government information dissemination assets would benefit from more effective use of commercial audience research, content production, and transport media (Internet, satellite TV, and radio). Each needs improved surge capacity for communicating in times of crisis. Greater use of commercial production and communication resources can enable them to leverage trends in global information dissemination.

The Task Force also examined U.S.-funded international exchange programs such as the State's International Visitor and educational exchange programs and military exchange programs such as IMET and the National Defense University's International Fellows program. These activities are not and should not be linked to short term policies. Nevertheless, no programs have greater long-term strategic value for U.S. interests.

The report opens with a review of the May 2000 Defense Science Board study that examined psychological operations (PSYOP) in time of military conflict.<sup>2</sup> This study responded to Congressional concerns about limitations on the performance of the Commando Solo (EC-130E) aircraft in disseminating radio and TV broadcasts in the Balkans during Operation Allied Force. The study recommended increased use of the Internet and emerging media, better use of television and radio, and information dissemination policies and practices that respect the power of networking technologies to render tactical/strategic distinctions obsolete.

Chapter 1 establishes the need for managed information dissemination. It examines the objectives and legacy of PDD-68 on International Public Information and its coordinating body, the International Public Information Core Group. Chapter 2 addresses DoD managed information dissemination activities, including military public affairs, the Theater Engagement Plans of regional CINCs, and operational and tactical PSYOP. Chapter 3 addresses the mission, structure, and key issues facing nonmilitary U.S. international broadcasting. Chapter 4 discusses current international information dissemination programs within the Department of State and U.S. international exchanges. Chapter 5 examines central trends in commercial information dissemination, media production, and audience research. Chapter 6 offers the Task Force's conclusions regarding the road ahead for managed information dissemination based on revitalized program and production capabilities and provides a set of specific recommendations.

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<sup>2</sup> Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on *The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict*, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, DC, May 2000. The report's recommendations are in Appendix IV.

## *Summary of Recommendations*

### **Recommendation 1**

*The Task Force recommends that the President issue a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on international information dissemination to (1) strengthen the U.S. Government's ability to communicate with foreign audiences and thereby shape understanding of and support for U.S. national security policies, and (2) coordinate public diplomacy, public affairs, and overt international military information. The directive should require all regional and functional National Security Council (NSC) Policy Coordinating Committees to (1) assess the potential impact of foreign public opinion when national security options are considered and (2) recommend or develop strategies for public information dissemination strategies before or in concert with policy implementation.*

### **Recommendation 2**

*The Task Force recommends that the NSPD establish an NSC Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on International Information Dissemination. The committee should be chaired by a person of Under Secretary rank designated by the Secretary of State. The chair will be assisted by a deputy designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Members of senior rank should be designated by the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, and Commerce; the Attorney General; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.*

### **Recommendation 3**

*The Task Force recommends that the NSPD delegate to the Policy Coordinating Committee and its Secretariat adequate authority to coordinate timely public diplomacy, public affairs, and open military information planning and dissemination activities, including the authority to require*

- *Analysis of foreign public opinion and influence structures,*
- *Development of strategic themes and messages for long-term and crisis response communications,*
- *Identify appropriate media channels, and*
- *Produce information products.*

### **Recommendation 4**

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State support the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination through a dedicated and expanded Secretariat in the Department of State consisting of the current interagency working group on international public information augmented by an expanded staff and budget and an executive secretary from the NSC staff. A robust, expanded, and multiagency PCC Secretariat support staff, drawing upon expertise from DOS, DoD, the Joint Staff, 4<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group, CIA, and commercial media and communications entities must be established to facilitate audience research and to develop channels and information products.*

### **Recommendation 5**

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State strengthen the Department of State's International Information Bureau under the leadership of an Assistant Secretary; substantially increase funding for Bureau activities intended to understand and influence foreign publics, with much of the increase for contracted products and services; and make these assets available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of the Policy Coordinating Committee's Secretariat.*

### **Recommendation 6**

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State modernize and diversify the products and services of the Department of State's International Information Bureau to include significantly expanded use of*

- *Internet Web sites, streaming audio and video, and leased emerging satellite TV and FM radio broadcast channels;*
- *American Embassy TV and radio and Washington File print services for both direct distribution and distribution through foreign media channels;*
- *The Foreign Press Center by U.S. policymakers and military leaders to communicate with foreign publics through foreign press and media channels;*
- *Interactive information networks (and the associated databases) containing key foreign audiences and influence structures;*
- *Joint State-DoD training and increased interagency assignments; and*
- *A reserve cadre of retired, language-qualified State and DoD officers available for crisis response deployment.*

### **Recommendation 7**

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish an International Public Information Committee within DoD under OASD(SO/LIC) to coordinate all DoD open information programs carried out under the authority of the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination. DoD membership should include senior Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, PSYOP and Joint Staff representatives.*

### **Recommendation 8**

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense implement DoD's draft OASD (SO/LIC) guidelines to*

- *Increase coordination between PSYOP forces and the CINC/JFC staff,*
- *Revitalize the CINCs' Theater Engagement Plans,*
- *Strengthen PYSOP capability to support the U.S. Government's strategic information programs, and*
- *Effectively integrate these programs into the activities of the Policy Coordinating Committee's Secretariat.*

### **Recommendation 9**

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense enhance DoD's information dissemination capabilities worldwide in support of the regional CINCs' Theater Engagement Plans and in anticipation of crisis response requirements. In addition, the Secretary should make these capabilities available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of the*

*Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination. Enhancements include*

- *Expanded use of direct satellite FM radio and TV,*
- *Additional use of regional magazines such as Forum and Dialogue,*
- *Expanding use of regional Internet Web sites; and*
- *Establishment of a public diplomacy office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.*

**Recommendation 10**

*The Task Force recommends that the President and his senior national security advisors strengthen U.S. international information dissemination by*

- *Insisting that civilian and military information capabilities be harnessed to the Internet revolution,*
- *Taking full advantage of commercial media production methods, and*
- *Significantly increasing foreign opinion research and studies of foreign media environments and influence structures.*

\* \* \*

Information is a strategic resource—less understood but no less important to national security than political, military, and economic power. In the information age, influence and power go to those who can disseminate credible information in ways that will mobilize publics to support interests, goals, and objectives. What is required is a coherent approach as to how we think about managed information dissemination and the investments that are required for its more effective use by America's diplomats and military leaders.

## *Chapter 1: Introduction*

### **1.1 Review of Previous Study**

This DSB Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination emerged as a follow-on effort from the May 2000 DSB study on the Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Military Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict.<sup>3</sup> The May 2000 study was charged to assess

- The capability of the U.S. armed forces to develop programming and to broadcast factual information to a large segment of the general public;
- The potential of various airborne and land-based mechanisms to deliver such information; and
- Other issues in the creation and dissemination of all forms of information in times of conflict, including satellite broadcasts and the use of emerging mobile communication technologies.

The May 2000 Task Force was created in response to Congressional concerns over limitations in military operations in the Balkans, where *Commando Solo* (EC-130E) aircraft were unable to adequately disseminate TV and radio broadcasts. The Task Force also addressed issues associated with PSYOP as part of an overall information campaign during peace, crisis, and armed hostilities. It evaluated organizational issues associated with PSYOP forces within DoD and addressed issues associated with the PSYOP community's relationship with the intelligence community. Of particular interest was the ongoing worldwide explosion of information creation and dissemination technologies and capabilities. The Task Force spent considerable effort addressing modern trends in information dissemination and media content creation. With these trends as a backdrop, the Task Force assessed the viability of the *Commando Solo* fleet and a variety of options currently being studied by DoD.

The May 2000 Task Force found that Military PSYOP offers a unique and powerful asset in military operations, both in peacetime and war. However, outdated equipment and organizational issues often hamper the creation of PSYOP products that meet mission needs. Given the broad array of complex missions conducted by U.S. military forces, understanding the culture and preparation of the "soft" battlespace is imperative in the conduct of successful operations. A robust and flexible PSYOP capability can be an invaluable tool in these efforts.

With these issues in mind, the May 2000 study offered several recommendations.<sup>4</sup> Of particular interest are Recommendations 3-7, which led to the current study and its co-sponsorship by the DoD and DOS. These recommendations, written for a DoD audience, address the challenge of creating and disseminating a credible, coherent, and coordinated U.S. Government message to many different audiences. The May 2000 study called for a major effort to integrate DoD PSYOP with other U.S. Government international public information initiatives to help build credibility and brand identity. This integration would also help identify and leverage the delivery mechanisms required to ensure that a coherent U.S. Government message is heard in peacetime and during times of conflict as both a diplomatic and military tool. Effective efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical level require expert content and market-analysis capabilities,

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<sup>3</sup> May 2000 Terms of Reference and Members are listed in Appendices IV and V

<sup>4</sup> The full text of these recommendations appears in Appendix VI of this report.



which are available in both the U.S. Government and the commercial marketplace. Additionally, DoD needs to acquire the technical capability to understand emerging media dissemination techniques and technologies in order to implement these techniques when warranted. More robust connections with the intelligence community, specifically the Defense Intelligence Agency are required to enhance PSYOP products for specific countries and regions.

## **1.2 The Case for Managed Information Dissemination**

Understanding and influencing the opinions of the right audiences at the right time can create diplomatic opportunities, reduce tensions that might lead to war, help contain conflicts, and address nontraditional threats to U.S. security. These “right audiences” are not only in foreign ministries. They are publics who can be mobilized to support U.S. goals and objectives as well as publics arrayed against our interests. They are foes who may deploy nuclear or biological weapons, hate radio broadcasts, or computer viruses. They are friends and foes who may resent U.S. power and seek strategic balancing through rhetorical, political, and cultural means.

Today, as in the past, sound U.S. policies frequently are misunderstood. Persuasive arguments usually exist for these policies. But the U.S. too often fails to make sure that its message is heard and accurately perceived. In some cases the message may be understood, but publics may be mobilized against the policy. At times, the U.S. message may compete with sophisticated anti-U.S. communications strategies preferred by others to more coercive means of dealing with the American agenda.

It is not the job of the media to shape perceptions of U.S. foreign policy or respond to communications strategies directed against the United States. On national security and foreign policy, the U.S. Government must ensure that information dissemination is integrated systematically into policy planning and execution. In practice, such inclusion has been episodic and has depended for the most part, not on strategy, but on personalities and circumstance.

The U.S. Government’s information assets are compartmentalized and seldom coordinated. They are structured institutionally, not in the way information flows. National security agencies find it difficult to shape messages within news cycles or to deal imaginatively with a 24/7 world. Tasking authorities may not exist. Where they do exist, agency responses may be sluggish. What is the information environment? Is it proactive? Reactive? Crisis driven? Long-term? Who is the audience? Who is most influential? What do we know about the culture and public opinion trends? What communications channels are most appropriate? Is it preferable to leverage existing channels, or should the Government create and use its own? Do U.S. agencies have trusted, reliable, well-maintained Web sites on major national security issues? Have embassies developed good contacts with indigenous media? Who should go on camera and when? Are long-term information assets invested in areas that are potential flashpoints? These and a host of other questions are not routine in U.S. policymaking. And only rarely are innovative and persuasive communications strategies central to the policy process.

Denied areas present unusual challenges for international information dissemination. The perceived credibility of the message and the existence of adequate channels are threshold issues. Political boundaries, lack of receivers, literacy rates, language differences, government control of communications, jamming, and cultural or religious biases are significant concerns. At the

tactical level, physical factors such as distance, terrain, prevailing winds (leaflets), or threats can be important.

Different organizational cultures and professional standards are important considerations as well. Diplomats and warriors—Venus and Mars—think and act in very different ways. Links between U.S. international broadcasters and the Departments of State and Defense are not well defined. Broadcasters have long urged, and Congress has provided, a statutory “firewall” between policymakers and broadcast news and information programs as a way to maintain credibility and standards of broadcast journalism. U.S. broadcasters resist tailoring programs to short-term policy objectives, and most are not predisposed to work with military PSYOP. International exchange professionals are protective of the scholarly integrity and nonpolitical character of their programs. Former U.S. Information Agency officers valued a degree of separation between information and policy as a way to achieve more effective communication.

Yet, the United States possesses significant “soft power” and information dissemination assets. In times of international crisis, those who feel threatened will seek trusted sources of information. Given America’s political and scientific leadership, the U.S. Government often has more international credibility than any other institution—more than the U.N., more than the European Union, more than Japan, China, or India. As crises increasingly do not stop at national borders, it is not only in America’s national interest, but also a humanitarian obligation to be able to serve as a credible and rapid source of information to reduce international tensions and mitigate conflict.

The United States has proven Government-sponsored information dissemination resources and significant capacity to leverage commercial information channels when its leaders have something of consequence to say. The Department of State’s international information programs, the international military information programs in the Department of Defense, and U.S. broadcasting services are the primary U.S. Government assets. Each has value. Each can achieve communications objectives depending on strategic and tactical circumstances. Each faces significant challenges in rethinking missions and priorities, and in adapting legacy systems to the forces driving change in the global information environment. The following chapters in this report address many of these issues.

The U.S. Government does not have an effective means to coordinate the planning and use of Government-sponsored information assets or to determine when and how best to leverage outside channels. Nor, importantly, does the Government have a planned surge capacity for communicating abroad in times of crisis. These are urgent national security needs. A Presidential directive authorizing an information dissemination capability that effectively links civilian and military assets is required.

### **1.3 Objectives of PDD-68 and Creation of IPI Core Group**

#### **PDD-56**

In May 1997, the President signed PDD-56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations” and established the Peacekeeping Core Group (PCG). In November 1997, members of the PCG identified information (the ability of the U.S. Government to communicate effectively with foreign audiences) as a major component of complex contingency operations and raised the

concern that the Government's international public information (IPI) efforts suffered from a lack of interagency cooperation.

### IPI Assessment

In response to this concern, the NSC staff established a subgroup under the PCG with the mission to assess the Government's international information activities in peacekeeping and conflict-prevention operations and to make recommendations to the PCG to improve U.S. Government IPI capabilities.

The terms of reference (TOR) for the subgroup defined IPI as overt PSYOP, public information, and public diplomacy. The TOR stated that the purpose of IPI is to influence foreign audiences in ways favorable to U.S. national interests. The TOR pointed out that recent U.S. experiences in Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia demonstrated the need for the U.S. Government to fashion a coherent information strategy, to coordinate U.S. messages among the various agencies, and to clearly articulate U.S. and U.N. policies to foreign audiences.

The assessment was conducted between December 1997 and March 1998 and focused on the U.S. Government's capability to plan and coordinate IPI information and influence activities. The subgroup reviewed lessons learned from previous Government information efforts, information strategies, interagency coordination mechanisms, the information capabilities of the U.N. and other international organizations, and applicable policy and legal considerations.

During the conduct of the assessment, the NSC staff tasked the subgroup to plan, coordinate, and implement real-world IPI influence activities in support of U.S. foreign policy initiatives in Rwanda, Iraq, the Sudan, and Afghanistan. These crises-related IPI activities highlighted the advantages of maintaining the same IPI chairperson and interagency representatives regardless of the geographic region of the crisis.

### Findings

The assessment identified several lessons learned from past IPI-type experiences:

- Past information coordination committees were established by Executive Order, broad in purpose, long in duration, and staffed by full-time experienced personnel. These committees were effective and contributed significantly to the attainment of U.S. national security objectives.
- More recent committees were ad hoc, regionally and crisis-oriented, of short duration, and attended by individuals who had other full-time jobs. After a steep and time-consuming learning curve, these committees were marginally effective in the narrowly defined roles in which they operated.
- As the committee members became familiar with the capabilities and resources of the agencies involved, the committees slowly evolved into an imaginative and effective arm of U.S. foreign policy. Over time, they were able to address information activities such as developing information objectives, supporting themes, hostile information/disinformation, vulnerabilities, audiences, media, and timing.

- At the conclusion of the crises, the committees immediately disbanded and did not capture “lessons learned.” Each new regionally oriented committee started with a blank sheet, new players and chairperson, and few “lessons learned” from previous IPI committees. The mistakes of the past were made again and again.

The Sub-group’s assessment of IPI concluded that:

- Early IPI-type activities were highly successful because they were formally chartered, addressed global issues, and were attended by experienced members.
- Ad hoc IPI activities of the recent past, while limited, contributed to the attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives. The primary problem was that the participants lacked experience, expertise, and knowledge of proven procedures and techniques.
- IPI should have a global—not regional—perspective. The same committee and players should address influence projection issues regardless of the region.
- IPI should be a full-time committee with the same chairperson and participants and not reconstituted anew for each crisis.
- NSC-level involvement is essential.
- The U.S. Government should promulgate a PDD that establishes a funded and full-time, NSC-chaired interagency IPI coordinating committee.

PDD-68

On April 30, 1999, the President signed PDD-68. The vision of PDD-68 was to harness the enormous potential of the U.S. Government to plan, coordinate, and implement strategic influence campaigns to support its worldwide policies. The PDD created a national information policy, a coordinating and approval structure, and attainable goals. IPI was designed to improve the Government’s ability to communicate to foreign audiences in order to prevent and mitigate foreign crises and to promote understanding and support for U.S. foreign policy initiatives. The PDD stated that IPI is to address misinformation and incitement, mitigate interethnic conflict, promote independent media organizations and the free flow of information, and support democratic participation.

The PDD established an IPI Core Group (ICG) at the Assistant Secretary-level and chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. ICG participants include representatives of the NSC, State, OSD, Joint Staff, USAID, NIC, and others as required. The PDD directed the ICG to develop a national IPI strategy consisting of guidance on regional and transnational issues and to develop an early warning and crisis response capabilities. DoD developed and provided to State Department a draft national IPI strategy, which is awaiting interagency review and adoption.

The PDD established a training goal to develop civilian and military professionals skilled and experienced in IPI planning and techniques. It called for the exchange of personnel among agencies and a goal to promote the effective use of IPI by the UN and other international

organizations. In essence, the objective of PDD-68 was to end ad hoc information committees and reestablished the professional, full-time committees of the past.

Despite the assessment, promulgation of PDD-68, and promising experience in six NSC-directed IPI campaigns, IPI continues to suffer from a lack of funding, sufficient staff, and high-level support. Most of the objectives identified in PDD-68 have not been realized. The vision has not been achieved.

#### **1.4 Performance of IPI Core Group in recent conflicts**

Since the inception of the International Public Information (IPI) subgroup in December 1997 to the reestablishment of the IPI Core Group as a subgroup under the NSC's Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) in April 2001, there have been eight NSC-directed IPI efforts.

IPI was involved in varying degrees with Rwanda, Iraq, counterterrorism, East Timor, Serbia, and West Africa. Of these six IPI events, Iraq and Serbia required a sustained effort. This section will briefly address the Iraq IPI effort as a representative case study.

In January 1998, the NSC staff activated an Iraq IPI influence effort to support U.S. Government policy goals. Information objectives and themes were developed to guide the effort and were continually updated through USIA's international polling data. IPI directed development of a variety of briefings and press materials including videos, photos, and fact sheets for overseas distribution through Embassy outreach programs to the local media, academicians, diplomats, and other key communicators. IPI arranged for key individuals to visit foreign capitals to explain U.S. policy on Iraq and for senior U.S. officials to meet foreign journalists at the Foreign Press Center and participate in WORLDNET (interactive television).

In support of the December 1998 air strikes in Iraq (Operation Desert Fox), IPI developed "questions and answers" and talking points for use by military and civilian spokespersons. IPI coordinated a matrix of supporting informational objectives, themes, and media. It also coordinated the distribution of policy statements to U.S. Embassies and military headquarters for further distribution to local journalists and media outlets.

In addition, IPI coordinated enhanced Middle East radio coverage by VOA and other broadcasting entities. IPI worked with the President's speechwriter to ensure a consistent Government message and drafted op-eds for senior U.S. officials for placement in Middle East newspapers. USIA initiated a Web page in several languages and posted Government policy statements and other information including the President's Ramadan message, interviews with U.S. policy makers, and supportive statements by key foreign leaders. Following the December air strike, IPI initiated a post-strike IPI campaign to maintain the focus on Iraqi noncompliance with UN mandates.

In summary, the IPI successfully planned, coordinated, and implemented a strategic influence campaign to project U.S. policy statements and supporting rationale to various worldwide audiences. IPI employed a variety of spokespersons and information products to ensure a consistent flow of accurate and timely information reached Middle Eastern and European media.

As in all IPI information and influence campaigns, the messages to foreign audiences consist primarily of official U.S. Government policy statements and supporting rationale that are delivered to selected diplomats, foreign media, and key communicators in a particular region or country. The media controls actual delivery of the message to the general populace and may broadcast portions of the official U.S. policy statements or simply provide editorial comment. The timing of the broadcast, its relative importance and relationship to other news items or whether it is even aired is outside the control of the U.S. Government and IPI. Other than the Internet, the Government is not able to "talk" directly to large foreign audiences with the intent to create understanding and generate support. There is no strategic dissemination mechanism for the U.S. Government to advocate its policies directly to the people.

This is not to impugn the media. It is not their job to convince audiences to support U.S. policies. For issues that impact domestic U.S. audiences, time honored principles dictate the constraints imposed upon any administration's ability to communicate directly with the American people. These domestic constraints do not apply to communicating directly to overseas audiences. During World War II and the early days of the Cold War, the U.S. Government employed a variety of radio transmitters to communicate Government messages to European and Asian audiences. In Iraq and Serbia, U.S. Government messages intended for audiences such as the elite, the general populace, and other internal audiences could not be directly and reliably delivered to them.

For maximum effectiveness in communicating a U.S. Government message to foreign audiences, future IPI efforts need to employ a variety of means to ensure the message is received in a manner that fosters understanding and generates support. Currently, the Government uses the Internet, Washington File, official visits, Embassy contacts, and the commercial media, but lacks the ability to conduct sustained advocacy broadcasting, which includes purchasing local air time or supplying foreign media with broadcast-ready news items that support U.S. policy. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office prepares and provides foreign media around the world with news items for local broadcasting and reports that most overseas media welcome and broadcasts them as received.

The U.S. Government needs a more responsive information dissemination capability to tell its story directly in a timely, convincing, and credible fashion. Underpinning the message development and dissemination process is analysis of hostile propaganda and the intended target audience. Simply disseminating U.S. policy statements is inadequate. The Government needs to actively advocate its policies and immediately rebut misinformation with all possible means.

In this era of instant communications, the U.S. Government can no longer rely on its legacy communication programs to reach and influence increasingly sophisticated foreign audiences. New capabilities and organization are required to disseminate the Government position in the best possible light, which includes a more professional approach, direct and reliable dissemination, creative thinking, and a sustained and focused effort.

## 1.5 Review of PDD-68

The 1999 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68, "International Public Information" confirmed this outreach concept and drew upon two previous National Security Decision Directives, 77 and 130, to establish a high-level interagency information coordinating mechanism and related policies and procedures. The goal of PDD-68 was to use international information activities to improve the U.S. ability to prevent and mitigate crises and to promote understanding and support for U.S. foreign policy initiatives around the world.

Upon review and analysis, the Task Force embraced the views of PDD-68 and the ever-increasing importance in today's information age to communicate effectively the goals and objectives of U.S. foreign policy to foreign audiences. The Task Force noted that PDD-68 was never fully implemented because of a lack of high-level attention, inadequate staffing, and a lack of funding.

The Task Force then conducted an assessment of existing U.S. Government international information dissemination programs to determine whether these activities met the PDD-68 requirement to inform and influence foreign audiences. The Task Force noted that the Government seeks to influence foreign audiences through a variety of means, including cultural centers, media training, the Foreign Press Center, VOA TV, the Washington File, international broadcasting, the Internet, speakers' programs, policy statements, press briefings, books, and periodicals. These highly effective programs are essential instruments of U.S. foreign policy that address long-term U.S. objectives and, to a lesser degree, short-term international crises. However, upon examination, it became clear that they do not provide the United States with an immediate, responsive means to inform, rebut, influence, or persuade specific foreign audiences with tailored messages supportive of specific U.S. national interests.

Furthermore, existing U.S. Government international broadcasting capabilities such as Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and Radio Free Asia (RFA) are independent overseas broadcasting agencies designed to be long-term efforts to present balanced world news, programs of local interest, and American culture to foreign audiences. To maintain their credibility, these broadcasting agencies do not tailor their programs to influence foreign audiences in favor of short-term U.S. policy objectives. They present balanced, objective news similar to commercial radio stations. Consequently, they do not provide the U.S. Government with an immediate, responsive means to communicate with foreign audiences during heightened tensions or crises. Recent chairpersons of the IPI interagency working group confirmed the continuing challenge to find an effective and credible means to reach audiences with specific messages.

The Task Force concluded that media exist or are emerging to disseminate information effectively and fulfill the vision of PDD-68. Implementation requires a renewed commitment to international information in the form of a new National Security Presidential Directive, establishment of a Policy Coordinating Committee for information, sustained high-level interest, and adequate staffing and funding.

## *Chapter 2: Current DoD Information Programs*

### **2.1 General**

Because of the complexity of world events and the rapidity with which international crises are reported and analyzed, the U. S. Government must project a coherent, coordinated, timely, and accurate message to influence foreign audiences regarding its foreign policy objectives. Since today's high-profile, strategic-level influence programs require an immediate and coordinated response from several Federal agencies, the National Security Council staff is best suited to manage or oversee the effort.

### **2.2 Issues**

The two essential components of a viable U.S. strategic influence capability are (1) a national-level information coordinating mechanism and (2) the means to disseminate the message. The latter is the key issue.

Increasingly, the United States is faced with sophisticated and event-specific anti-U.S. propaganda that, for the most part, goes unanswered in the world's media. As a result, U.S. policy makers, public diplomacy officials, and commanders of the combatant commands require a responsive strategic and operational-level information dissemination capability to inform, rebut, influence, and persuade specific foreign audiences.

#### Department of Defense (DoD)

The Department of Defense maintains a significant worldwide capability at the strategic, theater, and tactical levels to inform and influence foreign audiences during peacetime and crises. The primary means of communicating with foreign audiences are public diplomacy (PD) events, public affairs (PA) activities, and overt military PSYOP. DoD foreign influence activities have their greatest impact when coordinated with those of the State Department and other Federal agencies.

#### Organizational Structure

Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) is responsible for PSYOP and International Public Information (IPI) policy. Since PSYOP is one of the three components of IPI, SO/LIC is involved in IPI from a PSYOP policy perspective. Moreover, since IPI supports the larger DoD mission to shape and influence foreign audiences, SO/LIC supports IPI writ large.

Furthermore, PDD-68 tasked DoD to provide the IPI secretariat in the Department of State with a full-time individual to assist with planning, coordination, and implementation. That position is currently filled by an active duty Lieutenant Colonel with a background in PSYOP. Furthermore, SO/LIC supports the IPI Secretariat with planning and provides the entry point for IPI coordination within OSD.



### The Role of USSOCOM

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is responsible to organize, train, equip, and provide PSYOP forces for worldwide employment to the regional commands. While not a direct participant in IPI at the national level, USSOCOM deploys PSYOP forces in support of the regional commands and advises the Joint Staff on PSYOP issues, particularly those that affect IPI activities.

### **2.3 Public Diplomacy (PD)**

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-77, 1983, defined PD as those actions of the U.S. Government designed to generate support among foreign audiences for our national security objectives. While State Department is the lead Government agency for PD, DoD conducts worldwide activities with a PD impact. DoD public diplomacy is comprised of strategic actions such as deployment of troops and ships for combined training or demonstration of resolve, official visits, and defense and military contacts with foreign officials. However, there is no one within DoD specifically tasked to plan or conduct PD activities even though DoD possesses enormous potential to influence foreign audiences through an organized and coordinated PD program.

Presidential Decision Directive-68 tasked DoD and other Federal agencies to participate in the DOS-led IPI effort with their assigned PD, PA, and military PSYOP (only DoD possesses PSYOP capability). DoD PSYOP and PA personnel routinely participate in IPI activities.

The State Department is the primary Government agency responsible for the conduct of PD. The now-defunct U. S. Information Agency (USIA) was the primary implementer of PD on behalf of State. In 1999, USIA's PD personnel were integrated into State's regional bureaus and comprise the Office of International Information Programs (IIP), which also directs overseas IPI activities. Consequently, State conducts PD out of the regional bureaus and the IIP. The Under Secretary of State for PD and Public Affairs (PA) coordinates the overall PD and PA efforts within the State Department and the Government through the IPI process.

### Public Affairs (PA)

Department of Defense public affairs activities in support of strategic goals include news releases, public announcements, briefings for domestic and foreign journalists, visits, tours and open houses, guest speaker programs, and community relations programs, in addition to participation in State Department's IPI activities.

The principal purpose of PA is to make available timely and accurate information and news to and from the commanders and staff, DoD military and civilian members, their families and other internal audiences, and to the American people through Congress, the news media, and personal contact. These efforts are performed under the provisions of the Secretary of Defense's "Principles of Information."

Public Affairs uses all traditional PA methods such as news releases, interviews, contact with civilian and civilian organizations, and contact with media representatives. PA also plays a key role in providing commanders with assessments of public reaction to DoD initiatives and contingency missions and to determine and evaluate the PA issues to which a theater or

installation commander must be sensitive. PA officers use local contacts to assess public perceptions and effective PA communications methods to disseminate information. PA is responsible for community relations activities. The PA community also maintains effective internal information programs.

Additionally, PA officers provide advice to the Unified Combatant Commanders on matters of international media relations that apply to DoD relationships and missions with allied and friendly nations. Overseas PA organizations may also coordinate with U.S. Embassies on DoD matters that are a part of overall U.S. information objectives

### Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

Simply stated, PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected information to foreign audiences in order to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately their behavior in support of U.S. national objectives.

Despite its successful use by the U.S. Armed Forces since the earliest days of the Republic, PSYOP is viewed by some as a black art that employs falsehoods, half-truths, and deception. In fact, the opposite is true. To capture an audience, hold its attention, and foster a particular belief or behavior, PSYOP messages must be relevant, timely, and accurate. As an influence tool, however, PSYOP does not necessarily present balanced news or attempt to meet journalistic standards of impartiality. PSYOP may present only selected information, albeit truthful, to support a particular U.S. policy objective.

The successful use of PSYOP during military operations in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), the Persian Gulf (1991), Somalia (1993-94), Haiti (1994-96), Bosnia (1993-01), and Kosovo (1998-01) has helped dispel the myths about PSYOP and demonstrate its utility and flexibility across a wide range of military activity. It is the instrument of choice when communications with hostile, neutral, or friendly audiences—both military and civilian—are critical to accomplishing a mission.

The U.S. Army's PSYOP force structure, active and reserves, is relatively small when compared to their impact as a combat multiplier. The active force total no more than 1,200 soldiers and civilians while the reserves total another 2,700. The active force is regionally oriented, trained, and recruited in terms of language, cultural awareness, and ethnicity. A core of highly qualified civilians at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, provides the finely-tuned cultural awareness vital in the conduct of successful PSYOP. The force possesses many qualified linguists but usually relies on local hires and native-born speakers serving within the U.S. Army. PSYOP skills utilized include the ability to conduct systematic planning, detailed target-audience analysis, and innovative dissemination techniques.

The U.S. Air Force's 193<sup>rd</sup> Special Operations Wing, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, maintains six EC-130E aircraft dedicated to broadcasting radio and TV in support of the Joint PSYOP Task Force's dissemination program. The strengths and limitations of Commando Solo aircraft are documented in the May 2000 DSB Task Force report on the "Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict."

While the primary mission of military psychological operations resides at the operational and tactical-levels, PSYOP (known also as "International Military Information" (IMI) in the interagency arena) plays an important role at the strategic-level as one of the three primary components of IPI.

## **2.4 Precedence**

As early as World War I, the U.S. Government and the War Department (later the Department of Defense) recognized the value of managed information dissemination. The United States created a robust coordination and dissemination capability to inform and influence foreign audiences.

World War I: Created by Executive Order, the Creel Committee was active from April 1917 to June 1919 and was charged to foster foreign and domestic belief in the justice of the American cause and the selflessness of American foreign policy goals. The committee's objectives were to encourage loyalty and unity at home and understanding and support abroad for America's war effort. To accomplish its objectives, the committee established "country bureaus" to focus its efforts and created numerous overseas offices around the world to distribute literature and audio/visual products including feature motion pictures.

World War I also witnessed the establishment of a military psychological warfare capability (PSYWAR) in the War Department and the American Expeditionary Force in Europe. Operating only at the theater-level, PSYWAR dropped millions of leaflets to influence German soldiers to surrender. At war's end, General Ludendorff, Germany's leading strategist, considered PSYWAR to be the allies most formidable achievement and directly responsible for the collapse of German soldiers' morale.

World War II: Shortly before Pearl Harbor, in July 1941, President Roosevelt established the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) and designated Colonel William Donovan as its first director. Donovan divided his responsibilities into two major divisions: (1) Research and Analysis and (2) Foreign Information Service (FIS). The FIS (also called the Psychological Warfare Division) was charged to explain the objectives of the United States throughout the world. FIS used information from the wire services and established 11 commercial short-wave radio stations to broadcast more than 300 programs a week into Europe and Asia. These radios provided the United States with an immediate and responsive strategic dissemination capability.

Cold War: The Korean War spawned several national-level information coordinating committees. The first was the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee established by NSC 59/1 in March 1950. The second was the Psychological Strategy Board created by Executive order in April 1951 and headed by Mr. Gordon Gray, former Secretary of the Army. The third coordinating committee was the Operations Coordinating Board, which was established by Executive order in September 1953 and continued until 1961.

Vietnam War: The conflict in Vietnam produced no less than four national level psychological operations committees between 1966 and the end of the U.S. involvement in 1973.

Formally chartered national-level information coordination ceased with U.S. involvement in Vietnam. For the next 25 years, the United States tended to rely on ad hoc committees to coordinate its messages and arrange to project them overseas.

DoD recognized this shortfall and as early as 1974 encouraged the Government—unsuccessfully—to create an interagency mechanism to better manage information dissemination. In 1978, the Secretary of Defense again requested that the NSC establish a national-level coordinating mechanism for psychological operations, but this request also went unheeded.

Persian Gulf War: During the 1991 Gulf War, the NSC chaired an ad hoc interagency information coordinating committee called “3PD” (PSYOP, Propaganda, and Public Diplomacy). Representatives of State, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), USIA, the Joint Staff, and OSD attended the committee, the purpose of which was to ensure thematic congruity. The committee discussed themes, objectives, media, Iraqi information/disinformation, vulnerabilities, audiences, and timing. At the conclusion of the Gulf War, and because of the success of the 3PD committee, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to the National Security Advisor that the NSC maintain a permanent, NSC-chaired information coordination committee. The Vice Chairman’s memo offered to provide two full-time military psychological operations officers to the committee. At the end of the war, 3PD stopped meeting without establishing a full-time committee.

Intervention in Haiti: Prior to the 1994 U.S. intervention in Haiti, the NSC chaired an ad hoc Foreign Information Subgroup composed of representatives of State, DCI, USIA, the Joint Staff, and OSD. The committee’s name was later changed to “Broadcasting to Haiti.” The committee planned and orchestrated activities such as dropping leaflets on Haiti, conducting unilateral U.S. radio and TV broadcasting, air dropping radios for the Haitians, and broadcasting President Aristide’s radio and TV messages. This committee also coordinated themes, objectives, media, audiences, and timing. As a result of the effort’s success, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy sent a memo in October 1994 to the NSC proposing that the NSC create a standing International Information Committee to ensure a more rapid and coordinated effort in future crises. When U.S. forces entered Haiti, the group stopped meeting without establishing a full-time committee.

PDD-68: PDD-68 established an international public information policy, structure, and process that incorporates the benefits of earlier coordinating committees while eliminating the shortfalls of ad hoc groups.

## **2.5 Strategic Dissemination**

The U.S. Government traditionally seeks to inform and influence foreign audiences during peace and war through a variety of means, including cultural centers, media training, the Foreign Press Center, VOA TV, the Washington File, international broadcasting, the Internet, speakers

programs, policy statements, press briefings, books, and periodicals. These programs are essential instruments of U.S. foreign policy that address long-term U.S. objectives and, to a lesser degree, short-term international crises. They do not, however, provide the United States with an immediate, responsive means to inform, rebut, influence, or persuade specific foreign audiences with tailored messages supportive of U.S. national interests.

Existing U.S. information dissemination capabilities such as Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and Radio Free Asia (RFA) are independent overseas broadcasting agencies designed to be long-term efforts to present balanced world news, programs of local interest, and American culture to foreign audiences. To maintain their credibility, these broadcasting agencies do not tailor their programs to influence foreign audiences in favor of U.S. policy objectives. Unlike their cooperative policy during World War II and the Cold War, they do not provide U.S. Government influence practitioners with an immediate, responsive means to inform and influence foreign audiences.

The United States has its legacy programs of public diplomacy, public affairs, overt peacetime PSYOP programs, and a forward-deployed military to favorably influence rapidly changing world events. However, as nation states and nonstate actors improve their ability to influence public policy through communications with global audiences, including those in the United States, the Government needs to develop a responsive information dissemination capability to tell its story in a more organized, timely, convincing, and credible fashion. Simply disseminating U.S. policy statements is inadequate; the Government needs to advocate its policies and systematically rebut misinformation.

At the strategic-level, DoD public diplomacy and public affairs activities are routinely developed and coordinated among the White House, State Department, and the Unified Commands to ensure a coherent and accurate foreign policy message. Similarly, State Department's strategic IPI efforts, which includes IMI (DoD PSYOP), are developed, coordinated, and approved for implementation through an interagency process involving the Deputies Committee and the National Security Council's Policy Coordinating Committee for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations. Currently, IPI's effectiveness is severely constrained by the absence of funding, an adequate staff, and a responsive national-level dissemination capability.

## **2.6 Theater Programs**

At the theater-level, the five geographic Unified Commands play a leading role in preparing the environment and in communicating U.S. policy to foreign audiences within their areas of responsibility. The tools at their disposal are significant and include, among others, forward deployments, military-to-military contacts, unit visits, conferences, public affairs programs, Internet Web sites, combined training exercises, civil affairs projects, and peacetime PSYOP activities.

The Unified Commands' Theater Engagement Planning (TEP) system is the cornerstone program for shaping, influencing, and engaging foreign militaries in peacetime. Conceived in 1998, TEP was DoD's response to the strategic imperative to shape the international security environment, respond to threats, and prepare for an uncertain future. Each regional Unified Command prepares and approves a Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) based on the Presidentially

approved prioritized regional objectives. The Secretary of Defense reviews the plans to ensure that they conform with national strategy, policy, and objectives. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approves each regional TEP for entry into the Global Family of Engagement Plans. The TEPs now encompass most peacetime DoD interaction with foreign countries.

The Unified Commands also employ a program currently outside the TEP. DoD instituted the Overt Peacetime PSYOP Program (OP3) in 1984. OP3 was authorized by a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) and codified for implementation by a DoD Directive. OP3 is an annual program proposed by the Unified Commands, reviewed by the Joint Staff, and approved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. The goals of OP3 are similar to those of the TEP but are designed to be operational in nature with a specific focus. Over the years, OP3 has suffered from a lack of funding and high-level attention within DoD. As a result, when OP3 does occur, it is because of other funding sources such as mine awareness and counterdrug activities. OP3 has not fulfilled its intended potential to support U.S. foreign policy objectives. Further, the Unified Commands have not appreciated the purpose of the OP3 program. There is need to republish the DoD directive governing OP3.

None of the Unified Commands possess a centralized information dissemination capability for their regions. However, two of the five commands have a theater-wide magazine that promotes the commands' regional strategy, U.S. military readiness, and the value of combined exercises as a deterrent. The commands rely on activities such as public information programs, seminars, and personal diplomacy to influence their areas of responsibility. In addition, the U.S. Southern Command employs a small Military Information Support Team to influence the region in favor of U.S. counterdrug policies. Nonetheless, a need exists for the Unified Commands to communicate more effectively with audiences within their respective areas of responsibility. An initial effort should explore working with the embassies to consider mutually supporting information efforts to promote U.S. policy objectives. Possible dissemination means include localized radio and TV editorials and infomercials, newsletters, and Internet chat capabilities.

Currently, the regional Unified Commands maintain Internet Web sites. These sites vary from providing read-only basic command information to fully interactive sites with file and e-mail servers, conference areas, bulletin boards, and chat capabilities. The interactive sites have controlled access, to include select foreign subscribers. These Web sites have significant potential to influence audiences in favor of U.S. foreign policy objectives. However, use of the Internet to support U.S. information campaigns faces several challenges. Foremost among them is the lack of doctrine or related force structure to implement Internet-based influence operations. Additionally, a number of legal and policy issues exist that must be resolved.

## **2.7 Tactical Operations**

In peacetime, communicating on the ground with hostile, neutral, or friendly foreign audiences falls within the purview of the local U.S. Embassy. The ambassador is the approving authority for all DoD activities within his or her country, unless the combatant commander has been delegated wartime authorities. In many countries around the world, DoD maintains a robust peacetime interaction with the host country's armed forces. The purpose of this interaction is to train U.S. forces and foreign militaries, and to encourage support for American values and foreign policy objectives.

The means of influence are vast and varied. Deployed U.S. forces may support ongoing U.S. Embassy public diplomacy programs or military-to-military programs through participating in combined training exercises, sponsoring health seminars, conducting train-the-trainer mine awareness programs, and providing civic assistance. Many of these in-country activities are designed to influence foreign public opinion by promoting acceptance of U.S. strategic objectives.

During conflict, the primary tactical-level communications with hostile forces and publics is through psychological operations. PSYOP forces possess the capability to communicate directly with foreign audiences through loudspeakers, printed products such as leaflets, posters, newspapers, and radio and TV broadcasts.

## 2.8 Crises

During international tension and crises, the U.S. addresses information coordination (1) at the NSC, via State Department's regional bureaus, and (2) through the IPI process, which includes DoD. The method of coordinating the message may vary but the means to disseminate the message remain constant (see Chapter 1, section 4 on IPI in recent conflicts). The question of strategic dissemination—how to get the message out—bedeviled previous ad hoc information committees and remains an unresolved issue today.

The long-term information programs conducted by VOA, RFE/RL, and RFA are of limited value when the requirement is to generate immediate support for U.S. policy, to influence attitudes and behavior, or to refute an adversary's misinformation. During the Serbian crisis of fall 2000, the State Department engaged commercial media contractors to mentor Serb opposition groups in their effort to oust Slobodan Milosevic.

The U. S. Government lacks an organic worldwide dissemination capability with reach, quality, and brand identity for use in peacetime and crises to enable the administration to reach specific audiences with coherent, timely, and convincing messages.

The Unified Commands communicate with foreign audiences during crises through the commercial news media using military spokespersons, news releases, and media briefings. PSYOP addresses specific foreign audiences directly through airborne and ground-based radio and TV broadcasting platforms and broad-area airborne leaflet drops. While effective in areas with limited access to outside media, PSYOP broadcasts lack name recognition (brand identity), credibility, and professionally developed programming. Other than the PSYOP broadcasting platforms and Internet Web sites, the Unified Commands are limited in their ability to effectively communicate with selected foreign audience during crises and hostilities.

The Unified Commands need to acquire and maintain regional information dissemination channels and some production capability to support Embassy dissemination efforts, the Theater Engagement Program, and the Overt Peacetime PSYOP Program (OP3).

DoD needs to establish a mechanism to coordinate all DoD foreign information programs conducted in support of U.S. IPI efforts and the recommended Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination.

DoD also needs to update and publish revised guidance on PSYOP to more effectively support the Unified Commands' Theater Engagement Plan, OP3, and U.S. IPI activities.



## *Chapter 3: U.S. International Broadcasting*

### **3.1 Mission and Principles**

The advent of shortwave radio technology early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century enabled governments for the first time to communicate over long distances directly to the people of other countries, bypassing their own governments and indigenous media. Russia, Germany, and Britain led the way in government international broadcasting in the 1930s. The United States established the Voice of America (VOA) in 1942. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), U.S. funded stations separate from VOA, originated in the early 1950s as “surrogate” national radios for listeners in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union denied free media in their own countries. Surrogate broadcasting services to Cuba, Asia, Iraq, and Iran were established in the 1980s and 1990s.

Allied war aims in World War II and anti-Communism and containment strategies during the Cold War shaped the mission and content of U.S. broadcasting for nearly 50 years. From the beginning, VOA’s programs have consisted primarily of news, music, and information about American society. VOA is required by its charter also to “present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively.”<sup>5</sup> Surrogate broadcasters emphasize news and information about other countries. Today the “mission of U.S. international broadcasting is to promote the open communication of information and ideas, in support of democracy, and the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information, worldwide.”<sup>6</sup>

The International Broadcasting Act of 1994 consolidated all nonmilitary U.S. international broadcasting under a part-time, bipartisan Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). Eight BBG members are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate “from among Americans distinguished in the fields of mass communications, print, broadcast media, or foreign affairs.” The Secretary of State serves on the board *ex officio* to “provide information and guidance on foreign policy issues.”<sup>7</sup>

The act established standards requiring U.S. international broadcasting to be “consistent with the broad foreign policy objectives of the United States” and “conducted in accordance with the highest professional standards of broadcast journalism.” The act also identified nine broadcasting principles.

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<sup>5</sup> Public Law 94-350.

<sup>6</sup> Chairman Marc B. Nathanson, Broadcasting Board of Governors, 1999-2000 Annual Report. <http://www.ibb.gov/bbg/mission.html>

<sup>7</sup> United States International Broadcasting Act, Public Law 103-236.

“U.S. international broadcasting shall include:

1. News which is consistently reliable and authoritative, accurate, objective, and comprehensive;
2. A balanced and comprehensive projection of United States thought and institutions, reflecting the diversity of United States culture and society;
3. Clear and effective presentation of the policies of the United States Government and responsible discussion and opinion on those policies;
4. Programming to meet needs which remain unserved by the totality of media voices available to the people of certain nations;
5. Information about developments in each significant part of the world;
6. A variety of opinions and voices from within particular nations and regions prevented by censorship or repression from speaking to their fellow countrymen;
7. Reliable research capacity to meet the criteria under this section;
8. Adequate transmitter and relay capacity to support the activities described in this section;  
and
9. Training and technical support for independent indigenous media through government agencies or private United States entities.”

*Fig. 3.1 International Broadcasting Act of 1994, Public Law 103-236, Section 303.*

When Congress merged the U.S. Information Agency into the Department of State in 1999, it established the Broadcasting Board of Governors as an independent Federal entity. The BBG views this independence as “an embrace of the idea that all of our broadcasters are journalists” and a reaffirmation of broadcasting’s role “as a voice of human rights and democratic freedoms with new global challenges and priorities to address.”<sup>8</sup>

### **3.2 Structure**

**Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)** — <http://www.ibb.gov/bbg>


The Broadcasting Board of Governors is authorized “to direct and supervise” all civilian broadcasting activities of the U.S. Government. These include the federally funded International Broadcasting Bureau, Voice of America, Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti), and WORLDNET Television. The BBG also administers grants of Congressionally appropriated funds to two nonprofit corporations, RFE/RL and RFA. The current annual budget for all of

<sup>8</sup> Broadcasting Board of Governors 1999-2000 Annual Report, p. 9. <http://www.ibb.gov/bbg/report.html>

these activities is approximately \$450 million. Programs are transmitted in 61 languages to a weekly audience estimated by the BBG at more than 100 million.

**International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB)** — <http://www.ibb.gov/>

Established by the International Broadcasting Act of 1994, the IBB provides engineering and transmission support services to all broadcast organizations supervised by the BBG. The IBB maintains a global network of shortwave and medium wave transmitting stations and leased communications facilities. Working with private satellite service organizations it manages a satellite network that delivers programs to AM, FM, and cable broadcasters. The satellite system carries WORLDNET TV and VOA TV programs to affiliated local stations and to U.S. Embassies and consulates for redistribution to local broadcasters and cable outlets. The IBB's Office of Affiliate Relations markets and provides VOA programs to a network of local radio and TV stations.



*Fig. 3.2 IBB/WORLDNET Satellite Coverage*

The IBB also carries out administrative and oversight functions for the Voice of America, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and WORLDNET TV. An International Media Training Center offers foreign broadcasters instruction in broadcast journalism and station management. The IBB's Office of Policy writes U.S. Government editorials transmitted daily on all VOA broadcasts. An Internet Development Office engages in research and planning for Webcasting and streaming live and archived audio over the Internet.

For 60 years the dominant medium of U.S. international broadcasting has been radio programming carried on shortwave frequencies. Shortwave has been a central focus of the IBB because (1) it can reach populations where government controls or weak communications

infrastructure restrict the flow of information, and (2) it is a legacy of the U.S. Government's significant past investment in this technology. In recent years, the IBB has increased the use of FM and AM frequencies through its strategy of placing programs on affiliated local stations. Its approximately 1,700 affiliates range from national networks to low-power village radio stations.

**The Voice of America (VOA)** -- <http://www.voa.gov/>

VOA broadcasts in English and 52 other languages to all regions of the world except Western Europe. Its correspondents and news bureaus produce 900 hours of U.S., world, and regional news and information programs every week. VOA reaches its audience through direct shortwave and AM/FM radio broadcasts, programs rebroadcast by affiliate stations, and limited use of the Internet on VOAnews.com. VOA's charter requires VOA's broadcasts to be an "accurate, objective, and comprehensive" source of news; to "present a balanced and comprehensive view of significant American thought and institutions;" and to "present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively."<sup>9</sup>

### **The VOA Charter**

The VOA Charter was drafted in 1960 and signed into law in 1976 by President Gerald Ford.

"The long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating directly with the peoples of the world by radio. To be effective, the Voice of America must win the attention and respect of listeners. These principles will therefore govern Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts.

1. VOA will serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive.
2. VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society, and will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions.
3. VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively, and will also present responsible discussions and opinion on these policies."

Public Law 94-350

*Fig. 3.3 VOA Charter*

**The Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Martí)** — <http://www.ibb.gov/marti/>

The Office of Cuba Broadcasting was established in 1990 to manage the operations of Radio Martí and TV Martí. The stations broadcast commentary and information about events in Cuba and elsewhere to promote the free flow of information and ideas in that country. Radio Martí began broadcasting in 1985 from studios in Washington, DC. Now located in Miami, it broadcasts on AM and shortwave 24 hours a day. Broadcasts provide Spanish-language news,

features, and entertainment programs. TV Martí's programming includes four-and-a-half hours of daily newscasts as well as programs about public affairs, culture, music, sports, and entertainment. The Cuban government has jammed TV Martí since its inception.

**Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) — <http://www.rferl.org/>**

RFE/RL is a private, nonprofit corporation that receives Federal grants from the BBG to operate as a surrogate radio, or "home service," to Central Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. With the recent addition of Radio Free Iraq and the RFE/RL Persian Service, RFE/RL broadcasts from Prague in 26 languages for approximately 800 hours per week. RFE/RL broadcasts can be heard on shortwave and AM/FM stations and are streamed over the Internet. Daily news, analysis, and current affairs programming concentrate on events within the region.

**Radio Free Asia (RFA) — <http://www.rfa.org/>**

RFA is a private, nonprofit corporation that receives Federal grants from the BBG to operate as a surrogate radio to Asian countries via shortwave and the Internet. Founded in 1996, RFA broadcasts about 200 hours per week in 9 languages to China, Tibet, Burma, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North Korea. RFA broadcasts news, information, and commentary and provides a forum for a variety of opinions and voices from within Asian countries.

**WORLDNET Television — <http://www.ibb.gov/worldnet/>**

While international radio dates to the 1920s, television broadcasting across frontiers is a phenomenon of the 1980s. CNN led the way and spawned a host of commercial imitators. The U.S. Government's television initiatives have consisted of TV Martí, WORLDNET TV's interactive satellite teleconferencing service, and a regional satellite-fed syndication service that broadcasts news and public affairs reports, programs that reflect American life, and discussions on U.S. foreign and domestic policies. Programs include news and live call-in shows. WORLDNET programs are available by satellite through broadcast outlets, cable systems, and direct-to-home satellite receivers. Planning is underway to merge WORLDNET into the Voice of America to provide video programs for television in formats to include news, public affairs, feature magazine shows, and special English video. WORLDNET's interactive programs with U.S. embassies were transferred to the Department of State following USIA's consolidation with State. The BBG continues to provide technical support, but program management and content are provided through the American Embassy TV Network in State's Bureau of Public Affairs.




Fig. 3.4 U.S. International Broadcasting Organization Chart

### 3.3 Issues

The Task Force received briefings from senior managers broadly representative of these broadcasting organizations. We found that U.S. international broadcasting services are unique and powerful assets. They had a profound impact during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. For millions of listeners they were a source of accurate news, high-quality information, and hope.

Today, in budget terms, these broadcasting services comprise the largest nonmilitary information dissemination activity of the U.S. Government. They have established brand identities and are staffed with dedicated professionals. They maintain journalism standards that are models in countries that lack free media and where newly independent media are fragile. The BBG and many of its supporters in Congress believe strongly that the board has a “responsibility to serve as a firewall between the international broadcasters and the policy-making in the foreign affairs community, both in Washington and overseas.” U.S. broadcasters believe just as firmly that international broadcasting serves U.S. interests and supports U.S. foreign policy by providing audiences “comprehensive, accurate, and objective news and information,” by representing American society and culture,” and by “presenting the policies of the United States.”<sup>10</sup> A decade after the Cold War, new information technologies and powerful political forces are fundamentally transforming the world in which U.S. international broadcasting has evolved. If

<sup>10</sup> Broadcasting Board of Governors 1999-2000 Annual Report, p. 2. <http://www.ibb.gov/bbg/report.html> “A separate governing board to supervise the broadcasting entities—the Broadcasting Board of Governors—is essential to providing what I call an ‘asbestos firewall,’ that is, an arms-length distance between the broadcasters and the foreign policy bureaucracy that assures journalistic integrity and independence.” Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-DE), March 6, 1997.

broadcasting is to be a useful tool in the future, more must be done to address structural weaknesses and make changes required to navigate successfully in the new global environment.

After extensive discussions with U.S. broadcasters holding diverse views, the Task Force concluded that these challenges fall into four broad categories: emerging technologies, television, language priorities and programming, and clarification of broadcasting's appropriate role in national security. Although full discussion of these issues falls beyond the scope of this report, it is useful to identify some critical questions.

***Emerging technologies.*** A variety of new and emerging technologies characterize modern communication. Access to the Internet is spreading rapidly in both the industrialized and developing worlds. Trends in commercial broadcasting and in dissemination and radio receiver technologies are opening doors to space-based broadcasting. Cable and direct-to-home satellite channels mean conventional terrestrial broadcasting is less important. Geographic broadcasting is breaking down as satellites broadcast TV and radio channels worldwide. Webcasting offers low transmission costs for audio and video. The Internet and direct satellite broadcasting make it difficult for governments to block programs without incurring significant financial and political costs.

U.S. broadcasters have begun to stream live programs over the Internet. The IBB has created a small Internet development team, and in November 2000, VOA went on the Web with VOAnews.com. These initiatives are promising but are only a beginning. A key question for the BBG is whether it will successfully manage the transition from shortwave to digital technologies and direct satellite broadcasting. Another is whether it will lead the change in how broadcasters approach their work. Will U.S. broadcasters adapt successfully to interactive and highly personalized technologies that allow programming on demand, that separate communications channels and media content, and that emphasize narrowcasting—precisely the opposite of broadcasting?

***Television.*** Television is a growing medium of choice in many countries, yet the vast majority of U.S. broadcasting resources are devoted to shortwave and AM/FM radio. Sunk costs, legacy thinking, and insufficient funding from Congress have prevented U.S. broadcasters from using TV to reach new audiences in key markets. For nearly a decade, VOA has offered TV simulcasts of some radio shows in selected languages. Recently, to capitalize on VOA's brand name and language talent, the BBG merged WORLDNET TV into the Voice of America to create VOA TV. The reach of these efforts is exceedingly modest. Radio is still needed and important in many areas. But as television continues to grow, policymakers and lawmakers must determine whether to create a true Government-sponsored international television capability and how best to use it.

***Language services and programming.*** In some countries, U.S. broadcasts are highly competitive and have sizeable market shares. In others, they reach only trace audiences. The International Broadcasting Act requires the BBG to conduct annual reviews to determine "the addition and deletion of language services." After undertaking the second review of its 61 languages, the BBG early in 2001 reallocated resources pursuant to "such criteria as audience size and awareness of the broadcasts in target areas, media environment, political and economic freedom, programming

quality, transmission effectiveness, cost, broadcast hours, and language overlap between broadcasters.”<sup>11</sup> It reduced some language services, increased others, and eliminated four. Shortly thereafter, as a consequence of diplomatic and political pressures, the BBC restored three of these four.

Audiences for U.S. broadcasting spike in international crises and listening rates can be high where credible alternative news sources are limited. Absent a crisis and in information-rich media environments, audiences for U.S. broadcasting are much lower. Program and research costs rise significantly when U.S. broadcasters seek market share in competitive media environments. Recently the BBG announced plans to greatly expand its audience research studies conducted by private contractor.<sup>12</sup> The BBG is also planning a new 24/7 Middle East Radio Network located in the region to bring targeted programming to the “new young mainstream” of educated Arabs under age 30 and the “emerging Arab leadership.”<sup>13</sup> These initiatives hold promise.

How much should the U.S. invest in language services where audiences are low as a hedge against need in a future crisis? Should language services be maintained only as symbols of U.S. interest and perceived requirements of bilateral diplomatic relations? To what extent does the U.S. still need surrogate broadcasting? How should surge capacities be developed and maintained? Overall, would U.S. broadcasting be more effective with higher-quality broadcasts in only a few “world languages”? How can programs be improved so they have immediacy and relevance in regions vital to U.S. strategic interests? As the power of the Internet transforms global communications, and news and information become more abundant in many countries, what will be the rationale for traditional government-sponsored international broadcasting? These are important questions not just for broadcasters but also for decision-makers in the Executive Branch and Congress.

***Broadcasting’s appropriate role in national security.*** Fundamental to all these issues is the question of U.S. international broadcasting’s relationship to national security strategies and foreign policy. Credibility, journalistic integrity, and objective, accurate news coverage are important. Equally important are decisions on what languages to broadcast and how many, how to use broadcasting assets properly in a crisis, and how to define appropriate relations between the BBG, the Department of State, and other U.S. national security agencies.

The Task Force concluded that U.S. international broadcasting services play significant roles as reliable sources of news, information about the United States, and programs that concentrate on events in countries where the free flow of information is restricted. They face a number of difficult choices, however, if they are to remain viable in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. These challenges and the statutory authority under which they operate do not make U.S. international broadcasting a

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<sup>11</sup> News Release, “Broadcasting Board of Governors Announces Results of 2000/2001 Strategic Language Service Review,” January 19, 2001.

<sup>12</sup> *Commerce Business Daily Online*, May 15, 2001, <http://www.cbdnet.access.gpo.gov>

<sup>13</sup> Broadcasting Board of Governors, “Reaching the Middle East: A New Broadcasting Opportunity,” Report of a Fact Finding Mission, February 11-16, 2001.



logical home for an expanded, sustained, and coordinated capability to influence foreign public opinion using technologies rooted in the information age.

## *Chapter 4: Current DOS Programs*

### **4.1 International Information Programs: Structure and Issues**

The Office of International Information Programs (IIP) is one of the three entities reporting to the Department of State's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The others are the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of Public Affairs. IIP is the successor to the United States Information Agency's (USIA) Information Bureau, whose predecessors enjoy a rich history dating to the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

During World War I, President Wilson established the Committee on Public Information to generate U.S. support for the war and counter German propaganda abroad. Twenty-five years later, President Franklin Roosevelt created the Office of War Information (OWI) to coordinate U.S. Government international information activities. Included among them was the newly created Voice of America, which signed on the air with these words: "Daily at this time we shall speak to you about America and the war. The news may be good or bad. We shall tell you the truth." That promise continues to guide the international information activities of OWI's successor organizations.

At the end of the war, OWI was abolished and its functions were transferred to the Department of State. There they remained as stepchildren of state-to-state diplomacy until 1953 when President Eisenhower established USIA as an independent agency. This new agency was directed to communicate with both opinion leaders and interested publics around the world. Its mission was to understand and influence international public opinion. From its inception, USIA served three related functions: international information, international broadcasting, and international exchanges. International information activities ran the gamut from motion picture production to the distribution of official texts, from the publication of glossy magazines to the production of large-scale international exhibitions.

The Information Bureau, or I Bureau as it was known, represented USIA's major reinvention initiative in response to the Clinton administration's promise to downsize the Federal Government. In October 1994, USIA consolidated programs and services from the then Bureau of Policy and Programs along with several activities from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Many traditional programs were eliminated, including several magazines and international exhibitions. Other programs such as support to overseas information centers and production of the Washington File were updated. Still other programs were initiated including an ambitious presence on the Internet and the rapid expansion of digital video conferencing. The Bureau was completely reorganized from a conventional top-down hierarchy to a flexible team-based operation. In short, the bureau moved from analog to digital production, and reduced its staff by 36 percent. The process of change was painful, but ultimately successful in increasing productivity and encouraging innovation. The Information Bureau's mission remained straightforward: "to provide reliable, timely information to support U.S. national interest and influence foreign publics to support our policies."

Approaching its seventh year, IIP continues its innovation in the Department of State, although by splintering its activities, it has been denied the holistic approach once envisioned. The Foreign

Press Center has been transferred to State's Bureau of Public Affairs, which also has assumed responsibility for the former WORLDNET interactive television productions, now labeled American Embassy TV. Similarly, responsibility for the I Bureau's former state-of-the-art printing plant has been transferred to State's Office of Administration.

Any student of bureaucracy will understand that the loss of control over assets directed at a bureau's primary mission leads to inefficiency. Nonetheless, the spirit of reinvention has not only survived, but prospered. For example, there is no single Internet site—U.S. Government or otherwise—that provides a more comprehensive record of current American foreign policy or of the Government's public record over the past decade.

IIP's current products and services include:

- Strategic planning. IIP develops short- and long-range public diplomacy strategies to support State Department diplomatic initiatives. A secretariat, charged with providing support to the former International Public Information Core Group chartered by PDD-68, is located within IIP. With a small staff and few resources, its potential has only been exploited infrequently.
- Multilanguage Web site (usinfo.state.gov). International users access IIP's Web site more than a million times every week. The site provides information on all major policy issues—from Kosovo to Iraq, refugees to the rule of law, climate change to biosafety. Materials include official texts, transcripts, analyses, and background information. In addition to English, information is available in Chinese, Russian, Arabic, French, and Spanish. Formats include text, images, audio, and video, although most materials are available in text format only.
- Internet initiatives. IIP leverages the Internet to address critical, international issues of particular interest to foreign audiences. When the United States struck terrorist sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, IIP established a Web site in four languages within two hours. The office maintained an extensive multimedia site on Kosovo, which was named "Best Political Web Site" by Politics On-Line, and developed an innovative public-private partnership that used the Internet to help Kosovar refugees. IIP also hosts a variety of subject-specific listservs through which international subscribers can receive current information by e-mail. The number of subscribers to IIP list services are modest compared to the potential.
- Print publications. IIP produces and distributes a large number of print publications in English and other major languages on subjects ranging from government and economics to history and culture. The office also funds translations of American books on policy issues for sale or distribution to foreign readers. As information is increasingly produced in digital format, the number of print products has been considerably reduced.
- Speakers programs. IIP programs nearly a thousand speakers each year to address issues identified by American embassies. While most speakers travel abroad to meet with foreign officials, media, academic, and other key opinion leaders, many others participate electronically, communicating with overseas audiences by digital video conferencing (DVC). The IIP network for DVCs currently includes more than 100 facilities.

- Information Resource Centers. Successor to open-shelf American libraries abroad, some 170 Information Resource Centers (IRCs) are supported by IIP. They use the latest technology to disseminate information to key foreign audiences, train mission staff, and mine electronic databases and other resources to provide American Embassies with the most timely information available to promote U.S. policy abroad.

State-USIA consolidation took place in October 1999. IIP's short history within the Department of State is mixed. On the one hand, the State Department respects the requirement for immediacy in information gathering and production, and contrary to initial fears, has not introduced bureaucratic constraints to inhibit the speed of information dissemination. On the other hand, State Department management has not shown, until recently, an appreciation for the role of information in policy formulation and implementation. Although there are a few exceptions, including the lead-up to the Yugoslav elections where information policy played a key role, IIP is seldom present at the planning table.

IIP, nominally the focus of international information programming, does not manage two key resources directed at international audiences:

- Foreign Press Centers. The Foreign Press Centers in Washington, New York, and Los Angeles are directed exclusively to resident and visiting foreign journalists. The centers provide briefings, research assistance, and facilitative assistance in support of American foreign policy. While they were an integral part of USIA's Information Bureau prior to its consolidation with the Department of State, they now report to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs whose activities are directed primarily to the American media.
- American Embassy Television Network. On the occasion of the USIA-State consolidation and the establishment of international broadcasting as an independent entity, the interactive portion of WORLDNET was transferred to the Department of State. Directed exclusively at foreign audiences, its logical home was IIP. Nonetheless, it too was transferred to the Bureau of Public Affairs.

Furthermore, IIP does not routinely produce and provide audio or video feeds to foreign journalists and news organizations. It has neither the charter nor production capability to do so. While the international broadcasting complex directed by the Broadcasting Board of Governors provides both audio and video materials to overseas broadcasters, these are not offered as a strategic communications service with the purpose of influencing international public opinion. Providing a production capability to IIP for the selective dissemination of broadcast materials would complement its current array of products and services.

The intent of the Task Force was not to review the rationale for the State-USIA consolidation or the disaggregation of international information resources. Rather, this report argues for reintegrating the diverse information activities that support American foreign policy. The IIP staff, inculcated with USIA's 50-year history, is technologically savvy, regionally specialized, and policy-sensitive. It operates with an annual budget of \$40 million and a staff of 279, considerably smaller than the 600-person staff of its predecessor a decade ago.

## 4.2 International Exchange-of-Persons Programs

The Department of State defines Government-sponsored international exchanges and training as the "movement of people between countries to promote the sharing of ideas, to develop skills, and to foster mutual understanding and cooperation, financed wholly or in part, directly or indirectly, with United States Government funds." These efforts include not only reciprocal exchanges of individuals, but also all related educational, cultural, and training activities. They are in some cases over 60 years old and represent a consistent, long-term effort to influence the international environment and modern history—one person at a time. Those with experience in international affairs and in other countries—especially with the way with Cold War ended and the Soviet bloc imploded—can testify to the cumulative effect of exchanges in support of U.S. national interests broadly and generously defined.

International exchanges, civilian and military, build personal and institutional relationships. Direct and multiplier effects make exchanges powerful long-term instruments of America's foreign relations. They break down barriers, promote dialogue and learning, and enhance mutual understanding between the United States and the people of other countries. They are not intended to influence government policies or public attitudes in the short-term. Their impact is difficult to measure, and a return on the investment is not guaranteed.

The best diplomats and military leaders have long recognized the power of ideas and cultural and ethnic identities in human affairs. The U.S. Government's strategic and pragmatic decision to expose American society and politics—warts and all—to elite audiences around the world has not always produced allies and friends. But it has increased receptivity to American ideas and the willingness of other countries to support U.S. diplomatic, military, economic, scientific, and cultural initiatives.

In the late 1930's, the Department of State responded to Axis inroads in Latin America by instituting its first significant government exchange-of-persons programs. Soon after World War II, Senator J. William Fulbright introduced legislation to initiate an academic exchange program, which turned out to be the most prominent of many international exchange programs designed to "increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries."

In the ensuing 55 years, the Fulbright program has provided participants—scholars, teachers, graduate students, and professionals chosen for their academic accomplishments and potential—with the opportunity to observe each others' political, economic, and cultural institutions; exchange ideas; and embark on joint ventures of mutual importance. Approximately 234,000 "Fulbrighters" have participated in the program since its inception, and today's program awards approximately 4,500 new grants annually with a fiscal year 2000 budget of \$105.7 million. The program is conducted in cooperation with U.S. missions abroad and in partnership with a global network of academic and nongovernment organizations. Today a wide range of U.S.-sponsored exchanges, adopted for academic and a variety of other purposes, now depend similarly on partnerships with private organizations—an arrangement that enjoys strong Congressional support and is deeply rooted in American history.

The FY 1999 annual report of the Interagency Working Group (IAWG) on U.S. Government-Sponsored International Exchanges and Training contains information on nearly 180 international exchange and training programs sponsored by 14 Federal departments and 28 independent agencies. The number of foreign and U.S. participants in 1999 exceeded 141,000. A complete figure for all U.S. Government exchange programs does not exist, because departments and agencies kept records separately until 1997. The Department of State calculates that its various programs have produced more than 700,000 alumni during the past 55 years. International military education exchanges sponsored by the Department of Defense and USAID's training activities are the other big programs. The U.S. Government's direct support for these programs totaled more than \$1 billion in 1999. Available voluntary reports from private partnership organizations show nearly \$640 million in financial contributions in 1999.

As a corollary to the official exchange programs, the United States also instituted an international education policy. Since World War II, the Federal Government, in partnership with institutions of higher education and other educational organizations, has sponsored programs to (1) help Americans participate in a global environment and (2) attract and educate future leaders from abroad. The policy seeks to shape the international environment by encouraging large numbers of people around the world to seek in-depth exposure to the United States as students and scholars. Nearly 500,000 international students now studying in the United States attest to the attraction of American post-secondary education and the importance of this element of American "soft power." While reliable figures are not available, tens of millions have benefited from this experience.

The official definition of U.S. Government international exchange programs traditionally excluded individuals trained in their home countries with U.S. Government funds using cost-saving methods such as distance learning and videoconferencing. IAWG now collects data on these efforts. A large number of private organizations (e.g. Experiment in International Living) and programs have been developed. Finally, commercially arranged and financed exchange and work programs have grown dramatically.

Past exclusions (training abroad, commercial programs, distance learning, etc.) prevent a comprehensive presentation of the breadth and depth of U.S. Government sponsored international exchange and training activities. However, the official figures do paint a picture of a long-term, consistent attempt to influence the international environment by providing large numbers of elites from every country in the world with a direct and personal exposure to American customs, attitudes, and beliefs.

U.S. exchange programs are not well coordinated, as the lack of reliable statistics shows. Congressional oversight committees and the General Accounting Office have expressed concerns about inefficiencies and the lack of systematic evaluations of program effectiveness in most departments and agencies. In 1997, President Clinton created the IAWG, through Executive Order 13055, to recommend measures for improving the coordination, efficiency, and effectiveness of U.S. Government-sponsored international exchange and training programs. The IAWG is chaired by Department of State's Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs and is comprised of members from 12 Federal departments and 15 independent agencies. Its executive committee includes representatives from the Departments of Defense, Education,

Justice, and State, and USAID. Representatives from an additional 15 Federal departments and agencies work with the IAWG and its members.

The most important value of international exchanges remains long-term. These activities are not and should not be linked to short-term policies. Short-term results have been mixed: on one hand, the programs have created a world-wide "Rolodex list" for American diplomats, soldiers, scholars, and business leaders; on the other hand, they have also trained disenchanted young students who lead anti-American riots and revolutions, as in Iran. Continued success will depend on commitment to proven procedures and standards.

Nevertheless, U.S. funded exchange programs face important challenges. Do American embassies and other U.S. entities maintain adequate and accessible electronic records of exchange program alumni? What criteria are appropriate in addressing program priorities, program duplication, operational efficiencies, flexibility in responding to changed circumstances, and interagency coordination? To what extent should exchanges be subject to strategic direction and justification?

Efforts are underway in the Department of State to create a comprehensive exchange alumni database, but work is slow and its value is underappreciated. In April 2001, the Department initiated a pilot project for a voluntary Web-based alumni directory in a test region, the Newly Independent States (NIS). A few pilot inquiry projects in other regions have attempted to obtain feedback on public information issues and programs. The Internet also gives users the power to network and advance communities of interest among exchange program managers and alumni. The means to sustain contact with exchange program alumni is of strategic importance to the United States. The U.S. Government should increase the funding required to maintain these networks and do more to ensure that their value is understood.

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires Federal agencies to set goals and measure the performance of programs. To evaluate the performance of exchange programs, the responsible departments and agencies must determine the impact of the programs—on the knowledge, understanding, and attitudes of the participants; on significant institutions in their societies; and on the larger society generally. These evaluations have met with varying degrees of success.

Improving how the Government directs and coordinates international exchanges can be achieved in ways that do not jeopardize their core integrity and the public-private partnership so critical to their success. Organizations that implement and manage international exchanges should be required to track and maintain contact with their alumni, and if necessary be provided added resources to do so. The IAWG should have sufficient staff and resources to comprehensively inventory U.S. Government exchange programs and collect information on the alumni community. The IAWG could be instructed to serve as a formal advisor to the PCC Secretariat on alumni networks, strategic planning, and coordination.

The Department of State's International Visitor and educational exchange programs, DoD's International Military Education and Training program (IMET), and the National Defense University's International Fellows program have enormous long-term value for successful

information dissemination. These activities are not and should not be linked to short term policies. Nevertheless, no programs have greater strategic value for U.S. interests.

\* \* \*

The Task Force was impressed with the versatility and potential of the Department of State's international information and exchange programs. The Office of International Information Programs is evolving into an Internet-centered operation that seeks to capitalize on cutting-edge information technologies yet is also sensitive to other countries' diverse information environments and the importance of person-to-person contact. State's Foreign Press Centers are a critical resource with a proven track record. Given an expanded charter and sufficient funds, American Embassy TV could provide a rich variety of visual products including video feeds to foreign news organizations, interactive policy-oriented video dialogues, and Internet video streaming. The Department's international exchange of persons programs are powerful long-term assets, but they require adequate means to maintain contact with alumni if their strategic value is to be fully realized.

The Task Force concluded that increased investment in these programs is both prudent and wise. They are flexible assets that need to be strengthened through additional resources, more effective use of audience research, and greater use where appropriate of commercial production and communication capabilities. If used by policymakers in tailored and coordinated communications strategies they could play a significant role in influencing opinions in support of U.S. interests.



## Chapter 5: Trends in Commercial Information Development

### 5.1 Transport

It is now widely understood that the Internet is fundamentally transforming the way in which America and the entire world communicate. Perhaps the most striking American example to date was Internet upstart AOL's acquisition of the "old media" stalwarts CNN, Time Magazine, and the former Warner Brothers. The "dot-com" speculative bubble and its subsequent bursting may have obscured but have hardly derailed this transformation.

The revolution is unfolding across all parts of the developed world. The major developing economies—China and India, for example—are not far behind. Indeed, some predict Chinese to become the number one Web language by 2007 with over 1 billion Chinese connected to the Internet. We can expect that a large fraction of worldwide Internet usage in the near future will be over high-speed end-user connections (1 million bits/second or more) such as cable modems or ADSL. Notably, such speed allows users to access live audio and video services.

At its most fundamental level, the Internet decouples *content* from its *transport* mechanisms. Figure 5.1 below illustrates how the U. S. Government disseminates information. The left side shows the current situation; the right side shows the rather different setup that is now emerging.




Fig. 5.1. The Internet Decouples Content from its Transport.

Before this decoupling, each content provider built its own transport infrastructure in order to deliver its content to its audience. CBS television, for example, built a chain of local TV transmitters, together with affiliate stations, to disseminate its content (television programs and advertisements) to the major U.S. population centers. Similarly, VOA built a series of shortwave transmitters at locations that would allow it to deliver its content to its audiences. Just as CBS built and maintained its own transmitters and antennas, so VOA relied on its own infrastructure

to transport its content to its listeners. And just as NBC built its own infrastructure, separate from and parallel to that of CBS, so RFE/RL built its own infrastructure alongside that of VOA. Similarly, the DoD built and operated its own dissemination infrastructures as the need arose, e.g., Commando Solo for radio and TV broadcasts.

After the decoupling, the world looks strikingly different. In this emerging world, content providers reach their audiences through a single, world-wide, shared transport network. The content may be audio, video, graphics, animation, video games, or any other digital form of information. Whatever the form, it is transported swiftly and reliably across a mesh of fiber optic cables, global satellite systems, cable TV systems, phone lines, and broadband wireless systems known as the Internet. One set of companies provides the content; another, largely disjoint, set builds and maintains the transport infrastructure.

But the Internet does much more than decouple content from transport: it fundamentally alters the relationship between the content producer and the audience. Accordingly, the simple broadcasting model of yesteryear gives way to a much richer set of interactions between content providers and audiences. Figure 5.2 below illustrates this new conceptual space by crossing the of “push vs. pull” axis with the “wholesale vs. retail” axis.




Fig. 5.2. *The Changing Relationship Between Content Providers and Audiences.*

In the past, short-wave broadcasters such as VOA were classic examples of the “wholesale push” quadrant of the chart. VOA produced content (radio programming) and broadcast it to everyone within radio range. TV broadcasts, newspapers, and magazines are likewise “wholesale push” phenomena; content is produced at a fixed scheduled and disseminated without customization to a mass audience.

The Internet Web-browsing experience is exactly the opposite. Consider a “My Yahoo” Web page. Here the user controls when he or she will “pull” the content. Further, in this case, the user also customizes the page to his or her preferences and tastes, so the experience is also “retail.”

Further, the page will display advertisements specifically targeted to that individual's probable buying preferences, and it will show the types of content that the individual wishes to see—and no others. In short, Web browsing creates a “retail pull” relation between content providers and their audiences. At present, such content generally consists of text, graphics, simple animations, and audio, but—given a faster transport network—even full-resolution video-on-demand is but a straightforward application of this “retail pull” concept.

The two other quadrants in this new space also present great opportunities for information dissemination, namely, “retail push” and “wholesale pull.” “Retail push,” also known as *narrowcasting*, is analogous to classic broadcasting, but to very narrow, sharply defined target audience. The content may be streaming audio, as in Internet radio stations, or e-mail messages, as in list servers. In either case, the content is prepared and disseminated to a tightly focused audience.

“Wholesale pull” is more akin to sending press releases, media kits, or other audio or video clips to intermediary organizations such as newspapers, local radio stations, Webzines, and so forth. In the government context, this technique provides an extremely easy and cost-effective means of disseminating the “raw materials” of a news story to any suitably equipped organization. For example, the U.S. Government can place archival footage or text, graphics, and audio and video clips of the day's news on a Web site. News organizations from around the world can then download the information as they desire. These news organizations can then blend this raw material into their own stories for “retail” distribution in a local-language TV show, newspaper, radio program, and so on. If necessary, the Government can control access to the Web site so that its content is available only to authorized organizations.

Not surprisingly, information dissemination organizations within the U.S. Government have taken some advantage of these new capabilities. VOA audio programming is available via on its Web site, for instance, so that its audience can listen to the VOA through the Internet as well as short-wave radio. Indeed, VOA programming is routinely made “wholesale”—or available for rebroadcast by other radio stations. As mentioned in Chapter 4, IIP has been particularly industrious in its use of Internet Web sites for information dissemination.

On the whole, however, the Government has taken only the first, most tentative steps toward the new “Internet-centric” world of information dissemination. In one striking example, American Embassy TV is still considered to be a more-or-less standalone TV system, rather than a means of transporting generic digitized content. Viewed as a generic transport system, the same satellites and antennas that carry TV programming could transform U.S. embassies into nodes for distributing all types of “wholesale” content—digitized pamphlets, photographs, audio programming, and so on—to local media outlets. This digitized content could then be further disseminated to local media outlets, with help from the Embassy staff, for incorporation in local programming, newspapers, etc. The moral here is quite clear: Internet technologies have fundamentally changed the business of information dissemination. To succeed in this new world, the United States must coordinate significant new efforts in significantly new ways.

## 5.2 Production

Modern methods of producing commercial media include, among others, advertising, news reporting, and TV and movie making. The process involves detailed audience research, state-of-the-art technology, and a variety of global transport channels such as the Internet, TV, and radio. Clearly, DoD and DOS must find ways to take advantage of the commercial sector's investments and technological advances.

### *Technology Focus Areas*

To remain competitive, the commercial sector has invested millions of dollars in media production techniques and technologies. As a result, the sector maintains a dominant competitive edge in the use of multimedia, special effects, computer generated effects, cinematography, digital sound, and dubbing and morphing.

*Multimedia:* The highly competitive film and news industries have learned that you must use multimedia to reach today's public. In fact, multimedia techniques are employed so widely in entertainment, news, and sports programming that they have become a *sine qua non* of modern movie, television, and Internet production. To reach publics accustomed to these techniques, DoD and DOS must follow the lead of commercial industry.

*Special Effects and Computer Generated Effects:* Special effects have become a major selling point of many modern movies—from *Star Wars* to *The Matrix*. The process that began with miniature models and blue screens in *Star Wars* has more recently moved into persuasively and even deceptively lifelike computer-generated graphics. As with multimedia more generally, the public is not merely entertained by these techniques but has come to accept them as a necessary trademark of high-quality production.

*Cinematography and Digital Sound:* As in the case of special effects, the movie, television, and news industries have mastered the art of cinematography and quality sound production.. It has taken the industry over 70 years to advance to its current point, and considering the multimillion dollar budgets that are required (and available) for movie production, the trend is bound to continue. Indeed, computers have become integrated into virtually all areas of the production process, including special effects, multimedia integration, and control of the filming process itself. Computers, for example, now allow production artists to employ techniques such as advanced time-lapse photography that simply could not be realized with human-controlled cameras.

*Dubbing and Morphing:* Dubbing and morphing also represent areas of emerging technology that DoD and DOS can apply to the process of managing and disseminating information. Film artists, for example, use dubbing and morphing to correct sound errors. The same technologies can be used as they were in the movie *Wag the Dog*, where digital techniques were used to enhance the image of a war that never happened. These same techniques can be used to integrate film data, digital imagery, and digital sound to create high quality lip-synching and voice-overs of previous film clips. An application of particular interest to DoD and DOS should be the ability to translate footage into any language and make it look like the words are being spoken in that language. In

recent years, entire companies have emerged that specialize in voice dubbing and digital morphing for film, video, and computer games.

The amount of money invested by commercial entities in these technical production capabilities far exceeds anything that DoD and DOS could ever expect to spend. In any case, duplicating a capability that exists already would be irresponsible. The key, of course, is to finding a reliable method of employing existing commercial production capabilities and, where necessary, expanding on commercial R&D efforts to meet unique DoD and DOS needs.

### *Policies and Procedures*

The effective sharing of technologies and techniques between the commercial sector and the U.S. Government requires an effective set of policies and procedures. These policies and procedures would define the relationships and responsibilities of both parties. They might, for example, allow for a teaming arrangement in which the Government would contract with a commercial media firm for a given production capability that would cost the Government too much or take it too long to develop from scratch.

The issue of competed contracts vs. sole-source work orders would also need to be resolved in order to meet the DoD and DOS requirements for timeliness. Similarly, the tasking channels and tasking authority for committing Government funds for commercial development of media products would have to be clearly defined. It is also likely that the commercial sector would require binding legal documents—including nondisclosure agreements—to protect proprietary technologies, as well as some form of plausible deniability or immunity from prosecution/liability in the event that a Government-sponsored media product produced a damaging effect.

### *Risk Assessment*

In situations where DoD and DOS must rely on commercial capabilities for analysis, production, and dissemination, there are risks that must be considered and assessed. Product reliability is a critical factor that will necessitate trusted relationships and may require close supervision during media production. In the same manner that the commercial sector is likely to seek legal protection or plausible deniability, the Government does not want to be caught short by an inappropriately prepared media product. There must be a strong degree of confidence that the content is accurate, the audience focus is correct, and the scheduling and timing of a media release is effective, all of which leads to the key issue of supervision and control.

### *Supervision and Control*

The primary concern regarding supervision and control of a commercial/Government partnership DoD is whether it should be centralized or decentralized. Given the assumed turnaround requirements and content sensitivity of potential DoD and DOS products, centralized control is the most likely option. An alternative to strict Government oversight (an option that would

hamper commercial participation) would be to develop a media production management office capable of handling responsibilities from contracting and accounting to actual production management. Drawing on the expertise of the U.S. Embassy staffs as well as the Public Affairs (PA), PSYOP, and intelligence communities, the Government could gather the right skill sets to provide effective tasking and oversight. Taskings must include appropriate level of detail and intended effect. They must also define any limitations or restrictions clearly. Oversight capability must include the ability to maintain the Government's control and understanding of the products as they are developed, while not hampering commercial creativity.

### *The End Result*

A successful teaming arrangement in which DoD and DOS have access to the media production capabilities of the movie, television, and news industries without duplicating commercial efforts at great cost is essential. This type of arrangement would allow DoD and DOS to contract directly for the use of not only known production media techniques, but of actors, reporters, and well-known media characters as well. Consider a recent example from Bosnia: the PSYOP community was seeking a way to publicize the dangers of landmines and was building a mine awareness campaign throughout Bosnia. Given Superman's status as a readily recognizable hero worldwide, the Government contracted with DC Comics to produce a comic book and posters using Superman as the central character. In the products, Superman rescued some children from a minefield and then warned of the dangers of minefields. An unfortunate outcome of this apparently well-thought-out production was that some Bosnian children actually entered a minefield because they wanted to see Superman come rescue them. This was certainly an unintended and quite unpredictable consequence, but it does demonstrate the power of the media and the need for clear analysis of the intended audience. It also highlights the likely desire of a company like DC Comic Books to seek immunity from liability for this Government-sponsored product.

The potential gains of a commercial/Government teaming arrangement are great, and DoD and DOS clearly cannot replicate these capabilities on their own. That said, the process will require cooperation, trust, and clear policy guidance.

### **5.3 Content**

The adage that the "medium is the message" is especially true when considering the marriage of channel and content within a cross cultural context. What is important is that content be managed so that it fits logically with the media available and the target audience.

For example, a photograph of a church with voice over about freedom of choice and family values would resonate with many in the United States. In Bosnia, however, the same image would be rejected by two of the three major contending parties. The message could be repackaged to portray a mosque for one group or an orthodox church for the other group and, with minor modifications to the text, the content would be acceptable.

Sports and music provide examples as well. An NFL game of the week, for instance, would not attract an audience in India or Pakistan or, in fact, throughout most of the world. Most of South

Asia plays cricket, while most of the rest of the world follows what Americans call soccer. Sports are universal and can form a good part of a total package for either radio or television but only if the sport chosen is appropriate for the target group. Finally, music is truly universal, but taste in music is not. What goes over well in Helsinki will bomb in New Delhi. Even the apparent universality of rock music is not as monolithic as it may appear. In fact, the current style or choice in Sarajevo may be very much out of date in the rest of Europe.

Crisis underscores the importance of reaching the audience with the right message through the right channel. In the Gulf War, for example, all that the Iraqis who wanted to surrender needed to know was that if they put down their weapons and walked south they would be given food and water on the way and be treated properly. During the Kosovo campaign, it would have been useful to be able to reach the Serbian population directly with simple messages such as "avoid train travel" or "stay off the bridges" since we viewed both as targets. It would also have been useful to be able to tell refugees what roads to use to reach shelter and food. In the event of a ground campaign anywhere, refugees can block the roads, and the ability to direct refugees off such roads could be critical in moving forces to meet an objective. In a future campaign it might be desirable to tell a civilian population the best prophylaxis to use before or after a chemical or biological attack, or simply how to stay out of the way of military operations.

It could be argued that all of the above could be done through existing media channels, but the reality is that the international commercial media that reaches a target population in time of crisis is not going to carry public service messages. NATO has already faced the question of war crimes over its actions in the Kosovo campaign when, in fact, it had no direct way of warning the civilian population. In a future campaign the United States and its allies are likely to be held to very high standards and will have to develop mechanisms to send messages directly to the affected population.

So how can the United States improve its ability to reach the right audience credibly with the right message? First, it must employ credible, already-existing channels, channels that possess an identity long before the conflict begins. Even if the audience is very small in normal times, its identity will be known and its audience will expand rapidly in the event of a conflict. Most people in the Middle East know about Al-Jazira television and Radio Monte Carlo. They also know that both operate independently and without local government interference. Many people listen or watch every day while others just ignore them. In times of crisis, however, the audience expands rapidly. People believe that these channels will broadcast information that their own governments do not want published. In short, they are trusted.

Second, the United States must make much greater use of its own ethnic diversity to help appeal to target audiences. Most Somalis were probably unaware that among the Marines sent to Somalia was Aideed's son, who later became one of their leaders. A U.S. spokesman may not be credible in the eyes of a target population, but an American citizen who came from that country and speaks the same language can relate much easier. It is not simply a matter of language, but of cultural affinity. Five major players in the National Basketball Association (NBA) come from the former Yugoslavia. They are better known and more popular in Croatia than in the United States and they could transmit simple messages very effectively. Most Muslims have no idea of the large number of mosques that exist in the United States or of the fact that Muslims practice their

religion in this country with absolute freedom and equality. Muslim religious leaders living and working in this country could dispel some of the anti-American propaganda existing in the Middle East quite effectively.

Finally, these are not choices best made by Government agencies. Advertising agencies and media groups make these choices daily and could assist in this effort. We should include the use of media research firms, advertising agencies, and media consultants to help devise and promulgate the product. Government agencies, universities, and think tanks can conduct basic research, but only the professionals can effectively sell the product.

#### **5.4 Audience Research**

Using information to shape and influence the behavior of a group or state requires feedback, every bit as much as does the control system for, say, an airplane or a bicycle. Getting that information, however, is quite a bit harder. In the case of the bicycle, our senses provide the correcting cues we need to balance and steer. In the case of the airplane, instruments augment our (frequently flawed) perceptions. In the case of shaping or influencing behavior, the differences between our understanding of a target audience and their actual behavior is often our only cue.

When dealing face to face, we receive, read, and decode verbal interactions and body language. But in the context of managed information dissemination, we are dealing not with a single individual face to face, but remotely, and with collectives—groups and subgroups of individuals. If our understanding of the audience is limited, our effectiveness in reaching it will be limited as well, and sometimes our attempts will do more harm than good. By understanding audiences, we can preempt misunderstandings and misconceptions and more effectively communicate American policies and values in ways that will make sense to the audience culturally, socially, and even linguistically. This requires increased efforts to understand both audiences and the global information environment. Only by understanding foreign audiences thoroughly can the United States hope to effectively explain its policy objectives to them and constructively influence their behavior.

Fortunately, the U.S. Government does not need to invent mechanisms for understanding and reaching foreign audiences. American political campaigns, Madison Avenue, the media, U.S. missions abroad (through analytical reporting), and existing U.S. Government opinion and media research activities have developed the techniques required to understand foreign attitudes and cultures. What is needed is for strategists to concentrate on mechanisms and metrics that work best, to increase the U.S. investment in opinion and media research, and to ensure that the findings of research professionals are used by policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders

Again, understanding and reaching foreign audiences is something we know how to do. We know, for example, what questions to ask. When communicating information to an audience, the first question is whether the signal *can* be received. This largely involves (1) a set of physical “hearability” measurements and (2) behavioral modeling. Next, do the intended audiences possess adequate receivers? Can they and do they use them? Having ascertained that the intended audience can hear us, do they? That is, do they “tune in” (or “click to,” etc.)? We must then ask:



Do they “listen,” and do they understand? Finally, does the signal effect sympathy with our message?

Sometimes, confidence in the earlier links in this chain, we can safely ignore their measurement and jump to the heart of the matter. But, if the results are less than satisfying, we must work our way backward (or start at the beginning) to find the problems and apply remedial efforts. The bottom line, of course, is whether the audience changed its views and behavior in the desired way. In other words, did our efforts matter? Often a need exists for behavioral modeling and simulation research. Again, field measurement is the ultimate test and is necessary to calibrate any models and validate any focus group pre-testing that may have been employed.

In the age of Internet media, some of the reception feedback is easily built into the medium itself. We can count the number of users accessing a Web site. We can also collect, if not solicit, information that characterizes the browsers—by geographic region and by correlated Web site visits. In the case of radio and television, we can sometimes use similarly direct measures such as monitoring the unintended emanations of the local oscillators in the receivers, but this requires proximity and freedom of action that is seldom available in practice. Instead, we can adopt the “call-in” and “give-away” techniques that are often employed by commercial media to estimate listenership, viewership, and readership.

With Internet media, it is also possible to build in “talk back” directly and then extrapolate from its frequency using proper modeling, analysis, and external validation. With less interactive media it is possible to introduce forums for feedback and “out of band” techniques that involve direct (or indirect) polling among prospective audience populations. Such polling techniques make it possible to work backward through the chain of events from real receptivity to raw reception.

The point of this discussion is simply to point out that by and large we have the tools and know what to do. We simply need to do it. Effective information dissemination is not just a matter of good policies, the right technologies, and determined advocacy. Effective communication is only possible if strategists commit time and resources to understand audiences *before* they disseminate information and evaluate its effectiveness *after* they disseminate it.

Too often audience and media research is perceived as the “soft” part of the information dissemination budget, an easy target when cuts are required. Often, the United States also tends to focus only on hard-hitting advocacy. Information dissemination must be a long-term process based on top-quality research and constant feedback that provides a vibrant, multidimensional understanding of audiences and their receptiveness.

## ***Chapter 6: Managed Information Conclusions, and Recommendations***

A coordinated capability to manage the dissemination of information to foreign audiences in support of U.S. interests is necessary, feasible, and an urgent national priority. The information and telecommunications revolutions have compressed time and distance. Publics are more engaged. There are more players. Issues are more complex. The rules have changed. Today, governments must win the support of people and their leaders in other countries if diplomacy and military actions are to succeed. This is more than just public relations or getting a “good press.” It is a political necessity.

The Task Force calls on America’s political and military leaders to lead a deliberate and well-conceived transformation in the way the U.S. Government deals with information in national security strategy. This chapter outlines historical precedents for coordinated information dissemination and offers conclusions and recommendations that will lead to a significant future national capability.

### **6.1. Strategic Information Dissemination Coordination – 20<sup>th</sup> Century**

Sustained attempts to strengthen and coordinate the U.S. Government’s international information dissemination activities date back to World War II, when a State-War-Navy committee was established to coordinate psychological warfare activities. Thereafter, Presidents of both parties created information planning and coordinating bodies, some led by the staff of the National Security Council, others by the Department of State.

President Truman created a Psychological Strategy Board in 1951 “to authorize and provide for the more effective planning, coordination, and conduct within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations.” The board consisted of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, or their designated representatives. The President’s Directive instructed the board to report to the National Security Council “on the evaluation of the national psychological operations, including implementation of approved objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned.” It did not conduct operations of its own.<sup>14</sup>

President Eisenhower abolished the Psychological Strategy Board and created in its place the Operations Coordinating Board under the National Security Council. The Board was directed to coordinate plans for national security policy, including psychological operations, and to “advise the agencies concerned as to . . . the particular climate of opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world.”<sup>15</sup> The Board was created as a way to overcome “lack of coordination and planning,” which had “resulted in the haphazard projection of too many and too diffuse information themes.”<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Harry S Truman Papers, White House Central Files: Psychological Strategy Board Files, 1951-53. <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpape/physc.htm>

<sup>15</sup> Executive Order 10483, 1953.

Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had less appetite for formal coordinating mechanisms. The Operations Coordinating Board was abolished. Formal structures gave way to ad hoc arrangements until President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 77, "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security," in 1983. NSDD-77 established a Special Planning Group under the National Security Advisor to the President comprised of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of USIA, the Director of USAID, and the White House Communications Director. The Special Planning Group was responsible for "the overall planning, direction, coordination and monitoring of public diplomacy activities." Four interagency standing committees were created to carry out specialized coordinating activities and report regularly to the Special Planning Group.<sup>17</sup>

President Bush abolished NSDD-77 and its elaborate committee structure in favor of more informal planning mechanisms and issue-based working groups. One that worked well was the Interagency Working Group on Iraq Public Diplomacy led by the U.S. Information Agency. This group worked effectively throughout the Gulf War "to plan a public diplomacy strategy, to develop themes supportive of U.S. policies, to counter misperceptions and Iraqi disinformation, and to coordinate media and other public diplomacy activities."<sup>18</sup>

President Clinton also adopted an issue-based approach to coordinated information dissemination in his use of special coordinators to develop communications strategies for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and NATO expansion. He later issued PDD-68 on "International Public Information," placing coordination responsibility in the Department of State. Chapter 1 of this report reviews the objectives of PDD-68 and the creation of its interagency coordinating group. PDD-68 stated the purposes of information dissemination clearly, and it created workable planning and coordination mechanisms. However, the NSC and participating agencies did not give adequate priority to PDD-68, nor did they provide sufficient staff and resources for its Secretariat.

The history of the past 60 years is one of episodic commitment to systematic information dissemination planning and coordination. Presidents have varied greatly in their approaches to coordinating mechanisms. Attention generally has been crisis related and tied to communication of high profile policies.

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<sup>16</sup> Findings of the Jackson Committee, quoted in John W. Henderson, *The United States Information Agency*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969, p. 51.

<sup>17</sup> NSDD 77, "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security," January 14, 1983. <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-1966t.gif> The four interagency standing committees were (1) the Public Affairs Committee, co-chaired by the Assistant to the President for Communications and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; (2) the International Information Committee, chaired by a senior representative of the U.S. Information Agency; (3) the International Political Committee, chaired by a senior representative of the Department of State; and (4) the International Broadcasting Committee, chaired by a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

<sup>18</sup> *Lessons From the Persian Gulf Crisis*, 1991 Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, p 14.

## 6.2 Strategic Information Dissemination Coordination—21<sup>st</sup> Century

### 6.2.1 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) and Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on International Information Dissemination

The U.S. Government's international public information dissemination activities are conducted by a growing number of players. An incomplete list would include

- The President, Vice President, and National Security Advisor;
- The Secretaries of State and Defense;
- U.S. diplomats and regional military commanders abroad;
- The Department of State's Office of International Information Programs, Bureau of Public Affairs, and regional and functional bureaus;
- The military public affairs and PSYOP activities of the Department of Defense and its combatant commands;
- The U.S. Agency for International Development;
- The Departments of Treasury, Justice, and Commerce;
- The international broadcasting services of the Broadcasting Board of Governors; and
- A variety of publicly funded nongovernment organizations.

Depending on issues and circumstances, all engage at the strategic level in seeking to inform and influence foreign publics.

Collectively, these leaders and organizations use a variety of means to project U.S. foreign policy. However, unlike many of America's adversaries who have become more skilled and imaginative over time, the U.S. Government routinely disseminates information without dedicating the resources to coordinate sophisticated communications strategies. The information planning process that informs U.S. national security decision-making is inadequate both for crises and for shaping the long-term information environment.

In part the U.S. Government requires new capabilities. In part, it simply "does not know what it knows."<sup>19</sup> A coordinating mechanism is necessary to bring together agency views and assets, identification of priority audiences, real time assessments of public moods and opinions, assessments of long-term attitude trends, strategic themes, relevant messages, language skills, crisis-related surge capabilities, inventories and evaluations of available channels, effective ties with allies and nongovernment organizations, and other elements of successful communications strategies.

In 1999, PDD-68 provided a vision to harness the U.S. Government's potential to plan, coordinate, and implement strategic information and influence campaigns. PDD-68 signaled that much more is required in international information dissemination. It established an interagency coordinating group to identify broad policy and information goals and a secretariat to manage strategic information dissemination activities. The core principles of PDD-68 were valid. Its

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<sup>19</sup> Statement to the Task Force by John Rendon, CEO, The Rendon Group, February 2, 2001.

implementing structures could have worked with sustained leadership interest and adequate implementing authorities, funding, and staffing.

Early in 2001, the Bush administration decided to review this experience before implementing its own structure to integrate information dissemination into the policy process. Simultaneously the this Task Force carried out its review under Terms of Reference established by the Departments of State and Defense. The administration's conclusions on structure and process may differ from the recommendations in this report. It is essential, however, that the President and his senior advisors recognize the strategic importance of coordinated information dissemination, adopt arrangements with which they are comfortable, and provide the sustained leadership that national interests require.

*The Task Force recommends that the President issue a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on international information dissemination to (1) strengthen the U.S. Government's ability to communicate with foreign audiences and thereby shape understanding of and support for U.S. national security policies, and (2) coordinate public diplomacy, public affairs, and overt international military information. The directive should require all regional and functional National Security Council (NSC) Policy Coordinating Committees to (1) assess the potential impact of foreign public opinion when national security options are considered and (2) recommend or develop strategies for public information dissemination strategies before or in concert with policy implementation.*

*The Task Force recommends that the NSPD establish a NSC Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on International Information Dissemination. The committee should be chaired by a person of Under Secretary rank designated by the Secretary of State. The chair will be assisted by a deputy designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Members of senior rank should be designated by the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, and Commerce; the Attorney General; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Its purpose: to strengthen the U.S. Government's ability to communicate with foreign audiences to prevent and mitigate crises and advance long-term U.S. interests. Its objectives: to shape understanding and generate timely public support for U.S. national security policies and to coordinate public diplomacy, public affairs, and open military information operations. A Presidential commitment to international information dissemination will make clear that it is a strategic component of national security policy to be treated and funded accordingly.*

## 6.2.2 Policy Coordinating Committee Secretariat Structure

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State support the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination through a dedicated and expanded Secretariat in the Department of State consisting of the current interagency working group on international public information augmented by an expanded staff and budget and an executive secretary from the NSC staff. A robust, expanded, and multiagency PCC Secretariat support staff, drawing upon expertise from DOS, DoD, the Joint Staff, 4<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group, CIA, and commercial media and communications entities must be established to facilitate audience research and to develop channels and information products. The Secretariat should consist of the current interagency working group on international public information augmented with an expanded staff and budget under the leadership of a senior officer experienced in policy, information dissemination, and interagency coordination. This officer should be selected from the Senior Foreign Service or the Senior Executive Service, or be a military officer of flag rank. It is especially important that the PCC Secretariat's Director and staff be sensitive to different civilian and military organizational cultures and to agency perceptions—and misperceptions—of the NSPD and its mandate.*

The PCC Secretariat should include a full-time staff of 10 to 12 accomplished senior professionals, drawn approximately equally from the ranks of the Departments of State and Defense, and an executive secretary from the staff of the NSC. Individuals from the Department of Defense should be detailed on a nonreimbursable full-time basis. It is important that the Secretariat not be viewed as a State and Defense Department condominium. Representatives of USAID, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the Interagency Working Group on U.S. Government-Sponsored International Exchanges and Training, and other agencies should provide advisory and operational support as issues and circumstance warrant.

The PCC Secretariat should report directly to the Policy Coordinating Committee. It should not be part of the State Department's Office of International Information Programs, and its Director should not be double-hatted with other management or operational responsibilities.

*The Task Force recommends that the NSPD delegate to the Policy Coordinating Committee and its Secretariat adequate authority to coordinate timely public diplomacy, public affairs, and open military information planning and dissemination activities, including the authority to require*

- *Analysis of foreign public opinion and influence structures,*
- *Development of strategic themes and messages for long-term and crisis response communications,*
- *Identify appropriate media channels, and*
- *Produce information products.*

The Task Force believes it is vital that adequate authority be delegated to the Policy Coordinating Committee and its PCC Secretariat. This should include authority to coordinate timely public diplomacy, public affairs, and international military information planning and dissemination activities. It should include tasking authority to require analyses of foreign public opinion and influence structures, development of strategic themes and messages for long-term and crisis response communications, identification of appropriate media channels, production of

information products, interagency training, deployment of qualified individuals from an information dissemination reserve corps, and surge broadcasting for crisis communications.

To meet these needs, the Task Force recommends that the expanded Secretariat be supported by a total of 15-20 technically oriented full-time support staff and subcontractors to provide a wide range of services essential to successful international influence activities across the spectrum of conflict. This group should be staffed and funded to provide for foreign audience analysis, facilitate commercial contracts for the development and placement of influence messages, coordinate and act as a liaison with other Federal agencies, identify appropriate dissemination means, and support implementation of approved programs. The support staff should include expertise in emerging media trends, public affairs, PSYOP, intelligence, media, planning, operations, and administration. Regional and country experts from State Department and DoD would assist as required. Their responsibilities would include long-range strategic information planning, development of interagency doctrine and operational concepts, and training of other Secretariat staff. They would support the Secretariat by identifying commercial resources to fill gaps in strategic dissemination requirements.

They would also provide a means to augment the Secretariat for action planning in crises, analyses of ongoing international events, and comprehensive cyber-watch capabilities intended to better analyze hostile propaganda directed against the United States. They would maintain indicators and warning capability and provide input to the Secretariat to assist the Joint Staff and Unified Commands with target analysis, themes, and messages. They would conduct audience research, media trend analysis, maintain media contacts, identify the type of products to be developed, and arrange the contracts for work performed. They would outline a general information campaign, including proposals for radio and television scripts, advertisements, appropriate media, how often to air the piece, placement schedule, and timing of the product in overseas media. The Task Force recommends an annual budget of \$20 million for the PCC Secretariat.

- **Information Strategy**

The Task Force recommends that the PCC Secretariat's conceptual planning adopt a three-dimensional influence space describing *publics*, *channels*, and U.S. *national interests* for each country or subregion. Planners should ask who are influential, what media do they use, and how important is it to U.S. interests that the U.S. Government can communicate with them. Analysis would undoubtedly show groupings that would require quite different solutions (e.g., an Embassy spokesman in Brussels, a short-wave broadcast to North Korea, a Direct TV broadcast to Beijing—and reliable issue-oriented Web sites for each.) From this, planners could construct a matrix that would optimize the use of channels in each country, at least insofar as the channels could be rapidly shifted as events warranted. The result of this exercise would be a well-coordinated but highly differentiated conceptual roadmap for information dissemination.

This cannot be done without expanding opinion research, influence structure analysis, and media usage research. With additional funding, the State Department's Office of Opinion Research can augment its current opinion polling. Additionally, contracts could be let with independent research organizations to examine influence structures and media usage in key countries. Adding

this task to already over-burdened embassies would not produce a uniformly professional product. Analytic capability to support information dissemination exists also at the Defense Intelligence Agency's Human Factors Analysis Center and the 4th Psychological Operations Group's Strategic Studies Detachments at Fort Bragg, NC. The challenge to the Secretariat will be to ensure (1) adequate resources for the audience and media analysis that is required and (2) sufficient staff to ensure that efforts coherently support strategic influence planning and implementation.

Some believe that merely conveying U.S. policy and intent equals influence. Providing information does not necessarily equate to influence. Audiences may hear the message and not understand or act upon it. Influencing individuals, organizations, and governments is a complex process that must address variously the audiences' accessibility, vulnerability, susceptibility, existing attitudes, and interests. The U.S. Government's current strategic influence activities suffer from a lack of rudimentary audience analysis—analysis to identify those key elements most likely to motivate audiences to respond favorably to U.S. foreign policy initiatives. Another challenge is to identify a responsive, timely, and credible means to disseminate the message in a manner acceptable to the audience.

### **6.3 Expand the State Department's Office of International Information Programs**

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State strengthen the Department of State's International Information Bureau under the leadership of an Assistant Secretary; substantially increase funding for Bureau activities intended to understand and influence foreign publics, with much of the increase for contracted products and services; and make these assets available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of the Policy Coordinating Committee's Secretariat.*

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State modernize and diversify the products and services of the Department of State's International Information Bureau to include significantly expanded use of*

- *Internet Web sites, streaming audio and video, and leased emerging satellite TV and FM radio broadcast channels;*
- *American Embassy TV and radio and Washington File print services for both direct distribution and distribution through foreign media channels;*
- *The Foreign Press Center by U.S. policymakers and military leaders to communicate with foreign publics through foreign press and media channels;*
- *Interactive information networks (and the associated databases) containing key foreign audiences and influence structures;*
- *Joint State-DoD training and increased interagency assignments; and*
- *A reserve cadre of retired, language-qualified State and DoD officers available for crisis response deployment.*

- **Internet-Centric Programs**

Internet growth in Europe, Asia, and Latin America is accelerating. By 2005, there will likely be some one billion Internet users worldwide. China is a good example. In 1993 it had 1,700



Internet users. By July of 1998, the number had increased to 1.5 million. Today there are some 20 million users. Some predict the number will surpass the United States within this decade. With the probable exception of Africa, the pattern will be repeated throughout the world. As the price of bandwidth decreases, video streaming will be far more accessible than it is today. Since transmission costs are negligible, the U.S. Government should give far higher priority to developing Web sites as the *key* element of its strategic communication.

The Task Force recommends that the Office of International Programs (IIP) continue its evolution into an Internet-centered operation, with expanded capacity for video production. The Department of State's international Web site ([www.usinfo.state.gov](http://www.usinfo.state.gov)) is comprehensive and authoritative. Without bells and whistles, it is intelligently organized and easily accessible, even with a low-speed modem. It is available in English, French, Spanish, Arabic, and Chinese. Yet, it could be made far more attractive to the publics the United States seeks to inform and influence abroad. As international users continue to multiply, the State Department should be there with the most authoritative site on U.S. views—attractive, accessible, and fast.

Visual products—videos and stills—should be produced for the Internet (particularly as it expands into video-streaming), but also made available in other media formats (e.g., videocassettes, satellite TV) where warranted. Greater attention to the visual media will complement an operation that is historically print oriented.

Print remains the medium of choice for many, particularly elite audiences. Packaging should be further enhanced to reach busy people, especially the gatekeepers who will redistribute the materials.

The personal touch should not be overlooked. While technology can augment the work of diplomats, there is no substitute for person-to-person contact. The work of the State Department's Foreign Press Centers must continue to be given priority, the role of American specialists who travel abroad must not be neglected, and the day-to-day interaction between American officials who serve abroad with their foreign interlocutors must be enhanced. DoD policymakers and senior military officers should make much greater use of the Foreign Press Centers for international military information purposes.

Bureaucratically, this view of a coordinated information policy argues for the reintegration of the Foreign Press Centers and the integration of American Embassy Television into IIP. Otherwise, valuable time that could be used to develop and disseminate coordinated messages will be spent negotiating priorities, or worse, ignoring them.

- **Crisis communications**

Whether for natural disaster, pre-crisis, complex contingency, or war fighting, the requirements for U.S. Government communication in a crisis are strikingly different than those for long-term strategic communication. For example, prompt communication is a continuing challenge in disaster relief. How does one inform fleeing refugees where to assemble? How are relatives reunited? Increasingly these are the issues with which the United States will be involved. One model is that developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in which

retired officials are recruited and trained to move rapidly into disaster areas. Thoroughly professional from a career of related experience, they are unpaid apart from training and occasional deployment. One could imagine a comparable reserve corps (military and civilian, including language-qualified personnel) that could be rushed to a crisis area to set up and staff local communication facilities (e.g., radio broadcasts, leaflets, loudspeakers) within a matter of days.

Under the guidance of the PCC Secretariat—and with the cooperation of the National Foreign Affairs Training Center and the National Defense University—State and DoD officers should participate in periodic joint training to ensure readiness to respond quickly to international crises.

Based on FEMA's model, the State Department should select a cadre of retired, language-qualified officers who would be available on short notice to assist, in Washington or abroad, during crisis conditions. They should be people who have current security clearances, current passports, and some periodic training.

- **Authority**

The proposals above are not inexpensive, but probably feasible. The real problem, however, is the content. For example, if all of this were in place today, what would the writers and producers be saying about North Korea, or global warming, or Plan Columbia? Does the United States have a persuasive message? An increasing number of media will carry the words of U.S. leaders without the need for a Government-sponsored channel, when and if our leaders have something of consequence to say to foreign publics. Few leaders take the time to do so. Those who have done so effectively include President Reagan when he addressed Europeans directly on the zero-option, and President Clinton when he addressed the Chinese directly over Chinese radio. But, until and unless U.S. policymakers in the White House, the State Department, the Defense Department, and elsewhere are attuned to the need to address international publics in real time, the channels may well be empty of strategic or tactical content.

A critical component of this Task Force's vision is to delegate the authority to make all of this work. First, policymakers must recognize the value in communicating with international publics, strategically and tactically. Second, the leadership of State and DoD must delegate clearly the authority to speak for the administration to responsible officers to avoid the interminable clearance process. The Task Force does not mean an end-run on policy makers, but a clear and fast channel between policymakers and message writers, producers, and packagers. All too often, public diplomacy and public affairs officers have been out of the loop. Although the problems of territoriality cannot be solved completely, it must be understood that the structure the Task Force is proposing will be meaningless without *content* that is timely.

- **Marketing**

The Task Force's Terms of Reference asked it to focus on establishing appropriate "brand identity." Among the several programs it considered are a few brands that are universally recognized, these include the VOA and Fulbright Scholarships, while others with regional or specialized recognition include RFE, Washington File, and WORLDNET. There is, however, no comparable brand identity for the State Department's international Web site.

The need is apparent, but it cannot be fixed quickly or carelessly. Resources for creating and marketing the brand are necessary. It happens that Secretary Powell appreciates the need, as evidenced by his testimony before the House Budget Committee in March 2001: "I am going to bring people into the Public Diplomacy function of the Department who are going to change from just selling us in old USIA ways to really branding foreign policy, branding the department, marketing the department, marketing American values to the world, and not just putting out pamphlets." The Task Force wholeheartedly endorses this approach for branding the State Department's international Web site. If it is not developed as a trusted source throughout the world, it will not serve in times of crisis.

- **Resources**

The current IIP budget will not support the expansion envisioned. The \$40 million budget of IIP should be increased by \$20 million, devoted largely to expanding

- State's international Web site ([www.usinfo.state.gov](http://www.usinfo.state.gov));
- Contract production and distribution of audio, video, and print materials;
- Branding and marketing of the IIP Web site;
- Influence analysis and media usage research; and
- Training and deployment of a reserve corps for deployment in times of crisis.

- **Content Production**

Content for strategic communication should be produced with a combination of in-house expertise plus contract production, particularly for video and audio for which expertise within IIP does not exist. As both timing and sensitivity is critical, contracts will have to be artfully drawn to ensure the responsiveness that is currently available from the IIP staff.

Content for crisis communication requires a delegation of authority to senior public diplomacy officials to ensure their ability to produce and disseminate timely content supportive of administration policy. While recognizing the distinction between private and public statements, the latter are useless unless they are available to international policy makers and publics in real time. Just as field commanders are given authority to act in time of crisis, so must information crisis managers have the same authority.

One of the greatest challenges to any information strategy is to produce high-quality content capable of competing with commercial sources in rich information environments. The primary content means for strategic communication are video, audio, print, and Web-based systems that include all three. Video products are the most costly and time-consuming. They are also highly

effective in environments where television is the medium of choice. Audio is not as expensive or time intensive as video, but audio production requires special equipment, studios, and talent. Print is less costly and time consuming than audio or video production, but requires presses and large volumes of paper and chemicals. The Internet crosses the boundaries of video, audio, and print production and is both product and channel. The cost of transmission on the Internet is exceedingly low. The costs of producing timely, reliable content can be high and will grow as a Web site becomes more attractive as a source of information.

Timeliness and effectiveness correlate directly. To insure that the U.S. Government is responsive in a strategic information campaign, it must utilize both organic and contracted production capabilities. The Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and other U.S. agencies have a variety of content production means organic to their organizations or available for their use. As part of the International Public Information process, it is essential that both the production and the dissemination of information be managed. The different U.S. agencies can function as members of a strategic information task force and share responsibilities for the production and dissemination of information.

#### **6.4 Strengthen DoD's Information Programs**

During peacetime none of the Unified Commands possesses a centralized information dissemination capability for their regions. Rather, the commands rely on activities such as public information programs, visits, exercises, seminars and conferences, and printed products to influence their areas of responsibility.<sup>20</sup> In addition, some commands employ a small Military Information Support Team to shape their regions in favor of U.S. counterdrug policies. Nonetheless, a need exists for the Unified Commands to communicate more effectively with audiences within their respective areas of responsibility. An initial effort should explore working with the embassies to consider mutually supporting information efforts to promote U.S. policy objectives. Possible dissemination means include expanded speaker programs, localized radio and television editorials and infomercials, newsletters, and increased media interviews. Emerging technologies such as satellite FM radio and television broadcasting should also be examined as should expanded use of the Internet to include chat rooms and online interviews to advocate specific policies. DoD public diplomacy activities such as official visits, military exercises, and high-level speeches designed to advocate U.S. policy objectives may best be coordinated by an office specifically tasked to support public diplomacy activities.

During crises the Unified Commands communicate with foreign audiences during crises primarily through personal visits, military spokespersons, news releases, and media briefings. PSYOP address specific foreign audiences directly through airborne and ground-based radio and television broadcasting platforms and broad-area airborne leaflet drops. While effective in areas with limited access to outside media, PSYOP broadcasts lack name recognition (brand identity), credibility, and professionally developed programming. Other than the PSYOP broadcasting platforms and Internet Web sites, the Unified Commands are limited in their ability to effectively communicate with selected foreign audience during crises and hostilities.

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<sup>20</sup> Two of the five commands have a theater-wide magazine that promotes the commands' regional strategy, U.S. military readiness, and the value of combined exercises.

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense enhance DoD's information dissemination capabilities worldwide in support of the regional CINCs' Theater Engagement Plans and in anticipation of crisis response requirements. In addition, the Secretary should make these capabilities available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination. Enhancements include*

- *Expanded use of direct satellite FM radio and TV,*
- *Additional use of regional magazines such as Forum and Dialogue,*
- *Expanding use of regional Internet Web sites; and*
- *Establishment of a public diplomacy office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.*

*To that end, the Task Force recommends that the Unified Commands acquire and maintain regional information dissemination channels and some production capability to support the PCC, embassy dissemination efforts, the Theater Engagement Planning program, and the Overt Peacetime PSYOP Program (OP3).*

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish an International Public Information Committee within DoD under OASD(SO/LIC) to coordinate all DoD open information programs carried out under the authority of the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination. DoD membership should include senior Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, PSYOP and Joint Staff representatives.*

*The Task Force also recommends that the Secretary of Defense implement DoD's draft OASD (SO/LIC) guidelines to*

- *Increase coordination between PSYOP forces and the CINC/JFC staff,*
- *Revitalize the CINCs' Theater Engagement Plans,*
- *Strengthen PYSOP capability to support the U.S. Government's strategic information programs, and*
- *Effectively integrate these programs into the activities of the Policy Coordinating Committee's Secretariat.*

## **6.5 Summary of Recommendations**

### **Recommendation 1**

*The Task Force recommends that the President issue a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on international information dissemination to (1) strengthen the U.S. Government's ability to communicate with foreign audiences and thereby shape understanding of and support for U.S. national security policies, and (2) coordinate public diplomacy, public affairs, and overt international military information. The directive should require all regional and functional National Security Council (NSC) Policy Coordinating Committees to (1) assess the potential impact of foreign public opinion when national security options are considered and (2) recommend or develop strategies for public information dissemination strategies before or in concert with policy implementation.*

### **Recommendation 2**

*The Task Force recommends that the NSPD establish an NSC Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on International Information Dissemination. The committee should be chaired by a*

person of Under Secretary rank designated by the Secretary of State. The chair will be assisted by a deputy designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Members of senior rank should be designated by the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, and Commerce; the Attorney General; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

### **Recommendation 3**

*The Task Force recommends that the NSPD delegate to the Policy Coordinating Committee and its Secretariat adequate authority to coordinate timely public diplomacy, public affairs, and open military information planning and dissemination activities, including the authority to require*

- *Analysis of foreign public opinion and influence structures,*
- *Development of strategic themes and messages for long-term and crisis response communications,*
- *Identify appropriate media channels, and*
- *Produce information products.*

### **Recommendation 4**

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State support the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination through a dedicated and expanded Secretariat in the Department of State consisting of the current interagency working group on international public information augmented by an expanded staff and budget and an executive secretary from the NSC staff. A robust, expanded, and multiagency PCC Secretariat support staff, drawing upon expertise from DOS, DoD, the Joint Staff, 4<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group, CIA, and commercial media and communications entities must be established to facilitate audience research and to develop channels and information products.*

### **Recommendation 5**

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State strengthen the Department of State's International Information Bureau under the leadership of an Assistant Secretary; substantially increase funding for Bureau activities intended to understand and influence foreign publics, with much of the increase for contracted products and services; and make these assets available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of the Policy Coordinating Committee's Secretariat.*

### **Recommendation 6**

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State modernize and diversify the products and services of the Department of State's International Information Bureau to include significantly expanded use of*

- *Internet Web sites, streaming audio and video, and leased emerging satellite TV and FM radio broadcast channels;*
- *American Embassy TV and radio and Washington File print services for both direct distribution and distribution through foreign media channels;*
- *The Foreign Press Center by U.S. policymakers and military leaders to communicate with foreign publics through foreign press and media channels;*

- *Interactive information networks (and the associated databases) containing key foreign audiences and influence structures;*
- *Joint State-DoD training and increased interagency assignments; and*
- *A reserve cadre of retired, language-qualified State and DoD officers available for crisis response deployment.*

#### **Recommendation 7**

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish an International Public Information Committee within DoD under OASD(SO/LIC) to coordinate all DoD open information programs carried out under the authority of the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination. DoD membership should include senior Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, PSYOP and Joint Staff representatives.*

#### **Recommendation 8**

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense implement DoD's draft OASD (SO/LIC) guidelines to*

- *Increase coordination between PSYOP forces and the CINC/JFC staff,*
- *Revitalize the CINCs' Theater Engagement Plans,*
- *Strengthen PYSOP capability to support the U.S. Government's strategic information programs, and*
- *Effectively integrate these programs into the activities of the Policy Coordinating Committee's Secretariat.*

#### **Recommendation 9**

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense enhance DoD's information dissemination capabilities worldwide in support of the regional CINCs' Theater Engagement Plans and in anticipation of crisis response requirements. In addition, the Secretary should make these capabilities available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination. Enhancements include*

- *Expanded use of direct satellite FM radio and TV,*
- *Additional use of regional magazines such as Forum and Dialogue,*
- *Expanding use of regional Internet Web sites; and*
- *Establishment of a public diplomacy office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.*

#### **Recommendation 10**

*The Task Force recommends that the President and his senior national security advisors strengthen U.S. international information dissemination by*

- *Insisting that civilian and military information capabilities be harnessed to the Internet revolution,*
- *Taking full advantage of commercial media production methods, and*
- *Significantly increasing foreign opinion research and studies of foreign media environments and influence structures.*

\* \* \*

This Defense Science Board Task Force has had the unusual advantage of joint sponsorship by the Departments of State and Defense. Our discussions have been lengthy and spirited. We have listened to diplomats, military officers, and U.S. broadcasters who carry out their responsibilities in different organizational cultures using different approaches and methods. The Task Force agreed on the strategic importance of managed information dissemination and the value of sustained interagency coordination.

Most policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders, if asked, will agree that information technologies and mobilized publics have revolutionized national security strategy. But too few act routinely on the consequences of this premise. An NSPD on International Information Dissemination, implemented by a committed Policy Coordinating Committee, supported by an expanded and robust PCC Secretariat and coordinated with expanded capabilities within the DOS International Information Programs, is a modest investment that promises to greatly improve our nation's ability to promote its interests abroad.



*Appendix I: Terms of Reference*



ACQUISITION AND  
TECHNOLOGY

## THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

05 JAN 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference- Defense Science Board Task  
Force on Managed Information Dissemination -  
Follow-On Initiative

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force to determine the need and feasibility of a coordinated information dissemination capability within the United States Government encompassing tactical, operational, and strategic information.

The Department of Defense is traditionally tasked with disseminating information to a foreign populace in a "tactical" context, dropping leaflets, loudspeakers, and "narrow-casting" via radio and television. The recent Defense Science Board Task Force on the Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of PSYOP During Time of Military Conflict determined that the use of newer media like the Internet as well as better ways of exploiting traditional media (e.g. television and radio) were both possible and desirable. It also became clear that this same technology was making the "tactical" distinction obsolete as increased networking provided global reach even to local information providers. Moreover, a signal finding of study was that "channels" and an established "brand identity" must be solidly in place long before the need to project a critical message to a target foreign audience, the implication of which is that peacetime operation is a key to success.

Policy and practice increasingly melds strategic, operational, and tactical treatment of information dissemination. At the Departmental level, JCS doctrine, stressing information superiority, broadens DOD's own focus on peacetime as well as wartime, and the regional CINC's each have their respective peacetime "theater engagement strategies". While it is clear that this capability is essential for winning and keeping the peace and advancing US interests in the 21st Century, the role of the Department of Defense in maintaining this capability on an




ongoing basis is less clear. Therefore, the Task Force should investigate:

- Detailed and actionable recommendations with respect to enabling "channels" and establishing appropriate "brand identity";
- Investigate and comment upon DoD's role in a US strategic information dissemination capability;
- Investigate policy, legal, and economic issues hindering US capabilities;
- Identify new and emerging technologies capable of enhancing US capabilities.

The Task Force should produce a final report by August 2001.

The Study will be co-sponsored by the USD (AT&L), ASD(SO&LIC), and the Department of State. Mr. Vince Vitto will serve as chairman of the Task Force. Mr. Tom Timmes ASD(SO&LIC) and Mr. Bruce Gregory (State) will serve as Executive Secretaries. Commander Brian Hughes will serve as the Defense Science Board Secretariat representative.

The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD Directive 5105.4, the "DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official.



J. S. Gansler

## *Appendix II: Members and Advisors*

### Chairman

Vincent Vitto\*  
*C. S. Draper Laboratory*

### Executive Secretaries

Bruce Gregory  
*Department of State*

Tom Timmes  
*OASD(SO/LIC)*

### Members

Chip Elliott  
*BBN Technologies*

Bran Ferren\*  
*Applied Minds, Inc.*

Barry Fulton  
*George Washington University*

Bill Howard\*

Joe Markowitz\*

Amb. (ret.) Edward Marks

Bob Nesbit\*  
*MITRE Corporation*

Larry Wright  
*Booz, Allen & Hamilton*

### Advisors

LTC Brian Keeth  
*USSOCOM*

William Murray  
*U.S. Government*

### DSB Secretariat/Support

CDR Brian Hughes  
*DSB*

Melinda K. Baran  
*SAIC*

Matt Amitrano  
*SAIC*

\*denotes DSB member

### *Appendix III: Briefings Received*

#### January 18-19, 2001

John Dwyer, DOS  
Paul Goble, RFE/RL  
Joe Johnson, DOS  
Richard Richter, Radio Free Asia  
COL Jack Summe, J 39  
Bruce Sherman, BBG

#### February 1-2, 2001

LTC Steve Collins, USSOCOM  
Brian Conniff, IBB  
Paula Feeney, USAID  
Carl Gershman, NED  
John Rendon, The Rendon Group  
Connie Stephens, IBB  
Tom Timmes, OASD (SO/LIC)  
Sandy Ungar, VOA  
Pete Williams, NBC

#### February 22-23, 2001

Jeff Brown, FPC  
Barry Fulton, GWU  
Col Rick Machamer, FPC  
Brian McKeon, CFR, United States Senate  
COL John Mills, PACOM  
Alberto Mora, BBG

#### April 11-12, 2001

Barry Appelman, AOL-Time Warner  
Bob Coonrod, CPB  
Craig Fields  
Mike Furlong, SAIC  
Tatiana Gau, AOL-Time Warner  
Jamie Metzl, CEIP  
Walter Roberts  
Tony Rowlands, FCO

#### May 21-22, 2001

GEN (ret.) Wesley Clark  
Joe Johnson, DOS

*Appendix IV: October 1999 PSYOP Terms of Reference*



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

27 October 1999

DEFENSE SCIENCE  
BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference--Defense Science Board Task Force on the Creation and Dissemination of all Forms of Information in Support of PSYOPS in Time of Military Conflict

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on all forms of information creation and dissemination in support of PSYOPS in times of military conflict. The Task Force is to support the Congressional directive for the Secretary of Defense to examine the creation and dissemination of all forms of information and the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States Armed Forces in this area to deal with situations such as the conflict in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In support of this Congressional direction, the Task Force should:

1. Assess the capabilities of the United States Armed Forces to develop programming and to broadcast factual information that can reach a large segment of the general public in a country like the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
2. Assess the potential of various airborne or land-based mechanisms to have the capabilities described above, including but not limited to desirable improvements to the EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft, and the utilization of other airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, and land-based transmitters in conjunction with satellites;
3. Assess other issues relating to the creation and dissemination of all forms of information in time of conflict, to include satellite broadcasts and the utilization of emerging mobile communication technologies;


The Task Force should provide a progress report by February 1, 2000 to the DoD so that the Secretary of Defense can provide his assessment and recommendations to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2000.

The Task Force will be co-sponsored by the Under Secretary

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Low-Intensity Conflict. Mr. Vince Vitto will serve as Chairman of the Task Force. COL Fred Gilbert will serve as Executive Secretary; and CDR Brian Hughes, USN will serve as the DSB Secretariat Representative.

The Task Force shall have access to classified information needed to develop its assessment and recommendations.

The Task Force will be operated in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD Directive 5105.4, "The DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of Section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official.



Jacques S. Gansler



## ***Appendix V: October 1999 PSYOP Task Force Membership***

### **Chairman**

Vincent Vitto\*  
*C.S. Draper Laboratories*

### **Executive Secretary**

Col Fred Gilbert  
*OASD [SOLIC] PRNA*

### **Members**

Jim Babcock  
*MITRE*

Denis Bovin\*  
*Bear Sterns & Co., Inc*

Ruth David\*  
*ANSER*

Chip Elliott  
*BBN Technologies*

Bran Ferren  
*Walt Disney Imagineering*

Bert Fowler  
*C.A. Fowler Assoc.*

Charlie Hawkins

Peter Marino\*

Joe Markowitz

Greg Poe  
*Logos Technologies*

Frank Stech  
*Mitretek Corp.*

Larry Wright  
*Booz, Allen, & Hamilton*

### **Advisors**

LTC Steve Collins  
*USSOCOM*

COL Lawrence D. Dietz  
*351<sup>st</sup> Civil Affairs Command*

CDR Jeffrey Stratton  
*USN*

### **Support Staff**

CDR Brian Hughes  
*DSB Office*

Melinda K. Baran  
*SAIC*

\* Denotes DSB Member

## ***Appendix VI: Recommendations from May 2000 PSYOP DSB Study***

### **Recommendation 1**

*The Task Force recommends that DoD create a military PSYOP planning staff, under the coordination authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD(SO/LIC)). This staff should ensure the integration of operational and tactical level PSYOP with strategic International Public Information (IPI) initiatives and provide planning support for strategic PSYOP activities, as described in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68.*

### **Recommendation 2**

*The Task Force recommends that rank structure and career paths within PSYOP forces should be reassessed and more specifically:*

- *the senior PSYOP Advisor to the geographical CINCs should be an O-6 or equivalent civilian and should be assigned to the CINC Special Staff, and*
- *the Commander of the Joint PSYOP Task Force supporting the Joint Task Force Commander in theater (typically a three-star flag officer) should also be an O-6.*

### **Recommendation 3**

*The Task Force recommends that the Office of OASD(SO/LIC) and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) strive to improve overall product quality through increased reliance on commercial providers for high-quality products. Furthermore, the Task Force recommends that the PSYOP force be adequately resourced and trained to engage a stable of commercial media content providers who can deliver these quality products. The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately \$10 million per year.*

### **Recommendation 4**

*The Task Force recommends that the Defense Intelligence Agency be tasked by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD C3I) to establish a psychological warfare intelligence element. ASD C3I should be charged to either (a) provide resources to the PSYOP community to implement a robust organic program of open source acquisition, or (b) task the Intelligence Community to fulfill the need for on-the-shelf, worldwide basic information, including the media and cultural background information necessary to adequately inform PSYOP products in a given country. The Task Force believes that this can be accomplished without incurring an additional budgetary burden.*

### **Recommendation 5**

*The Task Force recommends that ASD C3I make National Foreign Intel Program/Joint Military Intel Program (NFIP/JMIP) funds available to USSOCOM for the express purpose of acquiring available data sets, particularly for countries outside North America and Europe. The Task Force also recommends that USSOCOM work with the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) to ensure the integration of these data sets with the World Basic Information Library (WBIL) and their community-wide accessibility. Moreover, the Intelligence Community should be further tasked through ASD C3I to develop methods and sources to obtain media use demographic information where it is not now available but where the U.S. might plausibly have future*

*national security interests in which PSYOP might be employed. The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately \$5 million per year.*

#### **Recommendation 6**

*The Task Force recommends that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) work with the Department of State to fund, position, exercise, and maintain suitable distribution channels and brand identities, insofar as these can be reasonably anticipated for future PSYOP requirements. Policies with respect to the use of new and emerging transnational media need to be developed or refined. Liberal reliance on recognized professionals and the generous use of highly qualified commercial entities are highly recommended. Buying good content on which the messages will "ride" is a necessary and desirable expenditure. The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately \$10 million per year.*

#### **Recommendation 7**

*The Task Force recommends that DoD acquire the technical capability to understand emerging media dissemination techniques and technologies. Furthermore, DoD should provide the resources to acquire (rent or purchase) emerging media content and dissemination channels from commercial organizations. Here, DoD may be able to acquire good channels very cheaply by means of being an "anchor tenant." The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately \$10 million per year.*

#### **Recommendation 8**

*The Task Force recommends that DoD maintain the current EC-130E Commando Solo fleet with existing Special Mission Equipment (SME). The estimated cost of \$250 million to cross-deck the SME to a EC-130J platform is not justified by the marginal increase in performance offered by this option. In addition, future worldwide media dissemination trends will limit the effectiveness of radio and TV broadcasts. The Task Force recommends that USSOCOM investigate the creation of small and easily reconfigurable information-dissemination packages that would be compatible with multiple platforms, including UAVs and leased aircraft, for a variety of missions. The Task Force estimates the initial investment for design and development of these packages to be \$10 to \$20 million per year.*

#### **Recommendation 9**

*The Task Force has recommended annual funding increases (in recommendations 1 through 8) of approximately \$50 million per year. The Task Force believes that this increase would be readily supported by reprogramming the \$250 million that would be required to fund cross-decking the existing Commando Solo SME to the EC-130J platforms.*

The prompt and effective use of PSYOP in military operations can avert crises, end wars, and save lives. DoD should prioritize Psychological Operations appropriately, because the misuse of PSYOP can cause untold damage to military operations. A relatively small investment over time can reap huge rewards for the United States and its allies, both diplomatically and militarily.

## *Appendix VII: Acronym List*

3PD	PSYOP, Propaganda, Public Diplomacy
ADSL	Advanced Digital Subscriber Line
AOL	America On-Line
BBG	Broadcasting Board of Governors
CBS	Columbia Broadcasting System
CEIP	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
CFR	Committee on Foreign Relations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	Cable News Network
COI	Coordinator of Information
CINC	Commander In Chief
CPB	Corporation for Public Broadcasting
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DoD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DVC	Digital Video Conference
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign Commonwealth Office
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FIS	Foreign Information Service
FPC	Foreign Press Center
FY	Fiscal Year
GWU	George Washington University
IAWG	Interagency Working Group
IBB	International Broadcasting Bureau
ICG	IPI Core Group
IIP	International Information Program
IMI	International Military Information
IO	Information Operations
IPI	International Public Information
IRC	Information Research Center
JFC	Joint Forces Command
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Association
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBA	National Basketball Association
NBC	National Broadcasting Company
NC	North Carolina
NDU	National Defense University
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NFL	National Football League
NIC	National Intelligence Community
NIS	Newly Independent State
NSC	National Security Council
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive

NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary Defense
OP3	Overt Peacetime PSYOP Program
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OWI	Office of War Information
PA	Public Affairs
PACOM	Pacific Command
PCC	Policy Coordinating Committee
PCG	Peacekeeping Core Group
PD	Public Diplomacy
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
RFA	Radio Free Asia
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
SIS	Strategic Information Support
SISC	Strategic Information Support Center
SO/LIC	Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict
TEP	Theater Engagement Plan
TOR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIA	United States Information Agency
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
VOA	Voice of America
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

## ***Appendix VIII: References***

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Fulton, Barry, ed. *Diplomacy in the Information Age, The Magazine of Information Impacts*. July 2001 ed., The Center for Information Strategy and Policy: Science Applications International Corporation, 2001.

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*Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*, by Richard Burt and Olin Robison, Co-Chairmen. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October, 1998.

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*State Department Reform: Report of an Independent Task Force Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies*, by Frank C. Carlucci, Chairman. Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001.